Francophonie: A Subtle Response to Revisionist Powers

President Emmanuel Macron’s appearance at the latest 2024 Villers-Cotterêts OIF summit testifies to his willingness to defend a French concept of globalisation based on “a diplomacy that stands for sovereignty and territorial integrity” without “double standards.”[1]

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President Macron reiterated the outward vision of his government, extending his foreign policy to that of the entire Francophonie—seen as a French “area of influence.” The French president declaimed his resolute support for nations whose sovereignty and territorial integrity are in jeopardy, such as Ukraine, Armenia, Lebanon, and the Indo-Pacific countries. Undoubtedly, his speech was addressed to both his non-European partners tempted to apply double standards when Ukraine is mentioned and to revisionist powers like Russia and China.

The Roots

The idea of the French language as a political and commercial tool dates back to medieval France, but the term found its way into everyday language through the work of non-French heads of state. This led to the creation of the Organisation de la Francophonie, which grew to become a diplomatic framework for discussion on human rights, development, economy, and education.

French was once an official language in England and lingua franca during the Champagne fairs in northeastern France in the 12th and 13th centuries, connecting trade routes in the North and the Mediterranean. However, French only became the official language of justice and administration, at the expense of Latin, with the Edict of Villers-Cotterets in 1539 by François I. In March 2018, President Macron delivered a speech at the very same castle, promising to turn that venue into a laboratory of the Francophonie.[2]

French geographer Onésime Reclus coined the word “Francophonie” in 1880 to designate anyone who spoke French. However, the term fell into disuse until the 1960s, as “Francophonisation” was not the primary goal of the French colonisation. Canada, as well as African and Arabic countries, put it back on the agenda, coupled with the will to affirm cultural identity—such as in Quebec—or decolonisation, which saw several nations adopting French as their official state language, thus facilitating contacts between geographically dispersed French speakers.[3]

France’s position on digitalisation is a reaction to the revisionist power’s attempts to fragment digital space

The idea of a politically organised Francophonie at the international level was fuelled by Senegalese president Léopold Sédar Senghor in the 1970s. However, the lack of French commitment and disagreements between the Quebec state and the Canadian federal state scuppered the venture. Then, French President François Mitterrand and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney took it over, hoping to improve their nations’ stature.

The Legacy

The Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie builds upon the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (Agence de Coopération Culturelle et technique, ACCT) founded in 1970 in Niamey by presidents Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal), Hamani Diori (Niger), Habib Bourguiba (Tunisia), and Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Cambodia). The cornerstone of the Agency was the shared common language, while its goal was to intensify cultural and technical cooperation between members, as well as to promote and diffuse different cultures. In 1998, the ACCT became the Agence intergouvernementale de la Francophonie, and in 2005, the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF).[4]

The OIF comprises 93 members as of November 2024: 56 states and governments, 32 observing states, and 5 associated states. Belgium, Luxembourg, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Cyprus are members, while Ireland and countries that entered the EU after 2004 are observers. Every country in the Western Balkans and the EU Eastern Neighbourhood is represented except Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Belarus.[5] Estonia joined as an observer in 2010, whilst only 1% of its population (or 19 000 people) are considered “francophone.”[6] According to former Foreign Minister Urmas Paet, it allows Estonia to be in contact with countries in the French cultural space, inspiring Estonians, including state officials, to learn the French language.[7] Francophonie shines through its media like TV5 Monde and convenes ministerial meetings (e.g., the Conference of Ministers of Education, Confemen; the Conference of French-speaking Ministers of Youth and Sport, Confejes).[8]

Realpolitik vs Values

The first Francophonie summit in 1986 in Versailles launched a French-speaking development framework. President Abdou Diouf of Senegal addressed the organisation’s ambition to design a unique francophone response to global challenges, wondering: “Among superpowers, could we not conceive of other poles of development?”[9]

Since then, summits have usually taken place during politically charged events or revolved around specific issues. In October 2002, the ninth summit followed the 9/11 attacks and was the first gathering to be held on Arab soil—in Beirut, Lebanon—with “Dialogue of Cultures” selected as its theme.[10] The tenth summit was convened in November 2004 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; it was dominated by the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, the killing of French soldiers, and President Laurent Gbagbo’s accusations against France of pursuing a neo-colonial policy and Burkina Faso of trying to destabilise the region.[11]

By working together to prevent foreign information manipulation and interference, the Francophone community could increase its distance from Russia’s orbit

Although the OIF charter aims at developing democracy and upholding human rights and the rule of law, France and other countries’ recent position did not follow those values to the letter. In 2018, in a context of France’s rapprochement with Rwanda (motivated by historic and strategic reasons in France and in line with Rwanda’s attempts to “structure a soft power” at the continental level), President Macron—followed by Belgium and most African countries except for Democratic Republic of Congo—championed the candidacy of Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Louise Mushikiwabo for the position of Secretary General.[12] (He was subsequently elected in 2018 and 2022 by consensus[13].)

