The year 2025 is likely to be the most important year of the ongoing war in Ukraine, apart from 2022, when Ukraine successfully resisted Russia and managed to liberate a significant portion of its territory. Since that success, such momentum and manoeuvres have not been seen again, with the exception of the Ukrainian operation in Russia’s Kursk region. The failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive was largely the fault of the west, which delayed sufficient military aid due to fears of provoking Russia into escalating the conflict.
The coming year is expected to mark the final phase of the war of attrition – both sides are at the limits of their capabilities. Although the west has regarded Russia’s transition to a wartime economy as dangerous, this shift also burdens the Russian population itself, driving inflation and interest rate hikes, diverting funds from all other sectors of society, and hitting the middle and lower classes the hardest. Ukraine’s economy has relied heavily on western aid since the beginning of the invasion, as Russia has destroyed or damaged much of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and made many normal business activities impossible.
On the front line, there have been no major changes compared to last year. Ukraine has lost nearly two-thirds of the territory it captured in Kursk, but holding that land was never a goal in itself. Far more telling is the fact that Putin initially ordered Kursk to be retaken by 1 October. In the east, Russia has clearly seized the initiative – at great cost in casualties but with a tactic that allows for continued advances. The greatest pressure from Russian forces is being felt in Donetsk, particularly in the strategically important city of Pokrovsk, a key logistical hub that, if captured, would open broader operational possibilities in the Donbas region.
Russia’s tactics may appear suicidal, but they are based on calculated reasoning. Small groups attempt to advance metre by metre, supported either by drone strikes targeting Ukrainian rear positions or by artillery fire against Ukrainian defences. This approach has two advantages: if the small units advance, they secure new positions; but even if they are detected and fired upon, Russian forces gain easy targets for indirect fire. Additionally, this method helps reduce Russian equipment losses to some extent, as armoured vehicles are only deployed once infantry has achieved a breakthrough.
On Ukraine’s side, shortages persist in almost every domain. The supply of ammunition has improved over the years. In drones, there is even a degree of parity: Ukrainian drones inflict heavy losses on Russian units, but the same happens in reverse. One of the most critical needs, therefore, is electronic warfare equipment to disrupt enemy drones. Russia’s use of glide bombs has had a devastating impact on Ukraine – a direct consequence of the country’s lack of air defence systems and insufficient number of fighter aircraft.
Shortage of Soldiers and Equipment
Ukraine’s biggest concern is manpower. This is a complex problem that cannot be solved simply by lowering the mobilisation age, as some US politicians have suggested. However, it is worth noting that this proposal is based partly on President Volodymyr Zelensky’s own messaging, which frames the war as existential for Ukraine. If something is existential, the question arises as to why certain decisions are still being weighed with other considerations in mind. For instance, during the Winter War (1939–40), Finland initially set the mobilisation age range at 21–40, mainly to keep the economy functioning, but as the war continued, this range was expanded.
In 2024, Ukraine lowered the mobilisation age from 27 to 25, yet the average age of soldiers on the front remains 43. Mobilisation of younger age groups has not been very effective. Ukrainians, on the other hand, argue that it is cynical to demand mobilisation without properly equipping soldiers, as most would be killed before even firing a shot. Existing units must be fully staffed and provided with all necessary equipment from the outset of training to ensure they are combat-ready. The quality of training is also critical. Shortcuts have often been taken to deploy troops more quickly, but for inexperienced soldiers, training is their only foundation. For now, it seems that Ukraine is in the final stages of developing a draft mobilisation reform to attract 18- to 25-year-old men and women. It is important to keep in mind that if laws and regulations cannot be enforced, they are of no use.
Last year, Ukraine attempted to form new brigades without enough equipment in stock, assuming the west would supply them – but that did not happen. As a result, the current focus is on fully equipping already existing units. On the front line, the shortage of soldiers is often addressed by repurposing support units, with infantry being staffed by mortar crews, drone operators, or medics. However, this weakens frontline capabilities, as infantry units need these specialists’ support under enemy fire.
Challenges – but No Immediate Risk of the Front Collapsing
However, Ukraine has also struggled to reform its mobilisation system to make it more effective and fairer. It is common for wealthier men or those with good connections to avoid conscription, while less privileged individuals – even those unfit for service due to health issues – are still being drafted. Such injustices create social tensions and fuel resistance to mobilisation.
Equipment, training, and frontline conditions directly impact the morale of both mobilised troops and serving soldiers. The west’s slow and cautious approach, as well as hesitation to cross Russia’s so-called red lines, has led to a situation where more Ukrainians are either deserting or avoiding mobilisation.
By the end of this year, Ukraine aims to have mobilised an additional 200 000 soldiers. Whether this is feasible remains to be seen, but such a reinforcement on the front is urgently needed. Despite these challenges, there is no immediate risk of the front collapsing. Losing a strategic city does not mean losing the war; as seen in Vuhledar and Avdiivka, Ukrainians have shown they can reorganise their defences and continue fighting.
What the West Must Do This Year
It is likely that Russia’s key allies – China, Iran, and North Korea – will continue and even increase their support to Russia in 2025. While Iran and North Korea have little to lose on the international stage, China is more cautious, attempting to distance itself from direct involvement in Russia’s war. The purchase of sanctioned Russian goods is managed at a regional level, where potential US sanctions on dollar transactions carry less weight. At the same time, Beijing can claim that any support for Russia – including the supply of dual-use goods and technology – is the work of private companies and not the Chinese state.
Following its strategic partnership agreement with North Korea last year, Russia has now signed a similar but even more extensive agreement with Iran. While it seems unlikely that this could lead to Iranian troops joining the war, the possibility cannot be ruled out. At the start of this year, Iran delivered additional Arman air defence systems and Fath-360 tactical ballistic missile systems to Russia. Analysts believe North Korea is not only continuing to supply ammunition but also preparing a second rotation of North Korean soldiers.
The west must take all of these developments into account, alongside political shifts in western governments and the possibility of the US pushing for negotiations. Ukrainians are already growing disillusioned with the west, opening an opportunity for Russian influence operations. The west has delayed aid on multiple occasions, most notably when the US suspended assistance for months. To ensure that Ukraine can continue to defend itself, the existing efforts – which have proven insufficient in their current scope – must be intensified. Long-range missiles and air defence systems are a priority. The training of Ukrainian units too must continue, and the option of establishing training centres within Ukraine should be considered.
For Kyiv to enter negotiations with any meaningful leverage, it must hold the initiative on the battlefield, while Russia’s position must deteriorate. As things stand, Moscow has no real incentive to negotiate – its forces are advancing, and it has not abandoned its maximalist goal of subjugating Ukraine. Russia uses ceasefires in a deceptive way – not to move towards peace but to prepare for future offensives. The issue is not just about territory but the fate of its people, which Ukraine has consistently emphasised. As Nobel laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk put it, Ukraine cannot simply abandon its citizens in the occupied territories, where they face torture, rape, execution, and deportation – “Occupation is a continuation of war, only in a different form.”
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s). This article was first published on Diplomaatia.