The Future of Russia: The Relationship Between External and Internal Change

In a recent statement, the Russian oppositionist, Vladimir Kara-Murza, said that “the only thing that will bring peace and security to Ukraine is political change in Russia.” My view is the opposite. The greatest influence on Russia’s future will be the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

Lecture to the National Academy of the SBU

Let me present four scenarios. But before doing so, let me note that none of them holds great promise for the emergence of a stable, liberal (or even quasi-liberal) democratic order in Russia.

In the west, most people equate liberal democracy with normality. It isn’t. It is a political order, a system of values and a political culture that emerged from a specific historical experience. What is Russia’s political culture? What is its historical experience? The political culture of Muscovy was rooted in absolutism and patrimonialism: strict subordination to an authority limited neither by countervailing power centres nor by law. The principles of individual liberty, property rights, and judicial autonomy never struck deep roots in Russia, let alone triumphed, and their brief periods of ascendancy have been tarnished by compromises with illiberal political forces and by failure.

Let us make the heroic assumption that the Russian oppositionists who today call themselves agents of change genuinely embody liberal, libertarian, and democratic values. Let us make the equally heroic assumption that they will succeed in coming to power in the post-Putin order if—and this is a third heroic assumption—Putinism does not outlast Putin. And let us make the final heroic assumptions: that these values are embraced by the citizens of Russia and deliver positive, tangible results. In the 1990s, we merrily made the last two assumptions, and we were wrong. And so, we ended up with Vladimir Putin, who represented the revenge of the patrimonial system and the revival of Muscovy.

By the same token, one must ask, how does one separate Russia from its imperial inheritance? When in Russian history has the distinction between state, nation, and empire been clearly drawn? The expression, “Russian democracy ends where the question of Ukraine begins,” did not originate in Ukraine. It originated in Russia. In his address to the US Congress in 1992, Boris Yeltsin declared that “the imperial era in Russian history has ended.” Then, he went on to describe the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a post-imperial undertaking. During the Belovezhskaya summit that established the CIS, Yeltsin warned Leonid Kravchuk that if Ukraine did not sign the new treaty, Ukraine and Russia would be on “opposite sides of a barricade.” Have today’s Russian ‘democrats’ (any more than the ‘democrats’ of the 1990s) repudiated this way of thinking? To those who say the collapse of Putinism will produce a democratic Russia, we should ask: Why will you succeed today when you failed in the past? Let me now propose four scenarios.

Scenario 1: A Victorious Ukraine

What is our definition of victory? Western governments, even experts, have been notoriously reluctant to confront this question. So, I will propose the following definition. Ukraine will be victorious when all parties—Ukraine itself, its western partners, and most critically the state and military leadership of Russia—recognise that Russia can no longer achieve its political objectives in Ukraine by means of war. This is a modest and minimalistdefinition of victory. It says nothing about whether regime change occurs first or at all. It says nothing about whether order is preserved—in Russia’s armed forces, in its systems of command-and-control or in the country itself. It says nothing about whether Russia will pursue its aims by other means.

Ukraine will be victorious when all parties recognise that Russia can no longer achieve its political objectives in Ukraine by means of war.

But even if Ukraine secures and maintains a decisive military advantage, Russia will not agree to be defeated. Ukraine will only be victorious when the combat power of the Russian Armed Forces is broken. And if it is broken, it will not be possible to disguise this from anybody. The consequences are unlikely to be gentle. The Prigozhin mutiny of 2023 is instructive. It arose because Prigozhin and his backers—including some senior military figures—perceived that the military and state leadership were leading the army and the country to disaster. Russian armies do not rebel against victory. They do not rebel merely because of slaughter in their own ranks, even when the scale of that slaughter reaches 1 500 soldiers a month. They only rebel when they realise that their sacrifices have been in vain, when they see that the state and military leadership are incapable of prosecuting the war and defending the state.

If Ukraine is victorious in these terms, the consequence will likely be disorder in Russia and its army as well. Whether that means a rebellion, a mutiny, a putch, or merely putchists is a separate question. In these conditions, a change of leadership, carried out from above—by those who wish to preserve the state, possibly aided and abetted by those who wish to preserve much of the regime itself—is far from implausible. If we can accept all of these ‘ifs’, it stands to reason that the overarching preoccupation of the successor leadership, even one that is merely cosmetic and technical, will be to stave off a time of troubles (смутные времена) at home. To this end, their first priority is likely to be termination of the war as swiftly as possible, by agreement with the west first and foremost, and then proceed to an orderly withdrawal of forces, at least to the 24 February 2022 demarcation line. From this baseline, we can also envisage a set of negotiations about the future of the territories occupied after 2014. This is the most hopeful of Ukrainian victory scenarios.

