The perception that the US has turned its back on or is in the process of separating from Europe and continental defence and security is certainly understandable. Naturally, there is a focus on the noise of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric rather than the signal of his policy intentions. While there remains and will remain significant transatlanticism at nearly every level of government, Congress, and across the ecosystem of policy institutions and industry, there is a growing appreciation of the drivers of the president’s policies within these circles. In many ways, the Trump agenda towards NATO is a practical recognition of new realities, and more a long overdue re-balancing of the transatlantic relationship to reflect the administration’s geostrategic worldview and domestic priorities.
Download and read as a PDF: Brief 1. Trump and the Rebalancing of NATO
Trump and NATO
President Trump’s attitude towards NATO is driven largely by two parallel worldviews. First, that the US has subsidised Europe’s standard of living and social welfare states through its own defence spending (while incurring unprecedented levels of national debt ($35.46 trillion)) and receiving relatively little in return.[1] Increasing European defence spending was a priority of his first administration, and of his predecessors, as well.[2] The return on investment, for Trump, is not about shared values or the rules-based international order. Those are intangible concepts that are fundamentally immeasurable, and not evident on a balance sheet.
It is important to note that, in practice, the operations of the US-NATO relationship remain unaffected. Joint exercises continue uninterrupted, air and maritime interdiction missions regularly occur, targeting handovers happen seamlessly, and the military-to-military activities are, thus far, unaffected by the political dynamics between Washington and Brussels—a point NATO officials stressed to me in recent conversations. These relationships are invaluable, especially during a turbulent geostrategic period.
In parallel, the president views the EU as an unfair trade competitor, going so far as to call it a “foe” in 2018.[3] The president’s application of tariffs in April 2025 and his threat in late May to increase tariffs specifically on the EU to 50% are illustrative of his attempt to rebalance the trade relationship.[4] NATO and the EU, while separate entities, are part of the same equation for the administration—America subsidised European defence and security through its contributions to NATO, allowing the EU’s political and economic consolidation, and creating a competitor in the process. This conflation could lead to friction between defence and economic priorities as the US aims to secure increased spending in NATO whilst competing economically with the EU.
The return on investment, for Trump, is not about shared values or the rules-based international order
Neither Trump nor most of his cabinet share the inherent transatlanticism of previous administrations—even in 2003, when transatlantic relations were, perhaps, at their lowest in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush and his cabinet were philosophically and politically committed to Europe and NATO.[5] That this is no longer the case is, in many ways, a more realist reflection of the nature of the relationship between the US and Europe. It has always been transactional in nature, but now this is much more overt.
Second, for the president and his administration, the central international strategic challenge is the Indo-Pacific and the People’s Republic of China (the primary domestic challenge is the security of the southern border). This is the strategic logic behind his administration’s focus on critical minerals and rare earth elements, desire to regain control of critical supply chains, comments on the Panama Canal, and pursuit of Greenland.[6] All are connected to America’s strategic independence, the security of the western hemisphere and to American access to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and the Northern Sea Route (Beijing considers itself a near-Arctic state).[7]
The Trump administration aims to make alliances substantive rather than purely rhetorical
In an era of constrained resources, the US, in the president’s view, cannot afford to continue to subsidise European defence, when the continent can assume greater responsibility itself, while attempting to pivot to Washington’s strategic priority, the Indo-Pacific.
A Vision for America
Understanding President Trump is not just about understanding his worldview but about understanding his vision for the US, both at home and abroad. The two are inextricably linked: focusing on one to the exclusion of the other is to miss the totality of what is driving his administration’s policies.
The Trump administration aims to reset the terms of America’s engagement with the world and make alliances substantive rather than purely rhetorical. It is looking to establish greater trade parity and build greater economic independence in key supply chains, while reducing the country’s exposure to strategic adversaries. It seeks to avoid foreign wars, maintaining ‘peace through strength’.
