September 4, 2008

The Foreign Policy of a Small State

Siim Kallas claims that in comparison with a foreign policy based on bilateral relations, a multilateral international policy creates more opportunities for a small state and should be a priority when allocating resources.

Siim Kallas claims that in comparison with a foreign policy based on bilateral relations, a multilateral international policy creates more opportunities for a small state and should be a priority when allocating resources.

The Foreign Policy of a Small State

Siim Kallas claims that in comparison with a foreign policy based on bilateral relations, a multilateral international policy creates more opportunities for a small state and should be a priority when allocating resources.

The foreign minister of a small state delivers a report on the government’s foreign policy to the parliament. Occasionally, the minister seems to be having difficulties in remembering where exactly he is. The questions and statements of the opposition (and sometimes also of the coalition) suggest that the government’s foreign policy is failing, because it does not manage to give orders to the president of the United States or the governments of other countries. He wonders what would happen if he really demanded something useful for his country from a great power – something which the other is reluctant to offer. And he concludes that his request would probably not only be rejected, but also ignored.
It is very easy for a small state to be invisible in world politics.
Large countries have the atom bomb and lots of money. They also have a global, well-equipped and well-manned network of diplomats, foreign agents and embassies.
A small state can certainly adopt the position of a bystander (see Vahur Made, Külalisena maailmapoliitikas, Tartu, 1999). A small state might be content with the role of a satellite of a great power, provided that this great power protects it and steers it through the stormy waters of world politics. However, the policies pursued before World War II have demonstrated that you cannot depend on any great power. Estonia, together with Belgium and the Netherlands, recognised this bitter truth too late. And we should bear in mind that this happened quite recently.
It is usually hard for the government of a small democratic state to admit that it can control nothing or that it is at the mercy of other states. Every state would like to have a say in global issues and, of course, to safeguard its interests beyond its borders.
What should a state do to play a more significant role in world politics and, at the same time, to protect its interests in the most reasonable way, as there are never enough human resources or money, not to mention weapons?
Bilateral relations
When analysing the foreign policy of a state, it is most suitable to begin with its bilateral relations with other countries. Up to the 20th century, the history of foreign policy has predominantly been the history of bilateral relations between states. Treaties concluded between rulers of different countries, negotiations, delegations dispatched to other countries, choosing allies and then replacing them, betrayals, violations of treaties and, in the end, wars – every country has a history full of such events.
Bilateral relations are based on interests and these interests have to be, more or less, balanced. A state has to offer something to its counterpart in order to defend its interests. For example, the Republic of Venice had close bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire. The delegations these two great powers sent to each other and the negotiations they held form one of the most interesting chapters in the history of diplomacy. It is true that sometimes wars, even great wars, broke out between them. Nevertheless, Venice was interested in ensuring smooth trading conditions around the Mediterranean, especially in its eastern part, because Venice’s power depended on trade. In return, Venice was willing to offer Turkey a wide range of goods, agreements and deals. At the same time, both partners were backed by powerful military forces and fleets in particular.
Which countries should Estonia have bilateral relations with, considering that such relations are based on mutual interests and allow each partner to ask the other for something and to offer something in return?
The answer is our closest neighbours – Finland and Latvia. There are always bilateral problems which we must solve together. Anyone else?
Of course, our third neighbour – Russia. So far, Estonia has not managed to establish balanced bilateral relations with Russia. These relations should be seen in the context of the hatred felt by quite a large portion of Russian population towards all the nations who once formed part of Russia. It will take several generations for this hatred to disappear. Whether and to what extent the Russian authorities are guided by this hatred is a different matter altogether. So, to begin with, they are hostile. Are there any interests in relation to which the two countries could offer each other mutually rewarding deals on equal terms? There is cooperation on the border regions, the exploitation of Lake Peipus and some other, mostly technical issues, but nothing of paramount importance. This means that Estonia has several problems it would like to solve with Russia, but Russia does not have similar interests in relation to Estonia. What else could be done in the field of bilateral relations? Maybe there are some attractive services Estonia could offer Russia? Among EU members, the country which makes the biggest investments in Russia is… Cyprus! Well, there are not many prominent Cypriot financiers that I know of, but the truth of the matter is that Cyprus provides services to Russian businessmen in connection with investing in Russia. However, I rather suspect these kinds of services do not have much of a future.
