At their 2024 Summit in Washington, NATO leaders reiterated that Russia “remains the most significant and direct threat” and that “the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity” could not be excluded. They committed to reassess and overhaul NATO’s strategy and policy towards Russia in the light of the radically altered security environment.[1]
In the run-up to the Hague Summit, debates have intensified over whether to declare the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security (NRFA) void.[2] Russia’s blatant violations of the act, including repeated acts of military aggression, extensive nuclear coercion and escalation in the grey-zone, large-scale military build-up, and, in particular, its brutal war against Ukraine have made the document increasingly untenable as a foundation for mutual relations. Moscow has openly declared itself at war with the west for years, yet it has simultaneously exploited the reassurance measures embedded in the document to undermine NATO’s security and cohesion.
Download and read as a PDF: Brief 3. Recalibrating Relations with Russia
To address Russia’s security concerns, NATO affirmed in the 1997 NRFA that the Alliance had “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and d[id] not foresee any future need to do so.” Furthermore, it added, that “in the current and foreseeable security environment,” the Alliance would rely on reinforcements rather than “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces in the new member states.”[3] These assurances were offered by NATO despite Russia not agreeing to reciprocal limitations, aside from a general commitment to exercise restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.
The PJC could not overcome the deep-seated mistrust and suspicion that continued to permeate the NATO–Russia relationship
Significantly, the NRFA was founded on the premise of a cooperative security environment. Thus, it contains no provisions that would prevent NATO from adapting its policies in response to the profound transformations observed over the past decade.
The cooperation mechanism created by the NRFA—the Permanent Joint Council (PJC)—required goodwill from both sides to make consultations and cooperation pragmatic and effective. Since its earliest days, however, this framework could not overcome the deep-seated mistrust and suspicion that continued to permeate the NATO–Russia relationship, nor could it provide an answer to the enduring question of Russia’s role in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. For instance, in late 1997, European officials complained that there was no real dialogue in the PJC as the Russian representatives hindered consultations, directing their efforts toward gaining influence over NATO internal decisions and proposing initiatives beyond the scope of the Council.[4]
The PJC’s successor, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), also fell short of delivering the transformative relationship many had hoped for. While it facilitated progress in several practical areas, it struggled to address the more contentious aspects of NATO–Russia relations. The NRC was also struck by severe crises, including the suspension of dialogue in the wake of Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008 and of civil and military cooperation in 2014 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.[5] With these fundamental violations of international law, Russia was condemned for walking away from the principles and commitments agreed in the NRFA. The NRC has been inactive since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as NATO has declared that it can no longer consider Russia a partner.[6]
One of key reasons for the failure of the NATO–Russia relationship has been Moscow’s pursuit of an alternative model of European security and global order—one fundamentally at odds with democratic values and principles. Since the early 2000s, Russia has articulated and pursued a number of strategic objectives, including the restoration of its sphere of influence in the ‘near abroad’ and other strategically significant regions, and the dismantling of the existing European security architecture centred around NATO and the EU, particularly by degrading the US role in Europe.[7] Over the years, Russia has made repeated attempts to achieve these goals through political and economic pressure, the export of corruption, aggressive information campaigns, diplomatic initiatives, and other means. One representative example was the draft European Security Treaty proposed by then-President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008-09, widely dismissed as anachronistic and overly focused on military-political security.[8] Increasingly, Russia has used its modernised military to challenge the status quo.
Russia’s military reforms aim to prepare the country for a long-term confrontation, and possibly a direct military conflict with NATO
In Russia’s alternative vision of world order, called by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov a “new concert of great powers for the 21st century,” sovereignty is not a fundamental right that every country automatically gets, but a capacity only great powers can enjoy, including claiming their spheres of influence with special rights and privileges.[9] While small- and medium-sized powers can self-govern, their independence derives from the protection of a great power. This antagonistic worldview fosters a perpetual, zero-sum competition for spheres of influence among great powers, allowing little room for grey zones: either Russia takes control of a territory, or another great power will. Thus, expansion is construed as an existential imperative, ironically framed as a defensive act. In this worldview, control over Ukraine plays a pivotal role in strengthening Russia’s great power status and re-establishing its perceived right to a place at the top of the international power hierarchy.