At the same time, it does want to remain engaged in the world, but on more favourable terms and in a more transactional fashion. The dream or fantasy that America’s commitment to Europe was unconditional is ending. It is notable that despite the rhetoric, the administration remains active and engaged. This was ironically illustrated during ‘Signalgate’, when the White House and key cabinet officials expressed umbrage at “bailing Europe out again” while striking against the Houthis nonetheless.[8]
The Hague Summit
Expectations for the Hague summit are admittedly low. In conversations in Brussels at the end of May, NATO officials told me that the draft agenda is very short, with one official session that will focus solely on defence spending, at which the member states will agree to a new defence investment pledge of 5% of GDP by 2032—3.5% for core defence spending and 1.5% for ‘defence-related’ spending including resilience and aid to Ukraine.
This draft agenda has two objectives. First, minimising the likelihood of friction between the Trump administration and the rest of NATO by limiting the number of issues for debate. It is unlikely that there will be discussions on Ukraine and its membership (or security guarantees for Kyiv), and the NATO Russia strategy (the development of which was agreed to at the Washington Summit) is shelved for the moment.[9] Second, and concurrently, by providing the administration with a clear win, member states hope to secure America’s continued commitment to the Alliance—‘5 percent for Article five’ as one commentator described the arrangement.
It is likely that the administration will welcome the commitment. Speaking at a press conference following the NATO Ministers of Defence meeting in February this year, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said:
[…] the US is committed to building a stronger more lethal NATO. However, we must ensure that European and Canadian commitment to article three of this treaty is just as strong. Article three says that allies, and I quote, “By means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”[10]
The administration will, however, expect practical action to follow—foreign and defence policy by press release is insufficient. The commitment must translate into action in terms of real spending and real purchases (ideally from American defence companies) and within a realistic timeframe. The US, according to its Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker, is also prepared to commit to the spending target.[11] The previous ten-year Defence Investment Pledge agreed to in 2014 did not, in the minds of the administration, generate real results until the election of President Trump and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022—even then, only 23 of 32 states met the 2% minimum spending floor.[12] A pledge that is not met by action is as effective as no commitment at all.
In concert with the administration’s expectation that Europe spend more on defence, Washington wants European capitals to prioritise continental affairs. In response to America’s rebalance to the Indo-Pacific and in recognition of their own interests in the region, many European states developed their own Asia policies. However, for this administration, at least in hard power terms, Europe should look to Europe and leave the Indo-Pacific to the US.
Over the long term, the president wants to see the US become the backstop within NATO, delivering exquisite capabilities in the air, space, cyber, and strategic domains, while European Allies provide on-the-ground conventional forces. If the US were the petrol engine driving the NATO car, under Trump, the Alliance would need to shift toward a hybrid model, with a European electric motor able to deliver more horsepower.
Beyond The White House
Washington, at its heart, largely remains transatlantic in orientation, though there is differentiation in intensity. What is notable today is how much more the president’s signal has, belatedly, shaped the Washington debate.
President Trump has managed to catalyse the conversation on America’s strategic orientation to a degree that previous administrations have only attempted. Here, at its core, there is agreement between the White House, Congress, and the broader policy community on the central issues of America’s geostrategic orientation, expectations of allies, and strategic trade-offs. Whilst there is objection to the way in which the president engages internationally in terms of tone and style, the underlying signal amidst that noise is animating the policy discussion in Washington.
That an actual policy change was necessary is not a new development. Notably, it was President Obama who first articulated “rebalancing” to the Indo-Pacific in a 2011 speech to the parliament of Australia.[13] Even if the ‘pivot’ never came to full fruition, it carried with it an assumption that the US would do less in Europe (enabled by a stable continental security environment) and the Middle East.
