Europeanising NATO: European Leadership

NATO should remain central to a multilayered European security architecture in which European leaders also engage each other in a number of ad hoc formats to deal with the reduction of US military commitment.

Through these engagements, nations should build strategic dialogue and meaningful cooperation on collective deterrence and defence to Europeanise the Alliance, while renewing an effective transatlantic partnership within it.

The Ankara summit reaffirmed Allies’ “ironclad” commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as well as their assessment of Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security. However, Europe and Canada seriously doubt whether, how, how much, and under what timing and conditions the Trump administration would fight Russia if it were to attack an Ally. The next phase of the reduction of American military presence in Europe is being reviewed in Washington and discussed within the Alliance after the Pentagon’s moves caught some Allies by surprise. The announced withdrawal of 5 000 troops from Germany, the halt of the rotation of an armoured brigade combat team to Poland and, most importantly, the cancellation of the deployment of deep precision strike capabilities to Germany vindicated European fears of uncoordinated cuts that would leave significant gaps in collective deterrence and defence—gaps which the Kremlin may risk trying to exploit.

Europeanisation will be a profound transformation of the transatlantic Alliance.

The summit framed these discussions in a constructive way, around the goal of “a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO,” providing a political mandate for a structured process of shifting the burden of Europe’s conventional deterrence and defence from the US to the rest of NATO.[1] This process has already started.[2] In the short term, it mainly concerns the allocation of existing capabilities to NATO’s defence plans, for instance augmenting the European forces pre-assigned to SACEUR for crisis and wartime to compensate for US reductions.[3]  In the mid- to long-term, increased Allied military budgets should provide capabilities—including certain strategic enablers and greater combat mass in terms of military personnel—to make Europe less dependent on the US vis-à-vis Russia in a conventional conflict.[4]

A European First Response

This will be a profound transformation of the transatlantic Alliance.[5] It is not only a matter of allocating an additional few thousand troops, a few dozen aircraft or a handful of warships and submarines to the NATO force model. It is a transition towards an Alliance whose conventional deterrence posture will be founded mainly on Europe’s military contribution, political will and strategic choices regarding every aspect of defence from investment to deployment. This will be an Alliance where most European countries will have to share the burden of fighting Russia if deterrence fails, relying on reduced and uncertain support from the US and on more reliable, if somewhat limited, help from Canada.

America’s shift from a leading to a supporting role requires the European Allies to be able to deploy capabilities at speed, sustain them under pressure, and regenerate forces under contested conditions.[6] They will need to hold ground, ship reinforcements as planned, mobilise their air and sea power against Russia, and withstand its retaliation against their territories and populations for as long as necessary in a high-intensity conflict scenario against a peer competitor. The European Allies will also have to plan and decide what to do on their own terms. Conventional deterrence and defence should be their top priority, as they will be the first responders in case of crisis or escalation.

Perceptions of Russia

There is, however, no single European lead nation which is recognised as such by others. Some are more powerful in military, economic or political terms, but none is strong enough across the board to exert leadership by default—as the US has done so far in NATO. Convergence among European countries is crucial, yet their politico-strategic circumstances vary. By and large, all the Nordic and eastern European Allies, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK share an assessment of Russia as an imminent and real threat. This is not to say that all major forces on the French and German political spectrum are on the same page, as right-wing movements in future governments may adopt a softer stance towards the Kremlin. In Budapest, Bratislava and Prague, there are already different political perceptions of Russia.

A shared security interest should be the starting point for greater intra-European dialogue and military cooperation.

Moving south and west, the security outlook varies by geography, history and national interests. Italy has increased its commitment on the eastern flank from Baltic and Romanian Air Policing to the leadership of the NATO multinational battalion in Bulgaria. But it remains very cautious concerning a possible multinational military deployment in Ukraine and continues to prioritise the challenges of the ‘enlarged Mediterranean’.[7] Türkiye maintains a broad security agenda towards the Middle East and Africa and, while supporting Ukraine, has refrained from adopting western sanctions against Russia.[8] Spain has made a political drama of NATO’s defence spending targets despite their linkage with Europeanising NATO and deterring Russia. European-led conventional deterrence and defence, and the consequent requirements for political leadership, must operate within this complicated landscape.