Despite the extensive human, economic, material and political costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russia has not abandoned these ambitions.[10] On the contrary, it has intensified efforts to break the frontline and wage a brutal war of attrition against the Ukrainian civilian population. In February 2025, the Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Russian State Duma reiterated the Russian position clearly: Ukraine must be pro-Russian or non-existent.[11]
Furthermore, Russia has embarked on extensive military reforms aimed to prepare the country for a long-term confrontation, and possibly a direct military conflict with NATO. Putin has expanded the military organisation three times to nearly 2.4 million, including 1.5 million active troops to be organised in two new combined armies, 16 new brigades, and 14 new divisions.[12] While likely to remain largely on paper as long as the war in Ukraine continues, Russia has reconstituted its army faster than broadly anticipated: despite extensive losses, it is larger than at the beginning of the war, growing to 790 000.[13] Moreover, Russia has made changes to command and personnel structures, including a return to a structure based on military branches and services, and re-establishing the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, which indicates a stronger focus on the western and north-western strategic directions.[14] These changes seem designed to leverage one of Russia’s principal military advantages relative to Europe, namely its capacity to mobilise a vast pool of manpower for a major war, currently estimated at up to 22 million Russians of fighting age.[15]
While NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept implicitly acknowledged Russia as “the most significant and direct threat,” the Alliance has resisted walking away from the NRFA.[16] However, numerous NATO leaders have questioned the utility of the agreement, especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Eastern European Allies most affected by the NRFA’s constraints have been more vocal: Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda has declared that Russia’s deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus means that the NRFA had failed; Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Zbigniew Rau has supported withdrawal from the NRFA on the grounds that Moscow has violated its commitments and because NATO should not be prevented from deploying troops on its eastern flank; and former foreign minister of Estonia, Urmas Reinsalu, has urged the repeal of the NRFA since “we cannot talk about any cooperation with Putin’s Russia […] waging a war of aggression in Ukraine.”[17] NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană has also remarked that Russia’s actions have effectively nullified the NRFA and freed NATO from any constraints on its activities in eastern Europe.[18]
NATO’s strategy must factor in Russia’s high cost-risk tolerance and propensity for strategic miscalculation
Thus, in October 2023, a senior US official indicated that Allies were re-evaluating the document, acknowledging it was created for a different era and suggesting that a new strategy was warranted.[19] Even so, the debate has reflected divisions between the Allies. Some resist the idea of officially abandoning the agreement, citing concerns about provoking further instability.[20] There have also been reports that the Trump administration has proposed resuming talks through the NRC as part of a broader plan to end the war in Ukraine.[21]
At the upcoming summit in the Hague, NATO leaders will likely endorse enhanced defence capabilities and spending targets to counter Russia.[22] Yet a fully articulated new NATO strategy for Russia appears unlikely to be agreed upon by that time due to internal differences.[23]
Formally discarding the defunct NRFA could, nonetheless, be an important step towards that goal. Alternatively, NATO could radically redefine the NRC, replacing the overly ambitious and unrealistic cooperation agenda of the past with a more modest forum to address critical security issues, including the maintenance of deconfliction and crisis management mechanisms. Communication channels such as NATO–Russia and US–Russia hotlines, as well as localised links like those between the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and the Russian Northern Fleet, will remain key to reducing risks of misunderstanding, misperception, and unintended escalation.
As the work on redefining the strategy toward Russia continues, it should be grounded in several key realities. First, Russia’s relentless pursuit of both short- and long-term strategic objectives, which underpinned its assault on Ukraine, will continue to shape its international behaviour going forward. Second, the sources of these objectives make Russia not only a systemic but also a persistent long-term security threat to Euro-Atlantic security. And third, NATO’s strategy must factor in Russia’s high cost-risk tolerance and propensity for strategic miscalculation.
Moreover, even if the war in Ukraine ended tomorrow—especially without a Russian defeat—Moscow would be unlikely to relinquish its strategic goals and expansionist ambitions. On the contrary, such an outcome would likely embolden Putin to pursue them more aggressively. As Russia’s repeated acts of aggression have demonstrated over the years, a risk-averse approach and unilateral restraint not only benefit Moscow but also risk incentivising further aggressions. Similarly, concerns that bolstering NATO’s defences might provoke a Russian military build-up overlook 17 years of large-scale rearmament in the Russian armed forces, driven by strategic objectives independent of NATO’s actions. To disincentivise Russia, NATO must strengthen its posture decisively, calibrating it for a sustained long-term competition and potential conflict.
