The election results show that voters’ preferences in western and eastern Germany remain striking. Now, in order to deliver on promised rises in defence spending and assistance to Ukraine, the next government will have to overcome some tough challenges. The new coalition will have to include CDU/CSU who has had a meagre record in managing Bundeswehr so far.
The conservative CDU/CSU will be the strongest force in the new Bundestag, their share of the vote having increased by 4.5% from 2021. Other winners of the election are the far-right AfD and the Left Party, which both roughly doubled their 2021 results. The former governing parties all lost vote share: the SPD (Social Democrats, -9.3%, worst result ever), the liberal FDP (-7.1%) and the Greens (-3.1%). The FDP and the far-left BSW were unable to gain the 5% of the votes needed to be part of the new Bundestag. Voter turnout, at 82.5% (2021: 76.4%), was the highest in reunified Germany.
The differences between western and eastern Germany are again striking. The centrist parties (SPD, Greens, FDP, and CDU/CSU) achieved significantly better results in the west, while the Left Party, BSW, and AfD were more successful in the east, which has poorer economic conditions (income, unemployment, pensions) and an older population.
With a total of 216 of 630 MPs, the far-right AfD and the Left Party, both of which take a critical view of increasing the defence budget, will now be able to block proposals for constitutional amendments such as that required for a second Sondervermögen (special fund) for defence or for reforms of the Schuldenbremse (debt brake). To avoid this situation, Friedrich Merz wants to reform the Schuldenbremse together with SPD, Greens, and FDP in the current Bundestag in order to provide more money for defence before the newly elected Bundestag convenes in March.
Complicated Coalition Negotiations
While the results would allow two possible two-party coalitions to form a government, a coalition between the CDU/CSU and AfD is very unlikely. Indeed, Friedrich Merz has ruled this out several times. The most likely outcome is thus a CDU/CSU and SPD coalition, but this would have a slim majority of only 13 seats (together 328 MPs, majority from 316). Friedrich Merz and Olaf Scholz have also announced that they personally will not be part of a new government together. Coalition negotiations will take some time, as trust must be restored between the CDU/CSU and the SPD (not least after the CDU/CSU worked with the AfD in January to secure a vote proposing immigration restrictions, attracting criticism from the SPD). Procedural issues for the next legislative period must also be clarified. It is unlikely that a new government will be in office in two to three months after the election, meaning that Germany will not immediately return to the international stage.
Defence Policy
As no party is ready to form a coalition with the AfD, a government without the CDU/CSU is not possible. The conservatives will provide the next chancellor, but their record on defence has not been strong—at least until recently. They pursued the austerity programme for the Bundeswehr launched under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD, 1998-2005), while a CSU defence minister abolished compulsory military service in 2011. The CDU/CSU is also responsible for changing little in Germany’s defence policy or the Bundeswehr after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas in 2014 (the German Ministry of Defence was under the leadership of CDU/CSU politicians from 2005 to 2021).
Nevertheless, it was the CDU/CSU that repeatedly pressurised Chancellor Olaf Scholz regarding arms deliveries to Ukraine. Friedrich Merz argued for the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, while CDU/CSU votes ensured that the constitutional amendment required for the first Sondervermögen passed in 2022, increasing the defence budget for at least the short term.
Sondervermögen II?
The most important issue today is how Germany will finance its defence budget in the future. During the campaign, the candidates for chancellor proposed increasing spending to at least 2% of GDP (Friedrich Merz) or 3.5% (Robert Habeck) but did not specify how this would be achieved. Tax increases similar to those implemented in Estonia in 2025 are unlikely. A second Sondervermögen would be possible if the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the Greens were able to convince MPs of the Left Party, but this would not be in the interest of Defence Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD), who wants to increase the defence budget itself to ensure the long-term financing of the Bundeswehr. One thing is certain: the current Sondervermögen will be exhausted in 2027 at the latest, and without it, Germany will not reach NATO’s current 2% target—let alone any higher figure that might be agreed at the NATO summit in the Hague in June.
The next defence minister will also face challenges related to the deployment of a brigade to Lithuania, the main focus of German responsibility in Europe in the coming years. The first of the 5 000 soldiers have been stationed in Lithuania since last year; the majority are to be deployed by the end of 2025 and the brigade to be fully operational by 2027.
It is conceivable that Minister Pistorius, the most popular politician in Germany, will continue in office to work on the implementation of the brigade, a project he proposed himself in June 2023. Cabinet positions will be decided during the coalition negotiations. Whoever the next defence minister is, he or she will certainly not face fewer challenges than those currently facing Boris Pistorius.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).