A New but Ambiguous Momentum in EU Enlargement

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The positive momentum can be observed in at least three ways. Firstly, the accession processes with Ukraine and Moldova were opened, negotiations got underway with Albania, and as many chapters were closed in the last three months of 2024 as had been opened in three years before that. More intergovernmental conferences are planned for 2025 and for the first time in 10 years, the Commission has a realistic prospect of bringing an aspirant member state (Montenegro) to the finish line.

Secondly, sizeable financial instruments have come on stream. Disbursement under the €6bn Growth Plan for the Balkans and the €50bn Ukraine Facility has started. A Growth Plan for Moldova awaits formal adoption. And thirdly, the enthusiasm of Marta Kos, who took up office as Commissioner for Enlargement on 1 December 2024 to replace her widely loathed Hungarian predecessor, is blowing a breath of fresh air through DG ENEST, the newly named Directorate General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood. Kos has placed the quest for EU values back on the top of the agenda.

Yet, contradictions and ambiguities taint the new momentum. Compare, for instance, the differences in the EU’s handling of the problematic cases of Georgia and Serbia. On the one hand, the European Council paused Georgia’s pre-accession process in response to the government’s blatant disregard for the ‘fundamentals’ of EU membership: respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. On the other hand, there has been a notable dilution of the EU’s values-based criteria in the institutions’ silent treatment of the crisis of democracy created by the government of Serbia. Such contradictory practices raise questions about the very nature of pre-accession conditionality and the consequences that any double standards may have on the candidates, the enlargement process, and the EU.

When looking at the formal process, there has been a a notable acceleration

Balancing Progress Across and Within Regions

When looking at the formal process, there has been a notable acceleration over the last year. Ukraine and Moldova held their first intergovernmental conferences in June 2024, and the Commission is currently screening their domestic rule books and governance structures in the light of the EU acquis, with 35 chapters grouped in six clusters. Political momentum is building to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals) during the Polish EU Presidency.

For the Western Balkans, there has been little movement in the officially reported preparedness for accession.¹ Yet, the EU has been levelling progress for the region with that in Ukraine and Moldova. Negotiation clusters 1 and 6 (external relations) have been opened with Albania, and three technical chapters have been closed with Montenegro. Podgorica nominally met the interim benchmarks in its fundamentals cluster, signalling that the end of negotiations is in sight.

Despite evidence about its continued backsliding on the fundamentals, Serbia also advanced on its pre-accession track, with the December 2024 General Affairs Council approving a letter inviting Belgrade to submit its negotiation positions for chapters 16 and 19, which are part of cluster 3 (competitiveness and inclusive growth).

The Commission justifies this advancement by referring to the so-called ‘balancing clauses’, which include regional integration efforts and the normalisation of relations between neighbours.² These considerations have appeared alongside the traditional ‘merits-based’ approach but seem to be applied to the detriment of the very fundamentals the EU professes to uphold.

Similarly, the European Council has moved Bosnia-Herzegovina from ‘potential’ candidate country status in 2022 to the brink of opening accession negotiations in March 2024, without the country having fully implemented any of the relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendations.³ The status upgrade bestowed upon Bosnia-Herzegovina can only be convincingly explained by the geopolitical need felt by the member states to balance inter- and intra-regional momentum on the pre-accession track.

The EU’s new interpretative tools have their limits though. Kosovo continues to languish in ‘potential’ candidate country status, held back by a lack of progress in the EU-facilitated dialogue with Serbia and the non-recognition of its statehood by five member states. As North Macedonia has also experienced, the consequences of continuing political blockage by member states wielding their veto power at any of the many steps in the decision-making process are ominous. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s accession process remains frozen, pending access of Cyprus to its ports and airports, and recognition more widely.

The lack of transparency over the rating of progress serves as a cover to (geo)politically spin the conclusions

Various independent studies have shown that no candidate state is anywhere near completing the course purely on merit.⁴ This suggests a bleaker picture than the political statements of the Commission and the Council let on.⁵ The lack of transparency on the part of the Commission over the rating of progress required for accession is more than a technical weakness – it serves as a cover to (geo)politically spin the conclusions it draws from candidates’ performance.