Macron’s position was questionable (and publicly denounced by four former ministers in charge of Francophonie[14]) for three main reasons. First, due to its lack of consultation with its main partners, Macron’s paternalistic attitude engendered tensions with Canada—at that time, the organisation’s second-largest financial contributor, and holding the position of secretary general—when a united front vis-à-vis Trump was badly needed.[15]

Second, it went against the main principles of the charter: promotion of the French language and, by extension, support for training language teachers. Rwanda hardly excels at it: under President Paul Kagame, the country joined the British Commonwealth, ended French-language instruction in schools, and even began using English in communication with the OIF itself (even though French remains an official language alongside English, Kinyarwanda, and Kiswahili).

Third, the OIF’s role in crisis management, support for electoral processes, and strengthening democratic institutions came under serious scrutiny. One cannot help but wonder how Louise Mushikiwabo can be a credible democracy champion abroad when human rights violations are commonplace at home, in Rwanda.[16]

It shows that the OIF is no stranger to politically driven decisions. “The game of realpolitik increasingly at work in this forum” ultimately reflects the power struggles between states, which is common in most international organisations.[17].

The French Vision

The penultimate summit, held in Djerba, Tunisia, in 2022, defined the decade’s objectives. France presented a three-step plan, focusing on education, communication (i.e., promotion of French-speaking media, French language on the internet, and multilingualism in Europe), and art as well as artists. Thus, President Macron outlined a template for the French vision of globalisation that France is committed to defending.[18] (He elaborated on it further at the 2024 Francophonie Summit.)

Macron stated that he wants Francophonie to be a “space of diplomatic influence,” reiterating its support to Ukraine while pointing the finger at countries of the south that refused to condemn Russia’s aggression by exposing their double discourse narratives.[19] To push his idea of a diplomacy that defends the “sovereignty and territorial integrity,” he linked Ukraine with the situation in Lebanon, Armenia, and the Indo-Pacific states while confirming the French position on the two-state solution in Israel and Palestine.

The French president also unveiled the Appeal of Villers-Cotterêts, inviting digital stakeholders to help build an environment to fight against disinformation and hatred online. The summit called on digital platforms to step up their efforts and commitment to an inclusive, pluralist, high-quality, and trusted digital environment. In particular, it implies assuming greater responsibility for content moderation and protecting French-speaking companies and information space from the risks associated with the abuse of their services during elections and crises.[20]

The Language of Discord?

President Macron might use this platform to reconnect with certain African countries whose populations are influenced by Russian narratives. However, at the end of March 2025, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso withdrew from the OIF, thus allowing for less room for manoeuvre for France in Sahel.[21] To keep member countries away from Russian narratives, Macron could emphasise that countries like Senegal, Tunisia, or Niger were the main driving forces behind the creation of an organisation based on the French language.

The Appeal of Villers-Cotterêts was framed around the debates on internet freedom. France’s position on digitalisation envisions an open, safe, and diversified internet and promotes the French language online.[22] It is, at least in part, a reaction to the revisionist power’s attempts to fragment digital space.

Maxime Audinet and Kevin Limonier, who have studied Russia’s informational influence ecosystem in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa, point to its many vulnerabilities. They suggest that the greater the distance from the Kremlin’s orbit, the greater the opportunities and the flexibility of Russian players.[23] Maxime Audinet cautions that the so-called “Prigozhin Galaxy” continued financing bots and local media even after the founder’s death. Moreover, he notes that RT and Sputnik have shifted their focus onto the African continent.[24]

President Macron’s approach is a response to Russia’s informational manoeuvres in French-speaking Africa since 2022. By working together to prevent the risks associated with foreign information manipulation and interference, the Francophone community could increase its distance from Russia’s orbit. Countering disinformation is a paramount challenge and shall be combined with long-term public policies related to platform regulation, media literacy, and social inequality. Francophonie is an attempt to initiate such a change and can be a useful platform to bridge the gap between African countries on Russia’s radar and Russia’s neighbours in its sight.

Endnotes

[1] Emmanuel Macron, “Déclaration de M. Emmanuel Macron, président de la République, sur la Francophonie, à Villers-Cotterêts le 4 octobre 2024” [Speech by Emmanuel Macron], Vie Publique, 4 March 2024.

[2] Emmanuel Macron, “Transcription Du Discours Du President De La Republique [Transcript of the speech by the President of the Republic],” Présidence de la République, 20 March 2018; Célia Vanier, “Aisne: Macron veut créer un “laboratoire de la francophonie” au château de Villers-Cotterêts [Macron wants to create a ‘Francophonie laboratory’ at the Villers-Cotterêts Castle],” France Info, 20 March 2018.