Perhaps it is too hopeful. It is full of ‘ifs’. The consequences of a Ukrainian victory are likely to be more disordered and indeterminate than these. In fact, such consequences would probably precede the victory as well as follow it. Смутные времена might well begin before it is anticipated, and it might engulf many levels of power. Even if the army collapses, it is all too hopeful to assume that the present leadership, Putin and his immediate entourage, will just agree to be moved aside, that they will not be able to mobilise powerful allies and forces in their defence. It probably is also too hopeful to expect that all elements of the army will cease fighting in Ukraine after they are defeated, even if a successor leadership instructs them to withdraw from the territory they still occupy. Acts of resistance, even insurgencies, are possible, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be left in the unenviable position of liquidating the insurgents and removing them by force of arms. Under even the most hopeful victory scenario, there will be large numbers of aggrieved and embittered Russian servicemen returning home with weapons and knowledge of how to use them.

It probably is also too hopeful to expect that all elements of the army will cease fighting in Ukraine after they are defeated, even if a successor leadership instructs them to withdraw from the territory they still occupy

These are amongst the reasons why, since 2022, several western governments have feared Russia’s defeat almost as much as Ukraine’s defeat. But just how does смутные времена in Russia translate into a threat to western security? When has Russia sought to rescue itself from internal turmoil by launching a war against external powers? When has it ever launched a war against more powerful opponents? It is not easy to find such occurrences in Russia’s history.

Russia’s defeat in Ukraine will have other reverberations. State power is likely to be contested; other power relations, political and economic, are likely to be disrupted, and an end state is unlikely to be visible for quite some time. But смутные времена is also likely to have limits. Even the dissolution of the state in 1991–92 left the core elements of the national security system intact: the command and control of nuclear forces (and the orderly dismantling of these forces in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), the integrity of the General Staff and its operational culture and the operational culture of what until 1992 was the KGB.

With all of these uncertainties, a Russian defeat is preferable to any alternative. For Russia itself, it is the prerequisite to changing the political system, for good or ill. It is also the one scenario that might provide an opening for democratic forces.

Scenario 2: Negotiated Settlement

In the mainstream western view, all wars end in negotiation, and the agreement to negotiate is an agreement to compromise. But these propositions are false as often as they are true. In the Russian view, which remains a Leninist view, negotiation is a form of struggle—or as Lenin put it at the time of Brest-Litovsk, “a continuation of the war in a different sphere.”

With respect to the present war, it is likely that Russia will agree to negotiation in only two eventualities: when it is on the verge of political victory or military defeat. Experience suggests —as we saw in the Minsk process—that it will be determined to negotiate ‘on its basis’, on the basis of its specific agenda and only after a number of preconditions are accepted. Thus, Russia will seek to bundle its terms for a final settlement in its agreement to negotiate in the first place. This will be true for a cease-fire as well. If Ukraine and its western partners seek negotiation on some other basis, they will have to create this basis by the application of power. Putin will only enter negotiation from a position of weakness if he believes that the consequences of not doing so will be worse.

Russia will seek to bundle its terms for a final settlement in its agreement to negotiate in the first place

For his part, President Zelensky has expressed only one precondition for negotiation: a properly executed and enforceable ceasefire. It is possible that Ukraine will be persuaded by its supposed partners to abandon this condition and accept some Russian conditions as well. But that possibility falls outside the rubric of this discussion.

What do all of these considerations amount to in practice? Unless the “root causes” of the war—beginning with Ukraine’s constitutional arrangements—are addressed in a negotiation, Russia is most unlikely to consent to one. Wisely or not, Putin has made the return of Ukraine to the Russian world an existential cause and a pillar of his own legitimacy. The mere “swapping of territory” (in Trump’s casual phrase) will not satisfy him. To repeat what I wrote in 2015: “Putin is determined to resubordinate Ukraine or destroy it.”

Two conclusions. If negotiations are launched on Russia’s basis, Russia will be in a position of advantage from the start. In this case, negotiation will provide a breathing space (передышка) for the reconstitution of military power and command-administrative power as well. It will provide an arena for waging information war against Ukraine and a cloak for conducting grey zone, aka hybrid actions, insidious and brutal ones, inside it. Whereas Russia will reconstitute its power without inhibition, the west might be psychologically constrained from assisting Ukraine to the same end for fear of undermining the negotiation process. Not least importantly, a negotiation on Russia’s basis will freeze political change inside Russia itself.

However, if Russia finds itself on the brink of a conclusive defeat, then it possibly will ‘sue for peace’. Even in this eventuality, it will aim to achieve at the negotiating table what it cannot achieve on the field of battle.

Scenario 3: Russian Victory

Victory will cost Ukraine and the West dear.

First, it will strengthen the current regime. The defeat of Ukraine—its truncation, fragmentation, and enfeeblement—will be presented as the greatest victory of Russian arms over the ‘anti-Russia’ since 1945. “Victory is everything,” as Stalin told Mao in 1950: “victors are not judged.” Very different from Britain in 1945, where victory brought a new political leadership to office that addressed long-deferred social problems. Russian experience leads one to believe that leadership change, not to say regime change, will follow defeat, not victory.

Second, the consequences of victory—military, political, economic, and psychological—will be deep and long-lasting. Russia’s definition of victory in Ukraine is not territorial, it is existential; it entails the destruction of a nation. Therefore, victory will not be an end state. It will be aprocess. Because Ukraine will not agree to die, there will be resistance and insurgencies. And so, there will be provocations and reprisals, repressions, purges, and deportations. In the Baltic states, the most massive deportations occurred in 1949, five years after they were reoccupied and four years after Germany was defeated. For all of these reasons, the possibility of a Marshall Plan in Ukraine is far-fetched. The only economic investors Ukraine is likely to attract in these conditions will be predators and speculators.

