While NATO was unable to agree on a new defence spending pledge at its Vilnius Summit in July 2023, calls to increase defence spending remain prominent. We look at what has changed since we last examined the data.
See the data examined in February 2023
See the data examined in July 2023
The table below gathers data on the Allies’ recent defence expenditure and their longer-term expectations.
Ally | 2014
Defence Expenditure %age GDP1 | 2023 (estimates)
Defence Expenditure %age GDP1 | Long Term | 2014
Equipment Expenditure % of Defence budget1 | 2023 (estimates)
Equipment Expenditure % of Defence budget1 | Spending Priorities |
Albania | 1.35% | 1.72% | 2024: 2.10%
2025: 2.21% | 16.7% | 25.2% | Baykar Bayraktar UAVs,
Javelin anti-armour & Stinger anti-air systems * |
Belgium | 0.97% | 1.21% | 2024: 1.24% *
2030: 1.57% *
2035: 2.00% * | 3.5% | 20.2% | Investment in equipment, in military hospitals |
Bulgaria | 1.31% | 1.87% | 2024: 2.00% *
2026: 2.40% * | 1.0% | 29.3% | Combat aircraft, patrol ships and armoured vehicles, 3D radars for air force * |
Canada | 1.01% | 1.33% | 2024/25: 1.51%
2024/25: 1.51%
2026/27: 1.59%
2030: 1.76% * | 13.0% | 14.4% | Lockheed Martin F-35, Boeing P8-8A Poseidon, General Atomics MQ-9B Reapers, trucks, new air-defence and counter-drone systems, anti-tank missiles for its troops in Latvia * |
Croatia | 1.82% | 1.75% | 2024: 1.50% * | 5.6% | 23.9% | Rafale fighter jets, Black Hawk helicopters * |
Czechia | 0.94% | 1.53% | 2024: 2.00% | 6.5% | 25.8% | 24 Lockheed Martin F-35 * |
Denmark | 1.15% | 2.00% | 2024: > 2.00% * | 11.0% | 13.4% | Air defence systems for the Army Brigade, missiles and drones |
Estonia | 1.94% | 2.89% | 2024: 3.20% | 22.2% | 39.3% | Enhancing Estonian Defence League - 300 million euros in 2024–2027
Short range air-defence systems PPZR Piorun *
Blue Spear 5G SSM anti-ship missiles * |
Finland | 1.29% | 2.46% | 2024: 2.30% * | 13.7% | 50.8% | Lockheed Martin F-35, missiles * |
France | 1.82% | 1.90% | 2024: 2.00% * | 24.6% | 28.2% | Ammunition, contact drones and remotely operated munitions, new aircraft carrier (long term investment) * |
Germany | 1.19% | 1.66% | 2024: 2.00% | 13.0% | 23.9% | Lockheed Martin F-35, Boeing transport helicopters, a Eurofighter version for electronic warfare, arming of the Heron drone * |
Greece | 2.22% | 3.05% | NA | 8.2% | 35.6% | 40 Lockheed Martin F-35 |
Hungary | 0.86% | 2.07% | 2024: 2.10 % * | 7.8% | 39.2% | Facility of Rheinmetall in Hungary, Lynx armoured combat vehicles, KF5 Panther tanks * |
Iceland | NA | NA | 2024: 0.01%
(civil defence) | NA | NA | NA |
Italy | 1.14% | 1.47% | 2024: > 1.46% *
2028: 2.00% * | 11.0% | 20.5% | Tanks, fighting vehicles and rocket launchers, 21 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems — US-made rocket launchers, new Leopard 2 A8 tanks, new armoured fighting vehicles to replace aging Dardo vehicles * |
Latvia | 0.94% | 2.37% | 2024: 2.40%
2026: 3.00% * | 7.6% | 26.3% | Development of military infrastructure, including the Selonia Military training area, development of a comprehensive national defence system
Naval Strike Missile anti-ship systems and six M142 HIMARS * |
Lithuania | 0.88% | 2.75% | 2024: 2.75% | 14.1% | 23.1% | Multiple launch missile systems, armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled howitzers, anti-tank systems, artillery radars, combat drones, uninhabited aerial vehicles, mid-range air defence systems |
Luxembourg | 0.37% | 1.01% | 2024: 0.83% | 22.6% | 41.4% | Modern military capabilities such as RPAS in the context of its ISR mission |
Montenegro | 1.50% | 1.55% | 2024: 2.00% * | 7.5% | 24.0% | NA |
Netherlands | 1.15% | 1.63% | 2024: 1.95% | 10.7% | 25.5% | Tank modernisation * |
North Macedonia | 1.09% | 1.70% | 2024: 2.05% | 5.9% | 34.2% | New air defence system from France, artillery systems from Türkiye, system solution for maintaining existing military aircraft until new helicopters are procured |
Norway | 1.55% | 1.80% | 2026: 2.00% * | 20.4% | 28.3% | increase in stocks of munitions and materiel, maintain buildings and important infrastructure, invests in the military personnel (more conscripts, more employees), five new frigates with anti-submarine helicopters, at least five new submarines, and a standardized vessel class of up to ten large and eighteen smaller vessels, long-range air defence systems |
Poland | 1.86% | 3.92% | 2024: 4.00% * | 18.9% | 53.6% | IBCS integrated air and missile defence command system, including the necessary command and communications equipment
150 K9 howitzers, 146 self-propelled K9PL howitzers *
AW101 helicopters and Saab 340 AEW early warning aircraft * |
Portugal | 1.31% | 1.48% | 2030: 2.00% | 8.4% | 22.1% | KC-390 aircraft, P-3 fleet modernisation for maritime patrol missions, coastal patrol ships |
Romania | 1.35% | 1.60% | 2024: 2.50% * | 15.8% | 21.9% | 298 new vehicles, e.g. fighting vehicles and howitzer * |