Maybe we could use some tricks to cause problems for Russia and then, in return for not going through with these tricks, we could ask for something we need from Russia? Yes, we could pull some tricks. Unfortunately, our every trick could be countered by playing ten extremely nasty tricks on us. Consequently, we should not resort to this method. So far, we have not been able to find any purely bilateral solutions.
Multilateral cooperation is the key
Estonia has very good relations with many countries, for example Denmark. We had a bilateral problem once – the argument between SAS and Maersk Air connected with the decision of the Estonian government to sell a share in Estonian Air to the latter company. Today, the meetings of Estonian and Danish leaders are quite frequent and held in a positive atmosphere. What do they discuss at these meetings? It is clear enough what they discuss: cooperation in international organisations, i.e. the European Union and NATO.
This brings us to the central theme of this article: a small state has to take advantage of the opportunity, and to admit the necessity of pursuing its foreign policy primarily in the framework of multilateral international cooperation, which should still be combined with bilateral relations.
In essence, multilateral international cooperation is not a recent invention. In the Hanseatic League, Estonian cities were actively involved in international cooperation. The Congress of Vienna, held after the Napoleonic Wars, has received a lot of attention in this context. It gave birth to the congress system of maintaining international peace, which was quite effective in preventing big wars, although the League of Nations failed when it tried to preserve peace after World War I.
However, after World War II, large international organisations were set up in the framework of which international politics has certainly acquired an important role. These organisations constitute a platform for small states to have their say and, indeed, they have done so successfully. In comparison with a foreign policy based on bilateral relations, a multilateral international policy creates more opportunities for a small state.
Of course, you could still laugh contemptuously, claiming that great powers are the ones who decide everything in all the international organisations. It is true that they are great and that they have the deciding vote, but not always, everywhere and on every issue. This argument is actually quite well-grounded. While bilateral relations are usually determined by force (this does not mean only military force, but also size, wealth, etc.) organisations for international cooperation are founded on common ideological, moral, philosophical and political values. These organisations are based on a certain principle, idea or concept. Hence, the treaties signed by all member states also rest on this foundation and, in turn, the treaties form a basis for the system which ensures the implementation of all the agreements and regulations by means of various institutions, courts, arbitrators, structures of power and armed forces.
The same rules apply to all member states, at least in principle. However, the ideal and reality do not always correspond. Countries are constantly fighting over the fair and uniform application of rules. Exceptions are made; some of them are unjustifiable, while others favour small states. On the whole, today’s organisations for multilateral international cooperation still follow the rules. This confers an enormous advantage on small states, because what are the options available for a small state, if there are no rules or the rules are deficient?
The decision-making procedures used in multilateral organisations should be also highlighted. Decisions are usually consensual, which means that compromises are sought and made all the time. On this point, we should not be misled by the single blocking vote in the UN Security Council or by the majority voting system of the Council of the European Union. Voting is an extraordinary event. Before a vote is cast, long and laborious talks are held to negotiate a compromise and different parties usually reach an agreement. The compromise procedure itself depends to a large extent on the competences of the negotiating parties, the background materials they use and the readiness of the countries that back them to participate in international politics.
If an agreement is arrived at unanimously and through compromise, it constitutes a joint achievement of all parties. All the states share responsibility for the international decision they adopt. However, responsibility and guilt are two completely different concepts. Responsibility raises the self-esteem and the morale of participating countries and those who conduct foreign policy.
Should we participate or run and hide?
All this seems to be very straightforward and simple (at least in my opinion). Maybe it is too simple for everyone else?