The Curious Case of Serbia

Following on from protests over election fraud in 2023, anti-government demonstrations reignited in 2024 after the collapse of a Chinese-built structure in Novi Sad that killed 15 people. Despite its continuous backsliding on the fundamentals, now also by using Chinese technology to create a ‘digital prison’ for its opponents, Serbia has been allowed to advance its pre-accession with the approval of the opening benchmarks assessment report of cluster 3.⁶ During a joint press conference in October 2024, Commission President von der Leyen even congratulated President Vučić personally by saying:

Dear Aleksander […], [y]ou have shown that you can meet the necessary benchmarks. You have committed to delivering on reforms, in particular on the fundamentals, as you just said, of rule of law and democracy. And you have shown that deeds follow your words.⁷

High-ranking EU officials have tried to deflect from this questionable statement by pointing to Serbia’s fulfilment of the technical standards for cluster 3, the country’s slowly growing alignment with CFSP decisions (57%, up from 51% in 2023), and the need to also take Belgrade’s performance on the balancing clauses into account.⁸ The latter is especially counterintuitive given Serbia’s feet-dragging in the investigation of the 2023 Serb paramilitary attack on Banjska and its war of words over the 2024 sabotage of civilian infrastructure for drinking water in Kosovo. It would seem that as long as technical standards are met, the Commission is ready to interpret the balancing clauses in a positive manner.

More powerful geopolitical and geoeconomic arguments exist to explain the EU’s stance. Firstly, the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans has been fixated on Belgrade for years, banking on the premise that regional stability can only be guaranteed by aligning Serbia (the biggest potential threat) and that more support from the west will keep Vučić from dealing with autocratic leaders of adversarial states (Russia and China).⁹ While results of this approach have so far been disappointing, Belgrade’s decisions to make weapons available to Ukraine and sign a deal to buy French Rafale fighter jets have generated goodwill and more wishful thinking.

Secondly, by signing a strategic partnership on critical raw materials and encouraging lithium mining, the EU is prioritising the future of its own electric vehicle industry over Serbian citizens’ most basic (health) and political rights.¹⁰ This is a worrying development, whereby the EU becomes complicit to a candidate country’s backsliding on the fundamentals.

An Explosion of Bilateral Disputes?

Pre-accession conditionality, which has always been subject to political interpretation, is being eroded by the EU itself at a more rapid pace and to an extent not seen before. This phenomenon goes beyond the creeping nationalisation of the enlargement policy, whereby individual member states take not just the progress of a candidate country but also the pursuit of the interests of the rest of the EU hostage to settle parochial scores.¹¹ It touches on the key role to be played by the Commission, i.e. that of guardian of the treaties. When it is seen to be pushing the strategic interests of a couple, mainly big member states, the Commission undermines the credibility of the entire enlargement policy and the EU.

Pre-accession conditionality is being eroded by the EU itself at a more rapid pace and to an extent not seen before

As the EU applies double standards to candidate countries, it may be inadvertently fuelling simmering disputes that have the potential of boiling over. Bosnia-Herzegovina does not need much to descend into political violence. All it takes is for President Dodik to advance his secessionist agenda for Republika Srpska. Under the banner of a greater ‘Serbian World’, President Vučić would likely fan the flames of irredentism, also in Kosovo.¹² Certain member state governments might turn a blind eye and leave the EU in the position of a bystander to a fire that others, like the US, might this time not put out.

Today’s Poster Child, Tomorrow’s Bête Noire?

For now, EU enlargement has been given a new lease on life by the Council’s encouraging language in its conclusions of December 2024, creating the impression that a swift accession of Montenegro should be possible.¹³ Podgorica pushes for 2028, while 2030 is a more frequently cited possible date in EU circles.

But like all other Western Balkan countries, Montenegro has unresolved issues with its neighbours. In a compilation published in 2022, the Croatian Academy of Science and Arts listed, among others, the protection of Croatian minority rights, guaranteed mandates for Croats in the Montenegrin Parliament, and the demarcation of the land border.¹⁴ If the government in Zagreb were to demand the resolution of any or all of these issues as a condition for Montenegro’s accession to the EU, then 2030, let alone 2028, would all of sudden look unrealistically early to complete the entire process.

