Europe Between the Hammer and the Anvil

I was present at the Munich Security Conference in February when the US Under Secretary of War for Policy, Elbridge Colby, participated in the discussion moderated by Mark Leonard of the European Council on Foreign Relations. The sense of trepidation was palpable in the packed room as the smiling Colby entered, nodding enthusiastically and shaking hands left and right. Unmistakable rock star energy was in the air, and it seemed clear that the man of the hour was savouring the moment.

I was present at the Munich Security Conference in February when the US Under Secretary of War for Policy, Elbridge Colby, participated in the discussion moderated by Mark Leonard of the European Council on Foreign Relations. The sense of trepidation was palpable in the packed room as the smiling Colby entered, nodding enthusiastically and shaking hands left and right. Unmistakable rock star energy was in the air, and it seemed clear that the man of the hour was savouring the moment.

Very early in the conversation, it became evident that, on this occasion at least, the audience would be in for a good cop show. In stark contrast to the dressing-down delivered by Vice President J.D. Vance a year earlier, the audience received a reassuring message from Colby: the United States would remain committed to European security and to NATO.

Yet the other part of his argument was equally clear: in the coming years, the Alliance would be in for a significant recalibration—a burden shifting instead of the more traditional burden sharing. And that, at times, it would call for a little bit of tough love on the part of the Americans. He also asserted, quite presciently in hindsight, that there would be moments when the Allies and partners would not see eye-to-eye over the Atlantic.

A Thaw in the Chill?

Colby was indeed crystal clear that the Europeans would be asked and tasked by the Americans to rise to the mettle. This applied, in particular, to the conventional defence of the Old Continent, where Europe would have to shoulder the primary responsibility going forward. He was also optimistic that, given time, this would be an achievable goal. In his reading, deterring Russia in conventional terms should be within European means.

At the end of the hour-long discussion, the sigh of relief in the room was palpable. The sentiment was underscored by the relatively positive remarks from Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the main stage the next day. Although Rubio’s vision of the ties that bind across the Atlantic was not entirely easy listening to the majority of Europeans, it was, nevertheless, discernible that at least on that otherwise grey and rainy winter day in Munich, the much-feared rupture of transatlantic relations was not in the cards in DC.

I, too, was somewhat encouraged by what I had just witnessed. But as I left Munich, I was wondering whether the sensible approach outlined by Colby in particular would survive contact with the turbulence of world politics under President Donald Trump. How long, or rather short-lived, would this respite in relations prove to be?

The Shifting Sands

Now we know that the thaw over the Atlantic proved to be very short indeed. Amid the war with Iran, the merry-go-round of Trumpian policymaking has generated perhaps the most severe crisis the transatlantic Alliance has ever witnessed. The Europeans have been blindsided by the events unfolding, the lack of coordination or consultation with the Allies before the decision to go to war, and the repeatedly moving goalposts. What does it mean to be an Ally to the United States under President Donald Trump? What role can (and should) NATO and its members play under the shifting sands of Trumpian foreign and security policy?

Although no formal renunciation of the Alliance and its Article 5 has occurred, Trump’s ire over the lack of European support has been on public display. The Europeans find themselves between the hammer of Trumpian indignation and the Russian anvil, resulting in arguably the biggest challenge to European security in modern memory.

Hailing from a country that joined NATO only three years ago, I find it almost beggars belief that the one thing that has kept Russian appetites at bay—the North Atlantic Alliance—seems to be fraying before our eyes. Only a fool would argue that NATO and its cohesion remain fully intact. At times, it seems as if President Trump’s rhetoric has veered dangerously close to walking away for good from the ties that bind across the Atlantic.

This is bad news for anyone who has aspired to an orderly transition or burden shifting. Although it is easy to agree with Colby’s vision for the revamped NATO 3.0 in principle, it is equally evident that such a transformation will take time. Time to ensure Europeans can generate sufficient new capabilities to avoid critical shortfalls. And time for a more Europeanised NATO, its structures, and, indeed, the still embryonic European strategic culture and European way of war to mature and take hold.

An Orderly Shift We Must Achieve

Although at times we oversell the threat from Russia, there is no denying that it is clear and present. Putin’s Russia is a cynical and opportunistic actor that will not shy away from delivering the coup de grâce on the European security architecture, or system, or what is left of it, should the opportunity arise.

The United States cannot feel fully secure and prosperous without peace and stability in Europe.

This means that it is in all our interests to keep the Russian temptations to a minimum. Here, I would assert, the interest is shared across the Atlantic. The world is not that different from 1917 and 1941 when Washington learned that it could not, in fact, keep itself out of the wars consuming the Old Continent. Even today, the United States cannot feel fully secure and prosperous without peace and stability in Europe.

Here, the Trumpian way of making—or should one say, wielding—policy is particularly damaging. It frays the ties that bind and undermines one of the most critical aspects of deterrence: the belief in its automaticity. At the end of the day, deterrence is as much a political and even psychological variable as it is a military one. Do we, in Europe and across the Atlantic, have faith in the commitments we have undertaken? And do the Russians, by extension, have faith in our faith enough not to be tempted to test our resolve?

This basic dilemma is compounded by the changes in military technology and the nature of warfare. As so many times in history, the major war—this time in Ukraine—has generated a veritable leap in innovation and doctrine. The Russians have ample capabilities, capacity, and experience in this field—NATO and, in particular, the Europeans less so. This could whet the Russian appetite to try its luck, especially if there is an expectation that Alliance solidarity could prove hollow.

The Russians have ample capabilities, capacity, and experience in this field—NATO and, in particular, the Europeans less so.

Indeed, the fact that the political unravelling of the Alliance coincides with the revolution in the very nature of warfare bodes ill for the Europeans. One fears that the current setting might create temptations that could prove too alluring for Russia to resist.

It is imperative for Europeans to keep those temptations to a minimum. This calls for robust deterrence, combined with adept handling of relations across the Atlantic. Europe should try to avoid a situation in which it ends up in the role of a double demandeur: asking for peace and stability from Russia and, to achieve that, for political and military support from the Americans. Here, the iconic words of Henry Kissinger are worth repeating: “Whenever peace—conceived as the avoidance of war—has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community.”

It is a genuine European dilemma and even a paradox that, as of this writing, these words have currency both in our relations with Moscow and with Washington.

The Task Ahead

We must avoid the fate of hapless demandeurs for security and stability. That posture will carry very little weight in the present moment. On the contrary, the Europeans must be prepared to make forceful arguments that demand to be taken seriously on every front.

It goes without saying that keeping the peace in Europe is also in the US’s interest. This is easy to assert, but the uneasy question remains. Is this sentiment fully shared in the White House? In the current Trumpian framing, it seems, peace, security, and stability are not public goods with intrinsic value but commodities—or sources of leverage—traded to extract political and even financial gains. In the world of intense deal-making, peace sells, and the price tag is dictated from Washington.

None of this is to say that the Washington Treaty and NATO Article 5 have become null and void. Only a fool would claim that, even if the signs were completely obvious. And we are not there yet. However, there is significant uncertainty, and it is mounting. This uncertainty can, in its own right, act as a form of deterrent. Yet it is a poor substitute for the real thing: ironclad mutual security guarantees under which every inch of NATO territory is sacrosanct, beyond question. It is vital to our European interest to do everything in our power to ensure that this remains the case. One hopes that we can continue to do this in partnership with the Americans. But if need be, we Europeans must brace ourselves for the possibility of going it alone.

This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).