October 21, 2024

The BRICS Puzzle: What is it at Stake for the Club and for the West?

EPA/Scanpix
People stand behind the BRICS 2024 banner upon their arrival at the airport in Kazan, Russia, 20 October 2024.
People stand behind the BRICS 2024 banner upon their arrival at the airport in Kazan, Russia, 20 October 2024.

The BRICS annual summit taking place on 22-24 October was the first post-enlargement meeting of the still heterogeneous, yet now increasingly anti-western club. What was on each participant’s wish list as they headed to Kazan? Although no breakthroughs were expected this time, can the partnership yield the desired dividends to its members in the future?

As Alexander Gabuev and Oliver Stuenkel recently wrote in Foreign Affairs, the BRICS is a divided group. The title of their article, “The Battle for the BRICS,” is revealing enough: namely, a battle between those pushing for an anti-western profile and seeking enlargement, and those preferring non-alignment and pushing for enhanced cohesion. This has been an enduring cleavage for the BRICS. In 2023, the division tipped in favour of the former (advocated by China and Russia), leading Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to become members in 2024. (Argentina, invited to join, rescinded its application, and Saudi Arabia is yet to officially join.) The BRICS annual summit taking place on 22-24 October in Kazan will be the first post-enlargement meeting of the club.

When compared to other country groupings such as ASEAN, the EU, or the G7, the BRICS stands out for its lack of permanent institutions and the heterogeneity of its members. After enlargement, the BRICS features the second-largest economy in the world and a country just emerging from a highly destructive war (Ethiopia). It also hosts long-standing proponents of international law and flagrant transgressors, especially Russia, due to its aggression against Ukraine.

For the west, the relevance of BRICS in world affairs is puzzling if not questionable. On the one hand, the group has failed to take a cohesive approach to key issues. Although none of the BRICS members have sanctioned Russia for its war of aggression, Brazil, India, and South Africa have not broken relations with the west to support Moscow. Despite some serious allegations towards South Africa, none of them are known to have delivered arms to Russia. De-dollarisation, though popular among BRICS members, has not led to enhanced financial integration. For example, since 2022, Russia has struggled to transform its vast oil earnings from Indian rupees into roubles.

On the other hand, BRICS enlargement has demonstrated that there is a demand, worldwide, for the group. Several governments on all continents have expressed their interest in engaging the group, ranging from North Korea to NATO-member Türkiye; the latter formally submitted its application to join on 2 September.

The promise of the BRICS as an example of multilateralism is part of the club’s appeal. The mandate of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) — though relatively small — reflects critical views on matters of global economic governance and finance among countries of the global south. The BRICS has also opposed sanctions as a tool of statecraft, resulting in support for Russia on this topic, openly, since 2014.

The Kazan summit is not expected, however, to bring breakthroughs. On 14 October, Reuters reported that several top economic officials would not be present at all, thus lowering expectations about the group’s economic agenda. What is ahead for the BRICS, then? Looking into the agendas of its member states can reveal instances of synergy as well as division.

The anti-western option

For China, the BRICS has turned into another platform to promote a particularist vision of human rights that is no longer universal. Unveiled in March 2023, Beijing’s Global Civilisation Initiative likens human rights to their western imposition, calling instead for each country and each ‘civilisation’ to define their own rights. On this point, the BRICS adds to Beijing’s vision of a multipolar world. More immediately, China’s de-accelerating economic growth is making the country a less attractive partner, leading Beijing to adjust its foreign policy accordingly. So, an enlarged BRICS compensates for China’s decreasing investment in Africa and worldwide. Finally, in Kazan, Beijing might be seeking to prevent Russia from assuming a leadership role in the BRICS, especially as Russia-friendly governments join the annual summit for the first time.

