A short answer to the question of whether Putin’s foreign policy, starting from the year 2000, has been effective is “no”. Without a full-scale war against neighbouring Ukraine, Russia’s regional and strategic goals would be unachievable. Despite all its effort—diplomatic and economic, hidden and transparent, broad and targeted, etc.—Moscow eventually had to employ weapons, ultima ratio regum: “the last argument of kings,” as was once written on French cannons.
However, this short answer overlooks the details and may lead to complacency in the countries which have, or should have, an interest in opposing the Kremlin’s course of action. It sounds akin to the dismissive conclusions drawn by those (not always competent) commentators who, in 2022 after Ukraine had withstood Russia’s first onslaught, maintained that Russia had exhausted its war-fighting capabilities and that Ukraine’s victory was around the corner. As a result, western policies were strongly impacted by wishful thinking.
What is needed instead is a realistic analysis focusing on what Russia has achieved compared with its goals, on the capabilities it still has at its disposal, and on its strong and weak points. The key task is to understand how Moscow can adapt its policies in the evolving circumstances. This article is one attempt to apply this approach.
The Kremlin’s Objectives
The Kremlin’s strategic aims are not difficult to identify. They have been either publicly stated by the Russian leadership or can be reconstructed from the public discussion.
The overarching goal for Moscow—and, seemingly, a personal messianic endeavour of Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin—is revising the outcome of the Cold War. The west should be persuaded to admit, in words and in practice, that Russia is still a great power, equal in status to the US and China. This explains why, despite the declared “turn to Asia,” Russian foreign policy has remained west-centric. Great power status would mean, first and foremost, a right of veto on fundamental issues of European security, especially NATO and EU enlargement. A second pillar of great power status would be a recognition of Russia’s entitlement to dominate in the post-Soviet space.
Another set of strategic objectives deals with remaking Russia as a global power. This need not necessarily involve western consent. In some cases, Moscow may find itself in conflict with the west, but in others, it will not—simply because the west is abandoning many interests around the globe. Arguably, in this context, Russia’s partnership with China has a value in itself and is not simply a function of the Russian-western relationship, although, naturally, Russia’s conflict with the west is one of the drivers that accelerates Moscow’s rapprochement with Beijing. In addition, Russia is interested in being a balancer in the Middle East, a player in managing existing tensions between—especially—Asian countries, and an advocate of the so-called global south in its dealings with the “colonial” west.
Charm, Bribery, Coercion
The agenda is thus very ambitious. A question which inevitably arises is whether Russia has the resources to pursue its goals. An answer frequently heard is that Russia’s economy is much smaller than those of the US, the EU, or China and that its efforts will, therefore, be futile.
The reality, again, is more complex. To start with, in the world of diplomacy, Russia is not a lightweight. Moscow has inherited many positions that once belonged to the Soviet Union, such as the permanent seat on the UN Security Council, prime status in nuclear arms control domain, and pockets of influence in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Russia’s diplomatic approach is very skilful. Its tenacity and ability to negotiate without compromise, rejecting win-win outcomes, are well known.
Colossal natural resources enable the Kremlin to accumulate economic leverage. It can offer lucrative projects to foreign companies and individuals, converting them into Russia’s lobbyists. As Moscow will not open the country for fair competition, preferring instead to hand pick favourites, some business actors may choose to do the Kremlin “favours” in the hope of future rewards. Supporting political parties and movements to promote issues important for Moscow is another way of gaining influence abroad. Money can also be spent on media campaigns, partly compensating for Russia’s lack of classical soft power. Arguably, buying loyalty is Putin’s preferred tactic internationally.
But when support cannot be purchased, Moscow does not hesitate to turn to coercion. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the west had paid too little attention to Moscow’s readiness to weaponise dependencies on Russia, wherever they were to be found. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut gas deliveries to Ukraine, impacting several EU countries. In 2015, on the Finnish-Russian border, and since 2021, on the EU-Belarus border, Moscow has demonstrated that an inflow of migrants can be turned into an instrument of pressure. Furthermore, in 2008, Russia used military power against Georgia and in 2014, sent troops to annex Crimea. None of these developments, unfortunately, caused enough concern in the west. Germany’s case was particularly telling. Instead of hedging against its energy dependence on Russia, Berlin doubled down by constructing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
The nature of Russia’s regime allows it to deploy levers effectively. As in most authoritarian personalist systems, decision-making in the Kremlin can be fast and unopposed, while the lack of free elections increases Vladimir Putin’s manoeuvring space. His mistakes may later cost the country dearly, but in the moment, the system facilitates the concentration of resources and persuades him that time is on his side.
Europe As a Weak Link
From 2006 to 2022, Europe tried to accommodate Russia’s demands. Until the annexation of Crimea, the EU treated Russia as a “strategic partner.” At the Bucharest summit in 2008, the position of several European leaders prevented NATO from providing any details as to when and how Ukraine and Georgia could become members of the Alliance. Severing the relationship with Russia after its war against Georgia the same year quickly gave way to “business as usual.” In 2015, the leaders of Germany and France apparently helped Putin impose the so-called Minsk 2 Agreements upon Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko, which was most beneficial for Ukraine’s breakaway entities.
