NATO’s summit in The Hague succeeded in producing a substantial and important deliverable—a new defence investment pledge. But in dealing with the underlying strains in the transatlantic relationship, the summit was more sticking plaster than long-term cure. If the European Allies are not to be continually buffeted by the turbulence of the Trump administration, they cannot rely on simply seeking to avoid confrontation, as they did in the Netherlands. They will need to find the confidence to pursue their own interests more forcefully. In part, this confidence will come from successfully implementing the key summit deliverable.
When NATO leaders met on Wednesday for what was trailed as a crucial summit, the European Allies’ main objective was to avoid a transatlantic bust-up. The summit was thus shaped around two main drivers. The first was to ensure that there were as few opportunities as possible to upset President Trump—hence, a minimal agenda, a bare-bones declaration, and no top-level meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council. The second was to deliver to the president the increase in European defence spending he has pushed for.
By these measures, the summit was a strong success. NATO agreed to a huge increase in defence spending over the coming decade and the US delegation went home content. Trump went further than the European Allies might have wished, declaring an apparent overnight conversion to NATO’s core mission: “As far as Article Five … I left here a little bit differently … I left here saying that these people really love their countries. It’s not a rip-off, and we’re here to help them protect their country.” Evidently, dealing with European leaders is easier than dealing with those of Israel and Iran.
A New Defence Spending Pledge
The new defence spending agreement, at the heart of the five-paragraph Hague Declaration, commits Allies to spend “at least 3.5% of GDP annually … to resource core defence requirements, and to meet the NATO Capability Targets” and to “account for up to 1.5% of GDP” on broader security. This is a substantial uplift, raising core defence spending from around USD 500 billion to close to USD 900 billion (based on current spending levels, prices and exchange rates), with an additional almost USD 400 billion for broader security. A last-minute compromise on the text of the declaration (“Allies agree” rather than “we agree”) allowed Spain to sign up, albeit making clear that it would spend only 2.1% of GDP, as this was all that was needed to meet its share of NATO’s Capability Targets. For Trump, Spain’s non-compliance is unfinished business. A second compromise extended the deadline for meeting the goal from 2032, as proposed by Secretary General Mark Rutte, to 2035, but also included a promise to review progress in 2029 when NATO’s capability targets will next be reviewed.
Europe now needs to implement this pledge. Here, the framing of the summit may be problematic. While the declaration refers to the need to increase defence spending to meet NATO’s capability targets, and hence to strengthening defence and deterrence, the media has picked up The Hague Summit vibe and reported the pledge largely in terms of pleasing Trump, a narrative reinforced by the Declaration’s weak depiction—certainly compared to previous summits—of the threat posed by Russia. Against this background, European populations, who have low confidence that Trump will do the right thing in world affairs or even regard him as an adversary, may not be persuaded of the need to increase defence spending.
A Successful Summit, But …
The wider question, though, is how well NATO, especially NATO Europe, was served by choreographing a thin summit while the world burns. Europe cannot afford to be “doomed to endure the choices of the unpredictable Donald Trump” in the Middle East. It should have a voice (though, of course, not a veto) in US decisions to shift troops from the continent to support its objectives in the Indo-Pacific. It needs to agree with the US how to handle Russia. Most immediately, it should be able to share views on how best to support Ukraine as Russia’s war grinds on. For this, and much more, NATO is—or should be—a key forum for transatlantic exchanges.
Furthermore, in their relief, the European Allies must resist the temptation to see this immediate success as conclusive. Given President Trump’s unpredictability, and his administration’s broad antipathy towards Europe, The Hague Summit is unlikely to be looked back on as a new dawn for transatlantic relations or a rebirth of the Alliance. Trump does not understand, or rejects, the nature of the NATO Alliance. He talks of “we” the US, and “they” the Europeans, not of “we” the Allies. He talks of “protection” and not of collective defence. He is charmed by breakfast at the palace, less so by the routine of consensus building required of Alliance leadership.
Probably, in the circumstances, there were few choices for the Europeans in The Hague except to tread softly and hope for the best. But this is not a sustainable option going forward. There will be a NATO summit next year in Türkiye, and one at some point after that in Albania. Secretary General Mark Rutte, whose gushing interactions with Trump raised some eyebrows, will need to steer a course which better recognises that Europe’s has interests too. For their part, the European Allies will need a new, solid strategy for handling NATO’s transatlantic dimension, one in which they are more confident of their standing and more ready to stand up for their own interests. Part of the answer to the question of where this confidence comes from also rests in The Hague with the new defence spending pledge. If Allies are confident of their own contribution to NATO—if the burden of defence is, as they intend, shifted—they are more likely to be firm with their US partner. For the European Allies, there is little choice but to pursue the increasing Europeanisation of the Alliance. Not to satisfy the US, but to guarantee their own interests and security.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).