Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 tested the functioning of both Ukraine’s state apparatus and its entire society. During the period 2022-24, the relationships between civilian society, the political elite, and the military have reflected two distinct phases of the war.
The first phase occurred during 2022 when Ukrainians were engaged an existential struggle for their nation and was marked by a surge in civic consciousness, a high level of self-organisation, and a constructive relationship between the military, elite, and civil society. From early 2023, however, the war became ‘routinised’. This second phase has been characterised by war fatigue, habituation to war as the new normal, and a division in society between those who are included in the war’s infrastructure and those who mainly focus on their own lives.
In the third brief of the series, Mykola Nazarov writes that the consequent changes in trust in the political and military leadership have significantly complicated cooperation between these parts of Ukrainian society. He concludes that overcoming cleavages in society is essential in building the resilience necessary to resist an aggressor and that the consolidation of power as a response to the challenge of external aggression is to be expected, but it is not the optimal management solution. Political plurality, freedom of speech and the ability of the opposition to criticise the authorities without pressure and propose better solutions are necessary for effective governance in wartime. Also, civil-military relations need to be distanced from personalities and based on a robust culture and a framework of inter-institutional cooperation. The Ukrainian system of power has become hyper-personalised, which negatively affects its effectiveness.
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