Dialogue and Military Cooperation

At the same time, all Europeans share a fundamental security interest in preserving the peace and stability that enables their societies and economies to progress. This is achieved through collective deterrence and defence. A Russian attack against a member of NATO and the EU that was not countered by a collective military response would mean the political end of both institutions, with catastrophic cascading impacts on all dimensions of national interests.

This should be the starting point for greater intra-European politico-strategic dialogue, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, and defence cooperation. Building awareness of the Russian threat across Europe is essential if the military, diplomatic and political resources to ensure burden shifting from the US to Europe are to be mobilised. The necessary enhancement of the strategic layer of the Alliance’s European pillar will require a European strategic reflection, focusing on crisis and conflict scenarios, contingencies and the escalation ladder, and involving policy makers across the continent.

At the operational level, NATO’s regional plans and forward defence arrangements will need to be updated to reflect the shift of the burden towards the European Allies. The strategic and operational levels are obviously inter-linked, as operational deployments entail economic and political costs: capabilities allocated to NATO will not be available for operations elsewhere—deployments which remain important for countries like Italy, France and Türkiye. Forward defence also brings political risk, as they are the tripwire for involving all European Allies, as well as Canada and the US, in a conflict with Russia should Moscow attack NATO countries where these forces are deployed.

Bi and Minilateralism

European leadership in conventional deterrence and defence must now be built step by step among nations and Europeanised NATO institutions. Over the last few years, several bilateral, regional and minilateral formats have emerged as frameworks for politico-strategic consultation and/or military cooperation.

France, Germany, Italy and the UK have intensified their respective bilateral relations, albeit with ups and downs. The E3 format of Berlin, London and Paris, and the E5, which adds Rome and Warsaw, have gained traction through regular meetings of defence and foreign affairs ministries and of heads of state and government. Regional cooperation among the Baltic states has also intensified, as has Nordic Defence Cooperation and work in the broader NB8 framework, partly thanks to Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO.

The largest example of an ad hoc format is undoubtedly the ‘coalition of the willing’ co-chaired by France and the UK to provide security guarantees to Ukraine, including the deployment of a multinational force after an eventual peace deal with Russia.[9] At a more operational level, the joint Dutch-German corps has taken command, at corps level, for the defence of Estonia and Latvia, taking responsibility for existing divisional structures in those countries.[10] These are all positive steps signalling the greater willingness of European capitals to engage with each other.

The E5 groups together the five largest military powers in Europe and presents a fair balance between inclusivity and agility

The E5 format brings particular advantages. It groups together the five largest military powers in Europe, within and beyond EU borders, and presents a fair balance between inclusivity and agility. Regular consultation among countries with partially different strategic outlooks helps to bridge differences in threat perception, security priorities, defence industrial policies, and visions of NATO’s future. The E5 also discuss procurement, an important dimension of conventional deterrence, since Europeans need to invest together in capabilities such as integrated air and missile defence, deep precision strike and space-based early warning, which are currently provided mostly by the US.[11] This format could thus be a good incubator for developing a shared leadership of Europe’s collective deterrence and defence, which could then be brought to the NATO level. Italy insisted on convening an E5 meeting in the margins of the Alliance’s Ankara summit with just this aim.[12]  

The E5 and other bilateral and minilateral frameworks should be considered building blocks of a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO. More ambitious and effective defence initiatives, including on exercises, forward deployment, logistics and procurement, may well arise within these formats. Yet moving towards a European-led NATO will not be simple or straightforward, as the Euro-Atlantic security architecture will likely remain complex and multilayered. A good deal of pragmatism and coordination will be necessary to simultaneously work in different ad hoc formats and at the NATO level.[13]