Slovakia | 0.99% | 2.05% | 2024: 2.00% * | 11.1% | 24.3% | Aircraft and tracked combat vehicles, development of armaments and infrastructure * |
Slovenia | 0.97% | 1.33% | 2024: 1.44% | 0.7% | 24.1% | Fire-fighting module for the Spartan transport aircraft |
Spain | 0.92% | 1.24% | 2024: 1.30% *
2029: 2.00% * | 13.5% | 28.1% | F110 frigates, S-80 submarines *
8×8 wheeled combat vehicle * |
Sweden2 | 1.10% | 1.30% (2022) | 2024: 2.10% * | NA | NA | Ammunition
321 armoured vehicles |
Türkiye | 1.45% | 1.58% | 2025: 2.00% * | 25.1% | 28.8% | NA |
United Kingdom | 2.13% | 2.28% | 2030: 2.50% * | 22.8% | 33.4% | Ammunition * |
United States | 3.72% | 3.24% | 2024-2026³:
> 3% | 26.0% | 28.8 | Critical investments across all timeframes and domains; investments in integrated air and missile defences and operational energy efficiency, as well as in air dominance, maritime dominance, and in munitions, including hypersonics * |
Notes:
* – Data from secondary source (e.g., media report), rather than from a primary source (e.g., government publication, ministerial communication)
1 Figures for 2014 and 2023 defence spending as a share of GDP and 2014 and 2023 equipment spending as a share of defence expenditure drawn from NATO’s February 2024 defence expenditure report.
2 Data 2014 and 2022 defence expenditure of Sweden from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2024).
³ The US Defence Budget for 2024 is $886 billion, $905 billion for 2025 and $924 billion for 2026, according to the National Defence Budget Document of the US Department of Defense.
At the Vilnius Summit, several Allies lobbied for a stronger NATO defence spending pledge. In the event, consensus was not possible but the Allies agreed to refresh their 2014 pledge, including by adding two small (and rather technical) enhancements. The first made clear that the 2% of GDP threshold should be an “enduring” commitment, not something to be reached once and ticked off like an item on a bucket list. The second stated that the less well-known target—that 20% of defence spending should be allocated to major equipment—should be met “in conjunction with a minimum of 2% of GDP annual defence expenditure”, thus challenging the claims of some Allies that spending well can be an adequate substitute for spending more. The refreshed pledge was also buttressed by a statement that many Allies would need to spend more than 2% to remedy shortfalls and meet requirements.
Nonetheless, at Vilnius, NATO’s most visible and politically powerful defence spending target remained at 2% of GDP. According to the Alliance’s latest official figures, 11 Allies are estimated to have reached this level in 2023, up from seven in 2022. Furthermore, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has announced that he expects this to rise to 18 in 2024, and that in the same year the Allies’ total defence spending will, for the first time, exceed 2% of their total GDP.
NATO has not yet published official figures for 2024, but the table above suggests that 20 Allies have indicated, either unofficially or via media, that they expect to make the grade. This will, however, still leave around one-third of the Allies falling short on commitments they first formally made ten years ago. Although some have plans to meet the target in the relatively short term (e.g., Türkiye, 2025), others see less urgency (e.g., Belgium, 2035; Portugal, 2030) and still others have no apparent expectation of meeting the target at all (e.g., Canada, Luxembourg).
Most of the changes since July 2023 are small, but positive. Denmark’s goal of investing 2% of GDP by 2030, for example, has already been met in 2023, while France and Germany will also reach 2% this year (previously 2025). For Germany, this will be the first time in 30 years to spend at this level, but the main boost is from the Sondervermögen (special fund) which will be exhausted by 2027. Less welcome, new figures also indicate that the defence spending of Croatia and Hungary is set to fall in 2024.
The target to spend 20% of the defence budget on major equipment, which we include here for the first time, is a more positive story. All Allies, expect for Denmark, are expected to exceed the target in 2023, some by a considerable margin. However, given the wide disparity of the figures reported by Allies and the sensitivity of this figure, especially in smaller states, to one-off investments in major programmes, it’s value as a metric must be questioned. Certainly, it does not have the political clout of the 2% target. At present, though, as was evident at Vilnius, the Allies collectively lack the appetite to make fresh commitments about investing in defence. It is also unlikely that they will wish to take up the issue again in July in Washington and risk clouding the Alliance’s 75th anniversary celebrations with another heated discussion about defence spending.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).