[1] NATO, “Washington Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government,” 4 April 2024.
[2] Stuart Lau, “US and Europe to Clarify NATO’s Future Relationship with Russia,” Politico, 11 October 2024.
[3] NATO, “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris, France,” 27 May 1997.
[4] Katarzyna Zysk, Stanowisko Norwegii wobec rozszerzenia NATO na państwa Europy Środkowej, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Polski, w latach 1989–99 [Norway’s Approaches to NATO Enlargement to Central Europe, with Special Emphasis on Poland, 1989–1999] (Torun: Nicolaus Copernicus University and The Scientific Society of Torun Press, 2008).
[5] NATO, “Relations with Russia,” 5 August 2024.
[6] NATO, “NATO-Russia Council,” last updated 25 July 2024.
[7] Federation of American Scientists, “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” 28 June 2000.
[8] Adam D. Rotfeld, “Does Europe Need a New Security Architecture?” in OSCE Yearbook 2009, ed. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010), 40–41.
[9] “Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at MGIMO University on the Occasion of the Start of a New Academic Year,” Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna, 3 September 2007; Sergey Karaganov, “Mutual Assured Deterrence,” Russia in Global Affairs, 22 February 2017; Rotfeld, “Does Europe Need a New Security Architecture?”; Katarzyna Zysk, “Russia’s Geopolitical Vision: A Threat to European Security,” Dossiers du CERI, Sciences Po CERI, April 2022. See also Andrew Monaghan, Russian Grand Strategy in an Era of Global Power Competition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022).
[10] As of 8 May 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence assessed Russian casualties at 950,000, including 200,000–250,000 soldiers killed: Ministry of Defence (UK), “Latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine – May 08 2025,” X (formerly Twitter), 8 May 2025.
[11] Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en), video post on X (formerly Twitter), 22 February 2025.
[12] Martin Fornusek, “Shoigu: Russia to Form 2 New Armies by the End of 2024,” Kyiv Independent, 21 March 2024.
[13] Christopher G. Cavoli, “Opening Statement,” U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 3 April 2025.
[14] Michelle Grisé et al., How Will Russia Reconstitute Its Military After the Ukraine Conflict? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025).
[15] Jonas Kjellén, Russia’s Revamp of Military Districts – Back to a Centralised Future? (FOI Memo 8540; Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2024), https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20Memo%208540; Forsvarets etterretningstjeneste (E-tjenesten), Focus 2025, 2025.
[16] NATO, Strategic Concept 2022, adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid, 29 June 2022.
[17] Gitanas Nausėda, “NATO-Russia Founding Act Has Failed,” The Baltic Times, 28 June 2023; Grzegorz Adamczyk, “Poland Will Back Proposal to Withdraw from the NATO-Russia Founding Act,” RMX News, 14 April 2023; “Estonian FM: It’s Time to Annul the NATO-Russia Founding Act,” ERR News, 31 March 2023.
[18] David Brennan and Ewan Palmer, “NATO Hints at Permanent Bases Near Russia Due to ‘Unpredictable’ Kremlin,” Newsweek, 31 May 2023; “NATO Has Right to Deploy in Eastern Europe: Deputy Chief,” The Business Times, 30 May 2022; Saulius Jakučionis, “NATO Is No Longer Bound by Commitments to Russia and Will Beef Up Eastern Europe Presence, Says Deputy Secretary General,” LRT, 30 May 2022.
[19] Abbey Fenbert, “NATO to Rethink Alliance’s Relationship with Russia for First Time in Decades,” The Kyiv Independent, 12 October 2024.
[20] Lau, “US and Europe to Clarify NATO’s Future Relationship with Russia.”
[21] Khrystyna Bondarieva and Alona Mazurenko, “US Proposes Resuming NATO-Russia Council as Part of Settling Ukraine War, Says Bloomberg,” Ukrainska Pravda, 15 May 2025.
[22] NATO, “Allies to Agree New Capability Targets at Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers,” 4 June 2025.
[23] “‘This Has to Happen in the Next 5–10 Years’: With a Growing Russian Threat and Trump Raising the Stakes, NATO Scrambles to Lock in New Defense Plans,” Meduza, 6 June 2025.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation.
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