Recent months saw several reports that appear to indicate Russia’s increased military activities, including non-conventional ones, in the Baltic Sea basin. A question now arises: Is it just one more Russian information operation? Or does Moscow, amidst the confrontation with the West and NATO’s recent enlargement in the region, aim to strengthen its military presence and gain control over strategic geographic locations in the Baltic Sea?
Recent developments suggest that Moscow could be, on the one hand, sending threat messages, while on the other, it might also want to close off the waters. By doing so, it could try to gain full control over some areas in the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland, especially around the Kaliningrad region, and sea transport routes between Russia and the exclave region, while also restricting access for its NATO neighbours. It is of particular strategic concern for Moscow in light of the confrontation with the west.
On 26 July 2024, a Russian Navy vessel was suspected of violating Finland’s territorial waters in the Gulf of Finland. Reportedly, the hydrographic survey vessel in question belonged to the Russian Navy. The Mikhail Kazansky catamaran is a multifunctional modular hydrographic boat and a lead vessel in a series of three (Project 23370G), designed to perform pilot and hydrographic work, install (shoot) and service floating warning signs, as well as deliver service personnel, repair crews, food, fuel, and other cargo to coastal navigation aids, including to unequipped coasts. Most interestingly, such vessels can quickly measure depths in places where floating warning signs are installed using an echo sounder, which means they can be deployed for other military purposes as well.
The Murky Waters
Earlier, on 21 May, the Russian ministry of defence updated the list of coordinates from where the width of the strip of territorial waters off its mainland coast and islands in the Baltic Sea is measured. Additionally, Russia has proposed to establish a system of straight baselines in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, as well as in the area of Baltiysk and Zelenogradsk in the Kaliningrad region. The defence ministry thus deemed the 1985 documents “irrelevant” for they no longer agreed with the “geographical situation.” This would change the Russian state border in the Baltic Sea, thereby allowing the area to be used as Russia’s internal sea waters, the ministry added.
That proposal, however, did not contain the list of new coordinates that would reflect the revised state border. The changes are expected to take effect in January 2025. The document has been published on the official portal of draft regulatory legal acts and is currently at the public discussion stage. A day later, on 22 May, Russian state media released a statement by “a military-diplomatic source” saying that there were no intentions to revise the width of territorial waters, the economic zone, the continental shelf off the mainland coast, and the state border line of the Russian Federation in the Baltic Sea.
Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the ministry’s proposal had no political underpinning, although the level of confrontation in the region did require steps to ensure Russia’s security. He explained it as a response to the escalating tensions, especially in the Baltics, by NATO. “Of course, this requires appropriate steps from our relevant departments to ensure our security,” Peskov said. Yet, Russia was not in contact with the neighbouring states on that matter.
Less than 24 hours after the initial publication, the Baltic Sea border proposal was deleted from the governmental website. Soon, on 22 May, Tallinn stated that Russian border guards removed navigation buoys from the Estonian side of the Narva River separating the two countries.
The Larger Picture
Russia borders Lithuania and Poland in the Baltic Sea, near the cities of Baltiysk and Zelenogradsk in the Kaliningrad region, as well as Finland and Estonia in the Gulf of Finland. These recent developments could be just a threat directed at them. Or similarly to what it has tested with regard to the Northern Sea Route, Moscow might want to restrict access to the waters in those areas to its neighbours. Or it could be both. Moscow might, indeed, wish to close off those areas of the Baltic Sea, in and around the Kaliningrad region — Kurshskiy Bay (Kurisches Haff), Kaliningrad Bay (Vistula Lagoon), and Gdansk Bay — which Russia has been militarising since the 2010s.
Despite the Kremlin’s relatively calm acceptance of Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership, already in December 2022, then-Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that it was necessary to create two new military districts — Moscow and Leningrad — because NATO’s expansion of NATO required Russia to respond militarily. “Given NATO’s desire to increase its military potential near Russian borders, as well as to expand the North Atlantic Alliance at the expense of Finland and Sweden, response measures are required to create an appropriate group of troops in the north-west of Russia,” Shoigu said at the time. The presidential decree on the military-administrative division of Russia of 26 February 2024 assigned the republics of Karelia and Komi, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Kaliningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod, and Pskov regions to the newly-formed Leningrad military district.