Russia’s definition of victory in Ukraine is not territorial, it is existential

Third, Europe will be afraid. Some countries will respond to this fear by consolidation and rearmament. In others, the ‘adults in the room’ will return to their former prominence and seek grand bargains and normalisation. In yet another group of countries, collaborationist, aka Vichyite, instincts will be given full rein.

At some point, even under these conditions, the feet of clay under the Russian colossus might give way, but this is far from certain, and it is unlikely to happen swiftly, if it happens at all.

Scenario 4: Endless War

Although Ukraine’s victory (Scenario 1) is ultimately attainable, for the indefinite future, endless war represents the best provisional evil that can be realised. Pursued as a proactive strategy, it offers the most realistic route to ultimate victory.

Although Ukraine’s victory is ultimately attainable, for the indefinite future, endless war represents the best provisional evil that can be realised

Former Defence Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk has provided the essential formulation of this strategy, which must constitute the foundation of Ukraine’s operational planning as well as the overall strategic direction of the war. In his words:

Ukraine and its allies must plan to build a viable, sovereign, and secure state under constant military pressure. This reality demands a redefinition of what a successful outcome looks like. In this context, the objective should not be to defeat Russia outright or expect its regime to end the war because of economic or diplomatic pressure but to systematically deny it the ability to achieve its military goals.[1]

This will demand a holistic, all-of-government effort. The means to this end must be asymmetrical, dynamic, ingenious, and persistent. In several significant respects, this strategy has become a de facto reality, and it already has produced militarily significant results.

1. Maritime: Control of Ukraine’s maritime access was a central Russian strategic objective from the outset in February 2022. Yet by the end of 2023, asymmetrical means foiled Russian expectations, despite the facts that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet remains in being and Ukraine possesses no substantial naval forces of its own.
2. Air: Whilst the air domain remains the most dangerous for Ukraine—enormously costly to its strategic infrastructure and civilian population—Ukraine has denied Russia conclusive air superiority, not to say air supremacy. Had it been otherwise—had Russia, for example, been able to exercise strategic dominance and conduct close air support—the state as well as the army might have been mortally threatened. To this day, however, Ukraine has been able to maintain operational connectivity across all significant domains: governance, military, and civil.
3. Land: Russia’s gruesome ground war has yet to transform tactical gains into operationally significant results, and despite the critical assistance of China, Iran, and the DPRK, the Kremlin shows little prospect of realising its strategic objectives. According to the calculations of the American expert, Phillips O’Brien, Russian ground forces over the past eighteen months have advanced at one-third the pace of a snail and at withering cost.
4. Informational: Despite the fact that they remain intensive and continuous, Russia’s efforts to fragment and demoralise Ukrainian society have been a conspicuous failure. Although there have been lapses and deficiencies in western support, with isolated exceptions (notably nuclear signalling), Russia’s information efforts have had only a marginal effect on the cohesion of its partners and their commitment to support Ukraine, which by any measurable metric considerably exceeds the effort envisaged in 2022. Despite the ruptures and discontinuities of Trump’s presidency, Russia’s efforts to influence US policy cannot be judged a manifest success.

Enlightened Realism

Realism and sobriety demand recognition that Ukraine’s dependency on the support of its partners and the inherent fragility of this support render these gains potentially reversible. The fact is that many of those who matter in the west continue to project their own scheme of rationality (and cost-benefit analysis) onto Russian thinking. To this date, an insufficient number of critical players understand the ideological and existential basis of Russia’s aims, and for this reason, its adaptability and tenacity have come as a surprise to many. For the Trump administration, endless war is incomprehensible and prima facie unacceptable. As the Kremlin realises, should Ukraine suffer major reverses in the military domain—or even the appearance thereof—the results could compromise the integrity of other domains and test Ukraine’s own cohesion beyond realistic limits. Of all the significant variables, the national cohesion of Ukraine remains the most important of them all.

Realism and sobriety demand recognition that Ukraine’s dependency on the support of its partners and the inherent fragility of this support render these gains potentially reversible.

The most practical obstacle to waging endless war is the lack of understanding on the part of those who must underwrite it. In the western tradition, war and peace are antithetical states, and war is followed by peace. In the Leninist tradition, war and peace are complementary enterprises. Ukraine is the legatee of this tradition as much as Russia. For endless war to accomplish Ukraine’s aims, it must become a coherent and well-articulated strategy, supported by partners who have never suffered the dubious benefit of residing in Russia’s ‘historical zone of influence’. It falls on better-informed Allies, alongside Ukraine, to instil their collective wisdom amongst the leading western powers. It is essential that these powers perceive their experience as a resource rather than a hindrance. This too must be a dimension of Ukraine’s strategy, every bit as important as waging war against Russia. In this domain, we are still far from success.

[1] Andriy Zagorodnyuk, ‘Ukraine’s New Theory of Victory Should be Strategic Neutralization’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 June 2025

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).