Over the past year, Belarus has released 700–800 political prisoners in exchange for US sanctions relief, and the Belarusian companies removed from American blacklists include the state-owned potash firms now receiving American orders. But why is potash driving the Trump administration to engage with Lukashenka's regime, and what implications does this have for the EU?
Potash is a key agricultural fertiliser used to maximise crop yields and replenish soil nutrients, consisting of water-soluble potassium compounds. Countries rich in potash and with the industrial capacity to mine, process, and ship the resource include Canada, Russia, and Belarus. Together, the three accounted for around 77% of all potash exports in 2024. Unsurprisingly, Canada has been the dominant supplier of potash to the US agricultural market, meeting between 80–90% of US potash demand.
US overtures to Belarus appear to have devolved into bargaining over economic policy following the deterioration in US–Canada trade relations.
Farmers, in the US and elsewhere, have faced higher fertiliser costs in recent years: prices spiked in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and, despite stabilising relatively quickly, have continued on an upward trajectory. Price increases, however, are a response to rising global demand – driven primarily by Brazil, countries in Southeast Asia, and China – as well as supply-chain pressures, including higher costs and diesel shortages. Notably, potash is not among the fertilisers that have seen the sharpest price rises over the past year, a fact that may stymie Trump’s ability to score a political win with farmers ahead of the midterms. In an attempt to address US farmers’ grievances, Trump posted on Truth Social that the US was working towards a “massive Deal” to source potash from Belarus.
While US overtures to Belarus began in late 2024 as part of the American strategy towards Russia–Ukraine talks, discussions appear to have devolved into bargaining over economic policy following the deterioration in US–Canada trade relations. This represents yet another wrinkle in the complicated fabric of transatlantic relations, particularly as reports have emerged that the US is interested in transporting Belarusian potash through EU member states, with Lithuania’s Klaipėda port as a preferred export route.
Canada: Holding the Trump Card
When the Trump administration applied its first round of tariffs to Canadian goods in early 2025, there was a flurry of activity to determine which duties applied to potash. Initially, fertiliser was subject to the 25% rate, before being reduced to 10% a month later, with an exception for goods qualifying for duty-free status under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement. Leading Canadian potash companies fell under this exemption, resulting in no tariffs on potash. The administration seems to have learned a lesson: the latest round of US tariffs on Canadian goods in July 2026 left potash off the list entirely.
Canada, however, is aware of US dependence. Ontario Premier Doug Ford has noted that “if we ever cut out that potash, their agricultural sector would be dead overnight […] it’s one of our most powerful tools.” Prime Minister Mark Carney has taken a more measured tone, saying that Canada does not intend to use its natural resources as “leverage” against the US. Yet it is clear that he is conscious of the tools available if relations worsen.
Canadian potash production is booming thanks to global demand. There is a well-developed network of transport corridors linking Canada and the US through which potash can be shipped, and Canadian potash giant Nutrien selected Washington state as the location for a new terminal that, if built, would “allow the company to ship as much product through Washington as through Canadian ports by the early 2030s.” The US push for alternative sources of potash is, therefore, hardly a result of Canadian supply problems or infrastructure deficiencies.
Belarus: The Art of the Deal?
Potash represents one of Belarus’ most important industries and was its top export in 2024. However, since 2022, exporting the fertiliser has become increasingly difficult. Demand in India dried up entirely due to transport challenges and the inability to agree on payment in national currencies, while Brazil has reduced its orders. The EU market also disappeared due to sanctions. China, thousands of kilometres away, has since become the top importer of Belarusian potash. These factors have prompted Belarus to resort to dumping strategies – that is, pricing its potash far below market prices – in order to drive demand and remain competitive with Russian potash companies, whose products receive priority on shared Russian railways. Belarus’ low prices are due, in part, to the very sanctions that the US has just lifted.
The extent to which Belarusian potash could deliver Trump’s promised lower prices is highly uncertain. First, while the price difference between Belarusian and Canadian potash, rumoured to be as much as $80–$120 per tonne, may indeed be significant, this does not take into account the transport costs of shipping the potash across the Atlantic, up the Mississippi River, and then overland to Midwestern farming communities. The amount of potash supplied to the US is also unlikely to pose any serious challenge to Canadian dominance of the US market. Prior to 2021, the US imported only about 5% of its potash from Belarus. The first shipment of Belarusian potash to the US is rumoured to amount to 30 000 tonnes; by comparison, the US imported 10.5 million tonnes from Canada in 2023. Lukashenka has acknowledged that most of Belarus’ potash supply is already contracted and that supplying large volumes to western countries is not possible.
Belarus’ low prices are due, in part, to the very sanctions that the US has just lifted.
There may be more on the table than mere diversification of potash sourcing. Reports have emerged of discussions around the potential sale of the Nezhinsky potash mine to Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, after Chinese investors backed out, an idea that a Lithuanian politician has acknowledged “is not exactly a conspiracy theory.” Lukashenka has also floated the idea of a joint nitrogen plant project involving the US, Belarus, and Russia’s Gazprom – which Putin has apparently given a nod of approval to.