[3] Stélio Farandjis, “Repères dans l’histoire de la francophonie [Landmarks in the history of the French-Speaking World],” Hermès 3 (2004): 49-52.

[4] “Une histoire de la Francophonie [A story of Francophonie],” Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, accessed in April 2025.

[5] “93 Etats et gouvernements [93 States and governments],” Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, accessed in April 2025.

[6] “Estonie,” Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, accessed in April 2025; Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, “La Langue Française dans le Monde – 2019-2022[The French Language in the World-2019-2022],” Gallimard, 2022.

[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Estonia Applies for Observer Status in International Organisation of Francophonie“, 20 March 2010

[8] “Hervé Barraquand, “Présentation de l’organisation internationale de la Francophonie [Presentation of the Organisation de la Francophonie],” Hermès 3 (2004): 18-24; Specifically, France Télévision 46,42%, France Médias Monde 11,97%, RTBF (Belgium) 10,53%; and SSR (Switzerland) 10,53%, Radio-Canada 6,32%, TVMonaco 5,26%, Télé Québec 4,21%, Arte France 3,12%; l’INA 1,65%. Yves Bigot, CEO of the channel, initiated the entry of seven African countries into TV5Monde’s capital, only to be later criticised internally, see: “Non reconduit, Yves Bigot démissionne de la présidence de TV5Monde [Yves Bigot resigns as chairman of TV5Monde after not being reappointed],” Les Echos, 28 May 2024.

[9] Jacques-Yvan Morin, “Le premier Sommet de la Communauté francophone [The first Summit of the Francophone Community],” Revue québécoise de droit international (1986): 79-131.

[10] Peter Brown, “Le Dialogue des cultures and the Ninth Sommet de la Francophonie [The Dialogue of Cultures and the Ninth Summit of the Francophonie],” International Journal of Francophone Studies 6.1 (2003): 53-58.

[11] Peter Brown, “From ‘Beyrouth’to ‘Déroute’?: Some reflections on the 10th Sommet de la Francophonie, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 25–26 November 2004,” International Journal of Francophone Studies 8.1 (2005): 93-103.

[12] Mehdi Ba, “Francophonie : Louise Mushikiwabo, la favorite” [Francophonie : Louise Mushikiwabo, the favourite], jeuneafrique, 8 October 2018 ; Ousmanou Nwatchock A Birema’s, “Louise Mushikiwabo : les premières leçons de l’élection d’une « anglophone » à la tête de la Francophonie” [Louise Mushikiwabo: the first lessons of the election of an “Anglophone” at the head of the Francophonie], Revue internationale et stratégique N°113 (2019/1) : 32-44.

[13] Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, “Décision portant élection du ou de la Secrétaire général(e) à l’occasion du XVIIIe Sommet de la Francophonie à Djerba” [Decision on the election of the Secretary General on the occasion of the 18th Francophonie Summit in Djerba], XVIIIe Conférence des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement des pays ayant le français en partage, Service des instances et des conférences de l’OIF, DEC/SOM-18/2022/D7, 19-20 November 2020

[14] Charles Josselin, Pierre-André Wiltzer, Hélène Conway-Mouret, and André Vallini, “Louise Mushikiwabo n’a pas sa place à la tête de la Francophonie [Louise Mushikiwabo has no place at the head of La Francophonie],” Le Monde, 13 September 2018.

[15] “Les « pays de merde » réclament des excuses à Donald Trump [«Shithole countries» ask for apologies from Trump],” Le Monde, 13 September 2018.

[16] Josselin et al, “Louise Mushikiwabo.”

[17] Birema’s, “Louise Mushikiwabo.”

[18] “Djerba Summit: defining new ambitions for the Francophonie,” Campus France, retrieved on 1 November 2024.

[19] “Emmanuel Macron veut que la francophonie soit un « espace d’influence diplomatique » [Emmanuel Macron wants the French-speaking world to be an ‘area of diplomatic influence’],” Le Monde, 4 October 2024.

[20] “Appel de Villers-Cotterêts – Pour un espace numérique intègre et de confiance dans l’espace francophone [Appel de Villers-Cotterêts – For an honest and trusted digital space in the French-speaking world],” Élysée, 4 October 2024.

[21] RFI, “Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso withdraw from French language body,” 20 March 2025.

[22] “La mission de l’Ambassadeur pour le numérique [The mission of the Digital Ambassador],” France Diplomatie, accessed in April 2025.

[23] Maxime Audinet and Kevin Limonier, “Russia’s informational influence in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa: a flexible and heterogenous ecosystem,“ Questions de communication 41 (October 2022).

[24] Maxime Audinet, Eloïse Fardeau Le Meitour, and Alicia Piveteau, “L’appareil de désinformation russe [The Russian disinformation apparatus],” Diplomatie No 124 (November-December 2023): 70-72.

The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation.