Defence Spending: Who Is Doing What? April 2024

While NATO was unable to agree on a new defence spending pledge at its Vilnius Summit in July 2023, calls to increase defence spending remain prominent. We look at what has changed since we last examined the data. 

See the data examined in February 2023

See the data examined in July 2023

The table below gathers data on the Allies’ recent defence expenditure and their longer-term expectations.

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Notes: 

* – Data from secondary source (e.g., media report), rather than from a primary source (e.g., government publication, ministerial communication) 

¹ Figures for 2014 and 2023 defence spending as a share of GDP and 2014 and 2023 equipment spending as a share of defence expenditure drawn from NATO’s February 2024 defence expenditure report. 

² Data 2014 and 2022 defence expenditure of Sweden from SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2024). 

³ The US Defence Budget for 2024 is $886 billion, $905 billion for 2025 and $924 billion for 2026, according to the National Defence Budget Document of the US Department of Defense. 

At the Vilnius Summit, several Allies lobbied for a stronger NATO defence spending pledge. In the event, consensus was not possible but the Allies agreed to refresh their 2014 pledge, including by adding two small (and rather technical) enhancements. The first made clear that the 2% of GDP threshold should be an “enduring” commitment, not something to be reached once and ticked off like an item on a bucket list. The second stated that the less well-known target—that 20% of defence spending should be allocated to major equipment—should be met “in conjunction with a minimum of 2% of GDP annual defence expenditure”, thus challenging the claims of some Allies that spending well can be an adequate substitute for spending more. The refreshed pledge was also buttressed by a statement that many Allies would need to spend more than 2% to remedy shortfalls and meet requirements.

Nonetheless, at Vilnius, NATO’s most visible and politically powerful defence spending target remained at 2% of GDP. According to the Alliance’s latest official figures, 11 Allies are estimated to have reached this level in 2023, up from seven in 2022. Furthermore, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has announced that he expects this to rise to 18 in 2024, and that in the same year the Allies’ total defence spending will, for the first time, exceed 2% of their total GDP.

NATO has not yet published official figures for 2024, but the table above suggests that 20 Allies have indicated, either unofficially or via media, that they expect to make the grade. This will, however, still leave around one-third of the Allies falling short on commitments they first formally made ten years ago. Although some have plans to meet the target in the relatively short term (e.g., Türkiye, 2025), others see less urgency (e.g., Belgium, 2035; Portugal, 2030) and still others have no apparent expectation of meeting the target at all (e.g., Canada, Luxembourg).

Most of the changes since July 2023 are small, but positive. Denmark’s goal of investing 2% of GDP by 2030, for example, has already been met in 2023, while France and Germany will also reach 2% this year (previously 2025). For Germany, this will be the first time in 30 years to spend at this level, but the main boost is from the Sondervermögen (special fund) which will be exhausted by 2027. Less welcome, new figures also indicate that the defence spending of Croatia and Hungary is set to fall in 2024.

The target to spend 20% of the defence budget on major equipment, which we include here for the first time, is a more positive story. All Allies, expect for Denmark, are expected to exceed the target in 2023, some by a considerable margin. However, given the wide disparity of the figures reported by Allies and the sensitivity of this figure, especially in smaller states, to one-off investments in major programmes, it’s value as a metric must be questioned. Certainly, it does not have the political clout of the 2% target. At present, though, as was evident at Vilnius, the Allies collectively lack the appetite to make fresh commitments about investing in defence. It is also unlikely that they will wish to take up the issue again in July in Washington and risk clouding the Alliance’s 75^th anniversary celebrations with another heated discussion about defence spending.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).