The foreign policy makers of a small state have to start by choosing between two options: to participate in world politics or to cower in a corner, keeping well clear of everything unpleasant. But this is not that easy a decision to make. Active participation would mean a lot of hassle, it would involve investing money and human resources and, in addition, it might cause problems. For example, impartial small states are frequently offered the role of conflict mediator, who usually has to put up with the resentment and hostility of local communities. Conflicts are rarely settled to the equal satisfaction of all the parties. And what if they have guns and bombs? Would it not be wiser to stay out of it, to stay invisible?
Invisibility has its advantages. There would be no violent demonstrations in front of the embassies of that small state, its businessmen could trade without any restrictions and it would be possible to make money on deals prohibited in countries which are bound by certain principles and agreements.
But let us suppose that something happens in that invisible small state. For example, a Jewish cemetery is desecrated or somebody offends Muslims. Jewish or Muslim communities will definitely be banging the drum to draw attention to the fact that the policies of that small state have been and always will be anti-Jewish or anti-Muslim. Whom or what should the world believe? I am convinced that it would be much easier for the government of a well-known and reputable small state, which takes an active role in international affairs, to defend its views.
The proponents of invisibility are usually outnumbered in the parliament of a small state, while the general democratic public urges its government to participate in solving the problems of the world. I have seen no proof to the contrary, in Estonia or elsewhere.
The option of active participation in organisations for multilateral international cooperation also raises a lot of questions. Which organisations are the most important ones? Do we have enough human resources? Do we have sufficient funds to pay for foreign missions?
We should begin by making a list of all the respective organisations and establishing our priorities. Clearly, the most important organisations for Estonia are the European Union and NATO. The UN, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) also stand out.
I would like to comment briefly on the topic of the UN. I think that Estonia has never taken its work in the UN too seriously, including at the time when I was foreign minister. At the moment, it seems to me that we have underestimated the role of the UN in world politics. Indeed, Estonia is a member of two powerful organisations – the European Union and NATO. These organisations or other effective cooperation formats incorporate about 40 countries, which could be called Western or developed countries. However, the UN constitutes the only viable option for multilateral, international and political cooperation for more than 150 countries. If we want to have a say in world politics, we cannot ignore these 150 countries. We can cooperate with them primarily in the framework of the UN. In addition, there is much more to the UN than the Security Council and the General Assembly. Its subsidiary bodies deal with a wide range of issues, for example world health, refugees, development cooperation, and so on.
Do we have enough people and money to form effective teams which can work productively in international organisations? Here, the point is not just finding anybody, who could be present in all kinds of meetings, nodding away. If we mean business in international organisations and want to help others and ourselves, we need competent people, background materials, reliable information and good relations, the forming of which takes time and effort. At the same time, our resources are limited.
Resources and choices
Making a choice always involves preferring one thing over another. As our resources are limited, we must prefer sending excellent delegations to international organisations over manning and funding bilateral embassies. I think that Estonia has embarked too eagerly on the creation of an extensive network of bilateral embassies. The network is too expensive and it eats up too many talented officials. What is its output? What is its use for Estonia? Obviously, this does not concern embassies in key countries, but there are no more than ten, or at most fifteen, of those.
The decision to open an Estonian embassy in Georgia drew my attention to this issue. Personally, I am very fond of Georgia and Georgians can always count on me to support their reforms (this word really suffers from overuse!) and aspirations towards the West. But where do the real battles take place, the battles fought in the name of brave Georgians? These battles are fought in the European Union, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the UN, and also in NATO and the OSCE. Would it not be wiser to assemble a team of all the people who lead these organisations, to establish direct relations between them and Georgian politicians as well as to dispatch this team to explore the local situation, so that we could help our friends at any given moment? They would be ‘ambassadors’ – on a mission of service – in the original meaning of the word.
And what will happen if the transformation process in Georgia comes to a halt and, for example, Armenia rises to the centre of attention in international politics? We have to admit that we have always liked Armenians too.
In the European Union, policies are not coordinated between bilateral embassies, but between the member states’ representations at the European Union, which are located in Brussels. Indeed, the most intensive negotiations are held in Brussels.