This comes amid a broader push by Belarus to re-engage with Europe. On the sidelines of the 2026 UN General Assembly, the Polish and Belarusian foreign ministers met in a rare instance of dialogue, while Belarus has indicated its willingness to reinstate military transparency measures and early warning mechanisms with NATO members.
Yet it remains a valid question whether Belarus is capable of making autonomous foreign policy decisions. A June 2026 report by the New Eurasian Strategies Centre details the extent to which Belarus has become institutionally, economically, and fiscally intertwined with Russia since 2020 and concludes that Belarus retains limited sovereignty only because full annexation is too costly for Moscow. The Union State framework allows Russia to use Belarus as a tool for sanctions evasion and to test western willingness to provide economic relief in exchange for humanitarian concessions. Moscow has apparently liked what it has seen: the US envoy responsible for talks with Belarus, John Coale, has recently been named “Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs,” with duties that include negotiating for the release of political prisoners in Russia in exchange for sanctions relief.
The EU: Sanctions as Accountability
For the EU, this is the latest episode of American transactionalism to arrive on its doorstep. Lithuania in particular finds itself in a difficult position. Officially, the US has yet to formally request that Belarusian potash be exported to the Baltic Sea through Lithuania’s Klaipėda port. However, since May 2026, reports have emerged that discussions have begun and Washington is applying “pressure.” The current EU sanctions regime against Belarus remains in place until February 2027, when it is due for renewal, a period that coincides with Lithuania’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union.
Lithuania’s policy towards its eastern neighbour reflects Belarus’ participation in the hybrid war against Europe and its role in supporting Russia’s violence against Ukraine. The Lukashenka administration has weaponised migration, directing illegal migrants into Lithuania; hot-air balloons smuggling cigarettes have disrupted flights at Vilnius airport; and Lithuania’s State Security Department has accused Russian and Belarusian intelligence agencies of plotting attacks against Belarusians living in Lithuania. Lithuania banned the transit of Belarusian potash through its territory in early 2022, officially recognising such transit as contrary to the state’s national security interests.
The willingness of some Lithuanian politicians to consider restoring transit connections with Belarus, combined with US-led incentives, risks creating enough internal pressure in Lithuania for it to become a point of failure in the renewal of the EU’s sanctions package.
Lithuania’s foreign minister has rejected calls to ease sanctions on Belarus, saying that Belarus has yet to change its behaviour. Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has also encouraged European leaders to remain firm in their sanctions regime against Minsk as Belarus continues its political repression and unjust imprisonment of citizens. However, other voices have emphasised the potential leverage this could provide Lithuania. Centre-right member of parliament Matas Maldeikis has argued that transport fees could be used to fund defence spending and aid to Ukraine, saying, “Let Lukashenka explain to Putin why he supports the Ukrainian army.” However, the logic behind sanctions is not to maximise profit for one’s own treasury but to apply meaningful pressure on another state in order to change its actions. Lithuania could profit from permitting any number of Belarusian exports through its territory, as foreign policy expert Albinas Januska has pointed out.
The willingness of some Lithuanian politicians to consider restoring transit connections with Belarus, combined with US-led incentives such as the recent bilateral minerals deal and the prospect of a permanent US military base, risks creating enough internal pressure in Lithuania for it to become a point of failure in the renewal of the EU’s sanctions package against Belarus next year. This is the scenario most beneficial to Belarus and, by extension, Russia. Rather than the EU remaining united in renewing sanctions or proactively using them to secure concessions from Belarus – ideally reducing both its hybrid activity towards Europe and its role in the war against Ukraine – the sanctions could fizzle out amid internal disagreement. This represents the kind of political splintering that Moscow is eager to exploit as part of its drive to disrupt support for Ukraine and weaken the measures constraining its war economy.
Looking Ahead
That the US has pivoted towards transactional diplomacy is no secret, and the question of potash transport is the latest instance in which the EU must decide how to engage with this approach. It is not alone. As the EU works to define the status of ‘associate member’, potash provides an opportunity for Canadians and Europeans to demonstrate the value of coordinating diplomacy, sanctions, and economic policy. The EU, and Lithuania in particular, should recognise the role Canada plays in the Trump administration’s potash strategy.
The political impact of the US sourcing Belarusian fertiliser overshadows any economic drivers, and the potential easing of EU sanctions on Belarus is far more significant to Belarus than the potash is to the US.
Between Canada’s dominant market position and the logistical challenges facing Belarusian exports, it is difficult to see how a US–Belarus deal could result in meaningful changes in global potash flows. As such, the political impact of the US sourcing Belarusian fertiliser overshadows any economic drivers, and the potential easing of EU sanctions on Belarus is far more significant to Belarus than the potash is to the US. This imbalance should form the foundation for any discussion the EU decides to have about adjusting its sanctions on Belarus, alongside a frank assessment of the role Belarus continues to play in Russia’s war against Ukraine and its hybrid strategy against Europe.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).