Europe on Trump’s Chopping Block

There is little doubt that the upcoming US Global Posture Review will include major troop drawdowns from Europe. But there have been few indications of which units will be affected and where reductions will occur.

President Donald Trump has brought unprecedented scepticism about Europe’s contribution to NATO to the White House. His administration’s disdain for European “free loading,” alongside its shifting of priorities towards countering China, has the European Allies bracing for likely troop withdrawals. Even before the release of the long-awaited Global Posture Review (GPR), the Pentagon has announced two major changes to the US posture in Europe. Firstly, the USS Gerald R. Ford, along with three destroyers of Carrier Strike Group-12, has been redeployed to the Caribbean Sea to support the ongoing anti-drug operation near Venezuela. While not permanent, this decision removes the only US carrier in European waters, severely weakening naval capability in the region.

Even before the release of the long-awaited Global Posture Review (GPR), the Pentagon has announced two major changes to the US posture in Europe

Secondly, the Pentagon announced that the 2^nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) of the 101^st Airborne Division would return to the US and not be replaced. The 3 000 soldiers in this unit are stationed on a rotational basis in various countries on NATO’s eastern flank as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve. They include a novel multi-functional reconnaissance company that was created to exploit lessons from the war in Ukraine and units tailored to counter modern Russian tactics.

Past as Prologue

Trump’s 2020 plan to downsize the US presence in Europe may provide clues for which units might be affected in the future. This included the withdrawal of nearly 12 000 troops from Germany, including the 12^th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) and the 2^nd Cavalry Regiment. As the only permanent CAB and Stryker Battalion Tactical Group in Europe, both units provide critical air and armour capabilities to NATO’s defence and deterrence posture. Trump claimed that the drawdown was a response to Germany “not paying their bills” regarding NATO spending obligations.

The US House of Representatives blocked this plan, but Trump’s increased use of executive powers in his second term may be a route to sidestepping bureaucratic hurdles this time around. If so, a blueprint for major troop withdrawals from Germany already exists.

Carrots and Sticks

This episode also revealed the administration’s readiness to use US forces as bargaining chips to secure its political goals. Trump’s intent to increase (European) NATO spending has only become more prominent in his second administration, including through a US push for new, substantially higher spending targets at NATO’s Hague summit. Some countries have drawn sharp criticism for their lack of commitment to these new targets. Spain has seen particularly harsh blowback, with Trump suggesting that it be expelled from NATO and threatening to increase tariffs against it.

While his ability to wield tariffs may be restricted by upcoming court cases, the military stick of downsizing US presence at Naval Station Rota would be within his reach. This base contains the bulk of US forces in Spain, including five destroyers which provide critical air defence and long-range strike capabilities. A sixth, set to join Rota in 2026, could easily be cancelled as a means of punishment and justified by the need to serve pressing naval priorities in the Indo-Pacific and Caribbean. Trump will have to weigh the importance of US naval capability in Europe against letting Spain off the hook for its noncompliance.

Trump will have to weigh the importance of US naval capability in Europe against letting Spain off the hook for its noncompliance

But the politics of this foreign policy approach work both ways. Countries like Poland, which in 2020 was due to receive troops formerly stationed in Germany, are better positioned to escape the impending GPR cuts. Trump’s political alignment with the Nawrocki government may well shield the country from major changes in the US force presence there. Poland is one of the few countries that Trump has promised to support by maintaining, and even increasing troop levels. Still, a diminished US presence anywhere in Europe degrades NATO’s collective defence and threatens Polish security even if the US maintains its troop contingent in the country.

Words and Actions

Amid the guessing game of who will lose US troops, the Estonian MoD recently reaffirmed the US commitment to maintaining presence in the country. The newness of the US deployment here (September 2025) may offer some reassurance to Estonia—the forces withdrawn from Romania were reaching the end of their nine-month deployment—but this should be measured against the general erosion of the relationship between the US and its European Allies.

The US reportedly views the Baltics as “exemplary allies,” in part due to their commitment to the new NATO spending targets. But Marco Rubio offered similar praise in Romania shortly before the Pentagon announced deep cuts in US force presence there. Trump may promise to defend Allies in Europe, but his dismantling of the US presence on NATO’s southeastern flank opens crucial vulnerabilities that will reverberate across the Alliance.

Any erosion of the US and NATO military posture that might result from the GPR, from destroyers in Rota to garrisons in Germany and rotational troops in the Baltics, serves as a gift to Russia

More broadly, any erosion of the US and NATO military posture that might result from the GPR, from destroyers in Rota to garrisons in Germany and rotational troops in the Baltics, serves as a gift to Russia. Coupled with Washington’s muted response to recent incidents such as Russian drone incursions into Poland, the prevailing uncertainty surrounding America’s commitment to Europe’s security has left Allies and adversaries alike questioning how serious the administration truly is about defending “every inch” of NATO territory.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).