How Real is the Threat?
Is it all an attempt to intimidate NATO members in the Baltic Sea? Russia might have been trying to spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt about its intentions in the region amidst the discussions about potentially sending troops to Ukraine intensifying around the same time. In recent months, NATO countries, including the Baltic and Nordic states, have sounded the alarm about nonconventional attacks from Russia, meaning cyber warfare, weaponised migration, and acts of sabotage.
Deleting a document hours after its publication may have been an attempt to correct a mistake: it was mistakenly put out earlier. However, it is hard to believe that it was released completely unintentionally. The website is the governmental portal that specialises in the publication of the official draft regulatory legal acts. Moreover, as soon as the document was up online, all the main Kremlin outlets started promoting it as news. Under the authoritarian political regime that is modern-day Russia, a government media resource cannot simply publicise an official document, let alone a security-related one, without prior approval from the relevant authorities.
What happened on the Narva River later only reinforces this conclusion. It might as well be an attempt to kill two birds with one stone: to deliver a threat and to increase its potency by closing off the waters in some areas of the Baltic Sea, especially near Kaliningrad, for the littoral states, which are all now members of NATO.
Prepare for the Worst
In the Kremlin’s military thinking, the most urgent and dangerous challenge to Russia’s security in that region is the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. This is due to the fact that not only has Russia’s land border with the Alliance grown, but also that the Baltic Sea has effectively turned into a NATO lake. Moreover, the Gulf of Finland, a strategically important — as well as the most convenient — transport artery to and from Kaliningrad can easily be blocked by the Estonian and Finnish navies, primarily by laying down mines, should they so choose. In that instance, the Russian Baltic Fleet, whose main forces are based in the Kaliningrad ports, would find itself in complete isolation, with all the ensuing consequences, according to Russian military experts.1
One must remember that the Russian and Chinese navies have recently practised a similar scenario. Soobrazitelnyi, a Baltic Fleet Steregushchy-class corvette, and China’s Jiaozuo destroyer conducted a joint exercise in the Gulf of Finland in late July. With radio-electronic equipment, they discovered ‘minefields’ installed by a simulated enemy and destroyed them with artillery fire. During that exercise, the two navy groupings simulated search and rescue operations and assisted a vessel ship damaged in combat.
Old Tricks & New Targets
What unfolded on the Narva River most probably was an information operation that targeted Estonia’s government and society, as well as those of its Baltic neighbours. Nevertheless, the tactic itself is not new either: Russia has been unilaterally moving its border further into Georgia for years now. With Moscow’s probable goals in mind, one might assume that it has been purposefully using asymmetric approaches in the Baltic-Nordic region. And it will continue to ‘respond asymmetrically’ if its enmity towards the west incurs.
NATO is already concerned that Russia will reconstitute militarily and pose a serious threat to its Baltic neighbours again. The Baltic states themselves, as well as European powers such as the UK, Germany, and France, have warned that Russia could be able to attack a NATO member within the next few years. Finnish President Alexander Stubb recently said that although such attack was “highly unlikely,” Finland and NATO should prepare nonetheless.
There is simply no other way for Russia — if it wants to challenge the west — but to resort to asymmetric methods. Moreover, if Russia were to win in Ukraine, even if Moscow were to stop there, it would not change its disruptive behaviour towards the bordering western nations. It would continue targeting their societies, particularly their voters, in order to put pressure on the governments. Most likely, Russia will rely on strategic asymmetry, given its intention to avoid a direct clash with the much stronger North Atlantic Alliance.2
Probably the best response from the targeted countries will be, as the Finnish president has suggested, to proceed “calmly and based on facts” so as not to allow Russia to sow confusion among the western decision-makers and publics. For instance, the representatives of six Nordic-Baltic Allies have recently met to discuss security on the eastern border. They came up with some joint activities, such as a ‘drone wall,’ to prevent or defend from threats that Russia and Belarus pose. It is such practical regional cooperation — rather than statements devoid of action — that will help strengthen deterrence against Russia’s asymmetric operations.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s). This article was first published on Diplomaatia.