Nobody expected NATO’s heads of state and government to pull rabbits from a hat when they met in Washington this week. Big decisions on Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and spending had been taken, or at least argued over, in previous years in Madrid and Vilnius. Many Allies, notably the US hosts, were eager to avoid drama. In the event, the summit and its declaration were sober and businesslike but, given the challenges facing the Alliance, somewhat unambitious.
The Allies had promised to provide Ukraine with a strong and well-lit ‘bridge’ to NATO membership, although they had provided few details of what this might mean. In the end, the bridge was not the tangible path to Ukraine’s accession that the metaphor perhaps implies, but a collection of new and existing initiatives, most significantly the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) and a pledge of long-term security assistance. NSATU, a new effort involving some 700 staff commanded from Wiesbaden, Germany, will take over some coordination of the supply of weapons and training from the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format). It is important practically, but also symbolically as NATO as an institution will take a (coordinating) role in the supply of lethal weaponry for the first time.
The pledge of long-term assistance was originally proposed by Stoltenberg as a €100 billion five-year fund, but was downgraded by him, in the face of Allies’ hesitancy, to a commitment of €40 billion a year for as long as necessary. Disappointingly, what emerged from Washington was “a minimum baseline funding of €40 billion within the next year” to be re-evaluated at future summits. This sum is roughly what the Allies have provided so far each year and is unlikely to be enough to allow Ukraine to launch counteroffensives any time soon. It is also hard to see that this short-term, non-binding commitment provides Ukraine with the enduring, predictable support NATO claims it is providing.
More positively, the Secretary General will be required to report twice per year on performance against this pledge, taking account of Allies’ GDP and thus offering the prospect, at least, that peer pressure within NATO will push some Allies to contribute more. In this regard, the Alliance was able to welcome important military support packages, including for much-needed air defence systems, that several Allies announced around the summit. NATO also upgraded its language on Ukraine’s membership, reportedly a detail on which the Allies struggled to find consensus, even if its practical impact is limited. The declaration says that Ukraine is on an “irreversible” path to NATO membership.
As major decisions on defence and deterrence were taken at last year’s Vilnius Summit, notably the agreement of new regional defence plans, the Washington Summit was mostly expected to take stock, rather than set new tasks. The declaration provides an extensive list of actions NATO has taken to “accelerat[e] the modernisation of our collective defence” (including, of regional interest, confirmation of the development of a NATO presence in Finland).
At about the same as leaders met in Washington, Allied ministries of defence should have received the first set of capability targets derived from the new plans. These are expected to be highly demanding and their implementation will likely require a range of new industrial and procurement measures and, crucially, increased defence spending. In Washington, heads of state and government endorsed a new industrial capacity expansion pledge to help deliver against the requirements of the regional defence plans. They also recognised that “more [investment] is needed urgently to sustainably meet our commitments as NATO Allies” but were silent on how this would be achieved. Absent a new defence spending pledge, the implementation of the regional defence plans will be a key test of whether NATO can stimulate defence spending and ensure fair burden-sharing. However, much of the detail regarding the plans will be classified, making it harder for the European Allies to persuade the American public that they are doing enough to justify continued US engagement in NATO.
NATO summits are often labelled ‘historic’ although only a few really deserve this designation. NATO’s 50th anniversary summit, held in Washington in 1999 arguably makes the grade as the Alliance welcomed its first new members from central and eastern Europe and published a new strategic concept, cementing its place in the post-Cold War world. But 25 years later, NATO needs new thinking regarding its support to Ukraine and its strategy towards Russia more widely. Meanwhile, the European Allies are still not doing enough to secure the Alliance’s transatlantic future. It is not clear that the Allies addressed these pressing issues in Washington. Aside from marking 75 years of NATO, a significant achievement which heads of state and government rightly recognise in the opening paragraph of their declaration, this year’s summit is unlikely to go down in history.