To be sure, such bilateral disputes are not contained to just the Balkan candidates. The present Hungarian government also seems intent on returning to history’s legacies of Hungarian diasporas, inter alia in Ukraine.

The Accelerating Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy

The general point is clear, though: historical nationalism is poison for the enlarging EU. The bad news is that the rise of the radical right is compounding uncertainties reflected in the enlargement process.

Historical nationalism is poison for the enlarging EU

Radical right parties are in government in seven member states (Belgium, Croatia, Finland, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Slovakia), returning to power in Austria, in controlling positions in parliament in France and Sweden, and expected to make advances in upcoming elections in other member states (notably Germany). Even if the positions of these parties vary on the issue of EU enlargement, the accelerating nationalisation of the policy introduces more complexities into Council decision-making than the EU can handle.¹⁵

While the new momentum in enlargement is real, it risks making the structural flaws bigger

While the new momentum in enlargement is real, it risks making the structural flaws from which the policy suffers only bigger. Escape routes into the Single Market are being built under the banner of ‘gradual integration’, but they too risk becoming a dead end on the way to full membership if this is where member states impervious to enlargement want to park some or all candidates.¹⁶ Yet, without a return to the values-based pre-accession conditionality and a change in decision-making requirements for enlargement, the time will come to pursue the alternatives without ambiguity – at least for a certain political period – to offset the costs of non-enlargement.¹⁷

Endnotes

1. Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, “Commission adopts 2024 Enlargement Package,” European Commission, 30 October 2024.
2. “EU-Western Balkans Summit: a renewed approach to the region,” Friends of Europe, 5 December 2024. See the comments of DG Koopman at approx. 1h36 into the video recording.
3. European Commission, Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions 2022 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, COM(2022) 528 final (Brussels: European commission, 12 October 2022).
4. “European Commission releases the 2024 Enlargement Package: How much has each candidate advanced?,” European Western Balkans, 30 October 2024; Michael Emerson and Steven Blockmans, “A Redynamised EU Enlargement Process, but Hovering Between Accession and the Alternatives,” SCEEUS Guest Report No. 1 (January 2025); European Stability Initiative, Scorecard 2024 What the Commission assessments reveal, ESI Background Paper (ESI, 31 October 2024).
5. Directorate-General, “Commission adopts”; General Affairs Council, Council Conclusions On Enlargement (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 17 December 2024).
6. “Serbia: A Digital Prison”: Surveillance and the suppression of civil society in Serbia: Executive Summary,” Amnesty International, 16 December 2024.
7. Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, “Statement by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with Serbian President Vučić,” European commission, 25 October 2024.
8. Friends of Europe, “EU-Western Balkans Summit.”
9. Florian Bieber, “What is a stabilitocracy?,” BiEPAG, 5 May 2017.
10. The European Union and the Republic of Serbia, Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a Strategic Partnership on Sustainable Raw Materials, Battery Value Chains and Electric Vehicles (Belgrade, 19 July 2024).
11. Christophe Hillion, The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement Policy, Report No. 6 (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, November 2010).
12. Igor Bandović, “Serbian World – A Threat to European Integration and Stability of the Western Balkans,” REUNIR Horizon, 8 June 2024.
13. General Affairs Council, Council Conclusions.
14. “Prilozi Za Zaštitu Hrvatskih Nacionalnih Interesa Prilikom Pregovora Republike Hrvatske S Bosnom I Hercegovinom, Crnom Gorom I Srbijom U Pogledu Njihova Ulaska U Europsku Uniju [Contributions for the Protection of Croatian National Interests During the Negotiations of the Republic of Croatia with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia with a View to Their Entry into the European Union],” Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 20 May 2022.
15. Ioannis Alexandris, The rise of radical right and Eurosceptic political forces and the impact on the EU’s enlargement policy (Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, 29 January 2025).
16. Emerson and Blockmans, “A Redynamised EU Enlargement Process.”
17. Anna Hofmann and Wojciech Przybylski, Costs of Non-Enlargement — Foresight Report (Visegrad Insight, March 2024)