NATO: Common Ground and Common Roof

The mere sum of bilateral or minilateral arrangements, however, will not make for collective deterrence and defence. NATO’s overall deterrence and defence posture still assumes not only US forces, but also those from Italy, Spain, Türkiye, and other countries not on the frontline with Russia. More practically, NATO’s integrated air and missile defence, for example, works in a way that makes it difficult to ensure the protection of a certain region by a certain group of countries only: sensors, effectors, and command and control nodes are distributed from Rota (Spain) to Incirlik (Türkiye) across Germany, Poland and other Allied countries. Hence, the (politically difficult) need to build a shared, inclusive European leadership—beyond bilateral, mini-lateral or regional groupings—to implement a Europeanised NATO.  

For this, NATO should remain both the common ground and the common roof of an architecture to serve every Ally. The common ground is the integrated military command structure, standards, infrastructure and infostructure needed to implement collective deterrence and defence. And the common roof is where politico-strategic reflection and bargaining take place, and positions and initiatives built at various levels are shared and deconflicted—again, to support collective deterrence and defence. NATO’s ground and roof will both have to evolve as Europeans not only replace gaps left by the reduction of American military presence, but also develop their own approach to doctrine, concepts and strategies.

The Allies are sailing through uncharted waters towards a NATO in which Europeans will have more autonomy from Washington than at any time in the last eight decades. The long-term consequences have still to be properly understood on both sides of the Atlantic.[14] Indeed, the US may be concerned about, or even hostile towards, a more autonomous Europe, while Europe may begin to view the US with mixed feelings: sometimes as a partner, sometimes as a competitor or threat.

A mutual estrangement would endanger the west at a time when Russia and China are keen to exploit such a rift. European leadership will be essential not only to make conventional deterrence and defence work with less America. But also, to ensure that transatlantic relations evolve through stable partnership and peaceful cooperation, despite a new strategic balance between the new world and the old continent.

Endnotes

[1] NATO, “The Ankara Summit Declaration,” 8 July 2026.

[2] Oana Lungescu, “NATO in Search of Unity in Ankara,” ICDS, 26 May 2026.

[3] Tony Lawrence, “NATO Heads to Ankara,” ICDS, 6 July 2026.

[4] Nuclear deterrence is beyond the scope of this brief, although it is interlinked with the conventional side. See in this regard Darya Dolzikova, “NATO 3.0: US Conventional Retrenchment and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe,” RUSI, 23 June 2026.

[5] Alessandro Marrone, “NATO after Ankara: Less than Perfect, Better than Feared,” Aspenia online, 12 July 2026.

[6] Jonathan Burchell, “The NATO Ankara Summit: ‘NATO 3.0’ in Practice,” CSIS, 9 June 2026.

[7] Alessandro Marrone, “Meloni’s Defence Policy: Adjusting the Balance Sheet to Crises,” IAI, Brief 26|16, 26 March 2026.

[8] Galip Dalay, “Turkey Presses NATO’s EU Members to Broaden Their Horizons,” Chatham House, 15 June 2026.

[9] Prime Minister’s Office (UK), “Statement of the Co-Chairs of the Coalition of the Willing: 13 July 2026,” 13 July 2026.

[10] Oana Lungescu, “As US Scales Back Forces Earmarked for NATO, Opportunity Opens for Europe,” RUSI, 29 May 2026.

[11] Michael Clark, “The E5 Declaration: Toward a European Pillar of NATO,” Geopolitical Monitor, 16 July 2026.

[12] Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, “Tajani at the Meeting of NATO and Ukrainian Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Details Were Also Provided Regarding the Security Operation That Identified Russian Agents in Italy,” 8 July 2026.

[13] Galip Dalay, “Stop Mourning the Old NATO. Build the New One,” Time, 7 July 2026.

[14] Katja Bego, “What Should a More European NATO Look Like? The US and Europe Disagree,” Chatham House, 13 February 2026.

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Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).