NATO After Ankara

NATO's Ankara summit showcased an alliance in transition. The European Allies and Canada are spending more to rebuild military capability and fill gaps left by a declining US role. NATO must now develop the political, military, and institutional arrangements that a genuinely Europeanised Alliance will need.

The European Allies’ main—albeit unspoken—aims for the Ankara summit were to avoid a public argument with the US and to demonstrate a resolute and cohesive alliance. In this they succeeded. 

Their fears that an ill-tempered Donald Trump would upset a carefully choreographed event were not realised even if, at moments, they must have held their breath. Ahead of the meeting, Trump loudly raised familiar complaints about the lack of support for his war in Iran, castigated Allies—Spain in particular—for poor defence spending, and once again threatened to take control of Greenland. But in his closing press conference, he spoke of “love” and “unity”. 

NATO published a declaration that underlined the Allies’ “ironclad commitment to our collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty” (even if Trump later dodged a direct question about whether the US would be there if Allies were attacked) and included just a few words on Iran that did not even hint at transatlantic tensions. 

The burden is shifting 

On investment and capabilities, the key point on the formal summit agenda, the European Allies and Canada had a good story to tell. NATO’s newly released defence spending figures showed that in 2025, they collectively spent over 570 billion USD (constant 2021 prices and exchange rates), 19% more than in 2024. If current trends continue, their spending could surpass that of the US in the coming years. 

They have declared many more units to the NATO force model, including many to replace those withdrawn by the US. For example, NATO officials assess that the European Allies and Canada have already filled almost 90% of the air defence gap left by the reassignment of US assets. And in terms of the all-important enablers, where Europe still depends too heavily on the US, NATO announced multinational projects to acquire A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft, Northrop Grumman Triton high-altitude long-endurance drones, and Saab GlobalEye airborne early warning and control platforms among 50 billion USD in new procurement projects. 

The European Allies also pledged 70 billion euros for military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine, both this year and next. Much of this is a repackaging of the 40-billion-euro pledge of long-term security assistance agreed at the Washington Summit in 2024 and allocations from the EU’s Ukraine support loan, but it underlines that by stepping up their own support, the European Allies and Canada have essentially replaced the contribution previously made by the US. 

Meanwhile, at a press conference with President Zelenskyy, Trump announced that the US would grant Ukraine a license to manufacture ‘Patriots’. He did not say whether this referred to complete systems or (more likely) to missiles. But in either case, legal requirements, infrastructure investment, training and the need to replenish stocks used in the Middle East likely mean that it will be some years before this comes to fruition. 

A few days later, in Paris, members of the ‘coalition of the willing’ and Ukraine highlighted the continuing priority attached to finding effective air and missile defence solutions by announcing a separate intent to develop an integrated missile defence architecture for Europe. 

Europeanisation requires more than capabilities 

The Ankara summit, then, showcased a NATO that is already some way down the path of ‘Europeanisation’. But if European Allies are not to build duplicative structures and capabilities elsewhere, a Europeanised NATO must also allow them to act through the Alliance, without risk of US interference or veto, in situations in which the US cannot or will not be engaged—at the same time, preserving the option for all 32 Allies to work together whenever possible. 

Increased defence spending and stronger, modernised European capabilities are essential. But other new arrangements will also be needed to make this Schrödinger’s NATO work, for example for operational and defence planning processes, command structures and procedures, defence industrial arrangements, and decision-making. 

Many of these items will be politically sensitive and expose transatlantic divisions. Here, the European Allies must be ready to stand up for their agenda for NATO and European security more widely. In addition to strengthening the core task of collective defence, this could include, for example, preserving arrangements that encourage collaboration with partners worldwide, most immediately with Ukraine, and allow crisis management tasks on Europe’s peripheries. Such tasks appear to have, at best, a very limited place in the ‘return to factory settings’ model for NATO envisaged by the Pentagon. 

There are, though, reasons to be cheerful. While the European Allies and Canada wanted a smooth summit, they also appear to have found a new confidence in dealing with, or brushing aside, Trump’s excesses. He is no doubt weakened internationally by his unproductive attack on Iran, but at the same time, the European Allies’ own position has certainly been reinforced by their substantial investment in defence and security. 

Furthermore, there will be no summit next year (the Ankara declaration referred only to “our next meeting”) removing what has become a burden, at least when it comes to dealing with the current US administration, from the NATO agenda. The European Allies and Canada can get down to the serious, and likely contentious business of pursuing their interests in the rebalancing of the transatlantic relationship, without distraction. 

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).