In the broader context, the Kremlin registered 1) Europe’s energy dependence, 2) the lack of unity in the EU’s approach towards Russia, 3) “Ukraine fatigue” in many EU member states, 4) the rise of challenges for the EU around the globe, illegal migration being one of them, 5) the discomfort in Europe with regards to a Russia-China partnership, 6) corruptible elites, 7) the rise of populism and societal infantilism, 8) pacifism and the denial of a role for military power in today’s Europe.
It was only a matter of time before Moscow would persuade itself that such a Europe would continually make concessions, if sufficiently pressured, in order to avoid clashes with Russia—around Ukraine and more broadly.
The Kremlin’s Miscalculations
However, the results of Russia’s policy—even before the annexation of Crimea—demonstrate that Moscow’s calculus was a mistake.
Crucially, Ukraine has proven to be motivated to defend itself and extremely resilient, largely thanks to assistance from western countries.
Europe has gradually come to realise how overwhelming the challenge it faces in Ukraine is, while the re-election of Donald Trump has made old European approaches to continental security untenable. Even if the probability that Europe will not rise to the task is, unfortunately, not zero, the awareness that inaction will cost dearly is now at the highest level in decades.
Finland and Sweden joined NATO, attesting to the fact that Russia is further away today from having veto power on issues of European security than it had been before 2022.
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia were granted the EU membership perspective. The mental map of many Europeans in which Europe and the post-Soviet space belonged to two different universes became history. It is worth remembering that Russia’s annexation of Crimea stemmed directly from Putin’s wish to prevent the signing of a free trade agreement between Ukraine and the EU: opening the EU membership perspective for the trio is thus a very big blow for Moscow. Although NATO accession for Ukraine is not on the practical agenda, the search continues for a format in which western security guarantees can be provided.
In the post-Soviet space, Russia’s clout is eroding. The Eurasian Economic Union is stagnating; without Ukraine, it makes little economic sense. Azerbaijan is performing a balancing act and building an alliance with Türkiye, challenging Russia’s positions in the South Caucasus. Armenia has suspended its participation in the Russia-led CSTO. Instead, Yerevan is seeking ways to strengthen its relations with the EU and even eyeing EU membership. Kazakhstan is conducting a multi-vector foreign policy. All five Central Asian states seem to have understood the imperative of regional security cooperation without Russia and have been developing ties with the EU. The only post-Soviet country that Russia controls fully is Belarus.
Russia’s dependence on China keeps growing. While the personal rapport between the two leaders is beyond doubt, this is anything but a relationship between two equal partners. Beijing largely complies with the sanctions regime imposed on Russia by the US. The BRICS bloc—which after its enlargement of 2024-25, includes Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, United Arab Emirates and Indonesia—is too heterogeneous to be an effective policy actor. Putin’s decision not to attend the 2023 BRICS summit in South Africa because of the warrant by the International Criminal Court is a powerful illustration of the state of affairs in the organisation.
The 2023 escalation in the Middle East has also become problematic for Russia. First, it is difficult for the Kremlin to stay equidistant from Israel and the Palestinians. Second, Moscow is too deeply involved in a security partnership with Iran, which is not acceptable to some other regional players. And third, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 has further weakened Russia’s position in the region.
Some commentators now place Russia in a format ironically called BRINK, which includes Belarus, Iran, and North Korea. Not to overstate the case, it nevertheless makes sense to point out that the need to rely on such partners can hardly help Russia regain superpower status.
Looking to the Future
The problem, however, is that the picture sketched above is not the end state.
Whatever policy plans Putin may have had before, the re-election of Donald Trump is like a lottery win for him. Trump is unpredictable, but his arrival gives Moscow a much better fighting chance.
Now, Putin can continue the war in Ukraine and pursue policies aimed at raising Russia’s status more generally with greater confidence. He will not admit his fiasco. The more observers say that Russia has failed to reach its goals, the more resources Putin will be ready to throw into the fray. Russia’s capabilities are not unlimited, but they are nowhere near exhaustion.
Moreover, it was often argued in 2022 that Russia had not only lost the war but also the future peace, as western companies would now flee. These expectations did not materialise. The western businesses that stayed in Russia perform relatively well. More importantly, they have not been ostracised at home. If there is a deal between Trump and Putin, more companies will rush to return to Russia. This will not be the old “business as usual,” but business it will still be.
The most important question remains whether Ukraine will obtain reliable security guarantees. If not, and if the west recognises Ukraine’s—and by extension its own—surrender, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia will likely quickly find themselves in the Russian sphere of influence, if not directly annexed. What will happen with Russia’s foreign and security policy after that cannot be forecast with any certainty.
For the time being, Vladimir Putin is still the person who matters most in deciding whether Russian foreign policy is a success and is worth continuing. The task of western policymakers is to change this.
This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).