If the foreign policy makers of the foreign ministry of a small state have opted for cooperation with international organisations and aim to participate actively in world politics, they must provide answers to at least three key questions. First, what ideas or guiding principles does the state support or what goal does it wish to pursue together with other countries? Second, how should its human resources and funds be allocated? Third, how should its activities be coordinated between the priority organisations in order to be able to contribute its fair share?
The first question raises a number of issues worthy of further deliberation and serious discussion in the domestic political context. The ultimate goal has to be defined before organisational matters are considered. Let me just make some remarks on this particular issue.
A small state should endorse the principle that your concerns are our concerns. In such a case, it might hope that if it needs help, its concerns can also affect others. This principle may be rephrased in more egotistical terms: we treat your interests as our interests and, in return, you should do the same for us.
A small state should also bear in mind one more principle: it cannot rely on (as a rule, implicit) agreements or deals struck between groups of states or two states in the framework of international cooperation. Large states are more fond of special deals, while small states prefer agreements that involve all member states and treat them equally, emphasising the importance of honouring such agreements. Still, everybody is always fighting over this issue.
The third point a small state should not forget is the right of national self-determination, i.e. different nations and small states have their own cultural, economic and political identities and they have a right to retain them. We are living in times of globalisation, but a vital source of stability is to be found in achieving the correct balance in the world.
Of course, there are other important goals a small state could pursue and capitalise on in the framework of international cooperation.
Probably every foreign minister would like to be in charge of more human resources and funds. However, there is usually a shortage of both people and money. A small state has to make a choice. If it prefers to play an active role in international organisations, it must minimise its network of bilateral embassies in the European Union. Certainly every state, including Estonia, has several bilateral embassies of paramount importance and these embassies must not, in any case, be under-equipped. But would it not be wise to ask a group of independent experts to analyse the contribution of all the Estonian bilateral embassies to the implementation of our foreign policy? Then we would find out which of them are really necessary and which should be allocated less money or even closed.
If a small state wants to be a player in world politics, it must have its own experts. Experts must be paid decent salaries, which must be comparable to those of others who work in the same field. The salaries of people employed in the Estonian foreign service and the officials of the institutions of the European Union must be similar. Otherwise the foreign service just adds another line to someone’s CV, followed by employment in a European institution. Several EU member states pay the employees of their representations higher salaries than those of the officials of the institutions of the European Union. They simply do not want to let their experts be lured away.
Consensus means joint responsibility
International organisations have organised their work in different ways. Very many organisations rely on a consensual decision-making process, which is quite complicated. This process allows every member state to block any important decision. A small state should exercises this right only in dire straits, otherwise its conduct may be characterised as dangerous and foolish. Lately, the scope of application of the consensual process has been reduced in the European Union, while some persistently propose to narrow it even further. Is there any other way to interpret, for example, the suggestion to restructure the European Commission, so that every member state will not have its own commissioner on an equal footing with other states? Incidentally, during the last two years the European Commission has reached all its decisions, without any exception, by consensus. It has been business as usual and all the necessary decisions have been adopted, despite the fact that consensual decision-making is hard. However, it has one great advantage: a decision supported by everyone means joint responsibility for the decision; it is based on a shared responsibility between big and the small, north and south, etc. If some states, especially smaller but otherwise progressive states, begin to sense that they are being held down or that their opinions do not matter or if formal procedures are introduced to ignore them, the functionality of the organisation will soon start to dwindle. However, this appears to be contrary to the initial predictions of consensus abolitionists.
World history contains examples of small states whose foreign policy has been successful. Estonia, among others, can be proud of its foreign policy achievements. Sadly, there are more examples of failures – failures which concern organisations for international cooperation between small and large states (above all, the League of Nations). We should learn from their experiences. Indeed, those who are smart learn from the experiences and, in particular, from the mistakes of others.

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