Roughly 70 percent of Swiss voters rejected a proposed initiative that would have defined neutrality more strictly, limited Switzerland’s ability to impose sanctions without a UN mandate, and restricted military cooperation with partner countries and alliances on 27 September. The result was decisive, but it did not amount to a rejection of neutrality itself. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has forced Switzerland to confront fundamental questions about its future stance.
The defeat of the neutrality initiative preserves room to manoeuvre in Swiss security policy. The Federal Council (Bundesrat) can continue to decide whether to adopt EU sanctions against Russia and how closely to work with European partners. Switzerland is not obliged to follow the EU or join an alliance. But the vote leaves the central question unanswered: how will Switzerland use that freedom? Invoking neutrality when the European security order is under threat is a political choice, not an automatic doctrinal consequence.
History Without Myth
Swiss neutrality is often portrayed as an unshakeable part of the country’s identity. Its history is more complicated. After the Napoleonic Wars, the European powers recognised Switzerland’s permanent neutrality in 1815. That suited Switzerland, but it also served the interests of Europe’s great powers. An independent, neutral Switzerland was preferable to one controlled by a rival power. In this sense, neutrality was not entirely a sovereign choice but also a product of great-power politics.
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 likewise do not require neutral states to become politically indifferent. They set out rights and obligations during wartime, including rules concerning foreign troop movements, war materiel, and the use of neutral territory. Military non-participation does not, by itself, require political silence.
Neutrality was not entirely a sovereign choice but also a product of great-power politics.
Switzerland’s conduct during the Cold War also complicates the idea of neutrality. Under pressure from the United States, it restricted exports of strategic goods to Eastern Bloc countries under the informal 1951 Hotz–Linder Agreement, partly aligning itself with western export controls. That did not end Swiss neutrality; it showed that Switzerland made choices shaped by its security interests. To describe Swiss neutrality today as an unbroken tradition of political equidistance is to mistake a national narrative for historical practice. The question is not whether neutrality has ever been free of politics but rather which interests and which European order Switzerland intends to protect through its neutrality today.
Neutrality in an Insecure Europe
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine makes those choices urgent. More is at stake than the borders of one country. Small states in particular depend on the understanding that borders will not be changed by force. Switzerland does not need to enter the war to have an interest in defending that principle. It has already adopted EU sanctions against Russia and supported Ukraine with humanitarian aid, mine clearance, and reconstruction. Those measures need not be seen as a departure from neutrality. They reflect the understanding that not fighting in a war is distinct from remaining politically passive in the face of an aggressive war of expansion.
The consequences of the war also extend beyond Ukraine. The Federal Council has publicly recognised Russia as a major threat to European security and warned of cyberattacks, espionage, and disinformation campaigns affecting Switzerland. Such threats do not respect declarations of neutrality. Cyber defence, intelligence-sharing, and the protection of critical infrastructure require cross-border cooperation. Switzerland does not have to adopt every EU decision or abandon its non-alignment. Even so, it cannot assume that it can guarantee its security on its own while its neighbours shoulder the burden of defending a European security environment from which it benefits.
Switzerland cannot assume that it can guarantee its security on its own while its neighbours shoulder the burden of defending a European security environment from which it benefits.
That is the test of neutrality today. The vote preserved Switzerland’s ability to choose its course, but it did not settle what that course should look like. A credible policy would maintain military non-participation without treating it as a reason to withdraw from European security cooperation or turn away from Ukraine.
The question is already visible in Swiss public opinion. In ETH Zurich’s Security 2026 study, only 38% of respondents expressed confidence that Switzerland could defend itself on its own, while 56% supported closer cooperation with NATO countries. Support for neutrality remained high at 85%, though it has fallen from 97% in 2022. These survey responses are not a vote to join an Alliance. They do, however, suggest that support for neutrality can coexist with doubts about Switzerland’s ability to secure itself alone.
The Next Test
On 29 November, voters will face a more concrete version of this dilemma when they decide whether to ease restrictions on the export and transfer of war materiel. The proposed changes would make cooperation with selected partners easier but would not permit direct Swiss arms exports to Ukraine. The vote will not resolve every question about neutrality. It will show, once again, that Switzerland cannot avoid making choices about how to provide for its own defence, support its partners, and assist a European state resisting Russian aggression.
Whatever voters decide in November, the question exposed by September’s result will remain: Will Switzerland use neutrality to help protect the European security order on which it depends, or will it treat neutrality as a reason to stand apart from it?
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).