For this administration, Europe should look to Europe and leave the Indo-Pacific to the US
For fiscal conservatives, the US cannot sustain its overseas commitments while accruing historically high debt. Hawks about the People’s Republic of China, such as the new Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, Elbridge Colby, see any continued spending in Europe (and Ukraine) as a resource that cannot, but should be, allocated to the Indo-Pacific.[14]
Industry, too, often overlooked in policy discussions, remains transatlantic in orientation. From 2020 to 2024, Europe accounted for 35% of American defence exports, with the US supplying 64% of European NATO member state imports.[15] If NATO were to reach the 5% of GDP spending the president envisions for hard military spending (not the 3.5% core defence and 1.5% non-core spending expected at the Hague), it would increase the Alliance’s spending to $2.4 trillion, with the US contributing half.[16] Increased European defence spending, at the same time the US is re-allocating resources to Indo-Pacific priorities, could well represent a boon for the American defence industrial base.
The Year(s) Ahead
Successfully navigating the second Trump presidency and its relationship with NATO specifically and Europe more broadly is about re-learning the lessons of Trump 1.0—not the least of which is separating the policy signal from the rhetorical noise and avoiding the temptation of reacting solely to the latter. The countries that were most successful in 2016 to 2020, such as Japan and Israel, were those that understood his geostrategic policy priorities, saw the art of (and the art in) the deal, and provided demonstrable value to the US and political results to the president himself.
All things being equal, it is quite possible that because of President Trump’s policies (whether by design or by consequence) NATO will be stronger, more capable, and better integrated, and more effectively able to deliver on its Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area mission and subsidiary Regional Defence Plans, with a more pronounced European identity. Washington may come to rue this greater independence and increased scepticism of America’s commitment to NATO in the future.
Endnotes
[1] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “What Is the National Debt?” FiscalData.Treasury.gov, 24 May 2025.
[2] “Trump Tells NATO Leaders to Increase Defense Spend to 4 Percent,” Reuters, 11 July 2018.
[3] “Donald Trump: European Union Is a Foe on Trade,” BBC News, 15 July 2018.
[4] Henry Foy, Andy Bounds, and Alex Rogers, “Trump Delays Imposing 50% Tariffs on EU Until July 9,” Financial Times, 25 May 2025.
[5] Simon Coss, “Time to Face Reality: Americans Come from Mars, Europeans Are from Venus,” Politico, 26 June 2002.
[6] Lori Ann LaRocco, “Why the Panama Canal Is a Big, Long-Term Prize in Trump’s Global Trade War,” CNBC, 4 May 2025; Edward Helmore, “Trump Says He ‘Doesn’t Rule Out’ Using Military Force to Control Greenland,” The Guardian, 4 May 4 2025.
[7] Maud Descamps, “The Ice Silk Road: Is China a ‘Near-Arctic State’?” Institute for Security and Development Policy, 28 March 2018.
[8] Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans,” The Atlantic, 24 March 2025; “Signal Group Chat Text Annotations: What They Reveal About U.S. War Plans,” The New York Times, 25 March 2025.
[9] NATO, “Washington Summit Declaration, issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. 10 July 2024,” 10 July 2024.
[10] Pete Hegseth, “Press Conference Following NATO Ministers of Defence Meeting in Brussels, Belgium,” Department of Defense (US), 13 February 2025.
[11] Steven Erlanger and Jeanna Smialek, “Trump Calls for NATO Allies to Spend 5 percent of GDP on Defence,” The New York Times, 23 May 2025.
[12] NATO, “Defence Expenditures and NATO’s 2 percent Guideline,” 3 April 2025; NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2024),” 17 June 2024.
[13] Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” The White House, 17 November 2011.
[14] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defence in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021).
[15] SIPRI, “Ukraine the world’s biggest arms importer; United States’ dominance of global arms exports grows as Russian exports continue to fall,” 10 March 2025.
[16] Cullen S. Hendrix, “Trump’s Five Percent Doctrine and NATO Defence Spending,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 5 February 2025.
The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation.
Read our series of briefs that examine some of the key issues of The Hague Summit.