For Iran, BRICS membership follows joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its strengthening relations with China and Russia. With an economy reeling from the COVID-19 pandemic, sanctions, and internal strife, Iran sees the BRICS in terms of investment, be it from the NDB or bilaterally. This is especially the case for China — already a key energy customer — and India. In turn, joining the BRICS adds to Tehran’s growing relationship with Beijing and Moscow, the latter already being a co-belligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine. As the potential for a war with Israel rises, Iran might be looking at the group as a way to enhance the resilience of its exports, already battered by geopolitical tensions.

For Russia, as for Iran, the BRICS helps escape diplomatic isolation. For the Kremlin, the BRICS is the foremost venue for Moscow’s ambitions to build a de-westernised, multipolar world order that agrees with its messianic vision of international relations. So, the Kremlin is set to push its de-dollarisation and anti-IMF agenda which, though popular, has proven unworkable. In addition, Russia will propose several new initiatives to facilitate trade among the BRICS, such as establishing a collective securities trade settlement platform. Finally, Moscow will likely promote the idea of creating a BRICS partnership model for governments interested in cooperating with the group short of pursuing membership. Reportedly, the list has 15 countries, including Cuba and Syria. The Kremlin will also involve countries from organisations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States and the SCO in the summit. There are signs that Beijing is interested in the partnership mechanism, too.

The non-aligned

For Brazil, the BRICS has been a platform for the country’s leadership aspirations, especially through multilateralism and global financial reform (the NDB is headed by former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff). President Lula da Silva sees the BRICS as an instrument for the global south to gain more relevance in world affairs, particularly along the lines of the Non-Aligned Movement, a well-established perspective in Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil — as well as India and South Africa — has also used the BRICS to gather support for its bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In recent months, it has sought to prevent Venezuela — regarded by Brasilia as increasingly aggressive — from capitalising on close China and Russia ties to join the club.

For Ethiopia, BRICS membership is a bid to regain economic dynamism after the destructive Tigray war and the international sanctions imposed for human rights abuses. Traditionally a close partner to Washington, Addis Ababa has been scrambling to enhance its relations with China and Russia and to consolidate its economic partnership with India and the UAE, typically large investors in the country. The BRICS could also lend more credibility to Ethiopia’s regional leadership, so far hobbled by the country’s internal problems and divisive — if not aggressive — foreign policy in what Sonia Le Gouriellec has characterised as an “imperfect hegemon.”

For India, the BRICS has transformed into another forum where it can balance against China with stronger relations with Russia, an approach prevalent in the country’s foreign policy since the 1960s. Moreover, New Delhi is wary of Beijing’s claims of leadership in the global south, so participating in the club is meant to prevent China from transforming the association into its vehicle for global influence, capable of blocking India from key partners worldwide. At the same time, seeking not to lose partners in the west, India has been aloof from organisations with Russian participation, such as the SCO as well as the BRICS.

For South Africa, joining the BRICS in 2011 represented a high point in the post-apartheid foreign policy and its recognition as a rising force in global politics and a leading voice in Africa. Still, Johannesburg has been dissatisfied with the club in recent years, which it would like to see as a more cohesive organisation, with increased intra-group trade. In turn, domestic opposition and divisions within the ruling coalition might pressure the government to limit its participation in the group to economic policy. In particular, the ruling party — the African National Congress (ANC) — has been put under pressure for what is regarded as a close relationship with Russia. Still, the BRICS and its enlargement are considered as an important vehicle for South Africa’s contributions to global governance.

Western partners?

For Egypt, partnership with the west represents the key to its security and regional relevance, as its economic and internal challenges are persistent. However, Cairo has been adept at hedging its relationship with the west, especially with Russia and the Gulf monarchies. Cairo’s expectations in joining the BRICS seem to principally reflect an economic agenda, especially to secure wheat imports after the drops caused by Russia’s war. Egypt’s membership might, in the future, also acquire a regional dimension. On the eve of the Kazan summit, Egypt hosted the Iranian foreign minister for the first time in over ten years, mainly to discuss the wars in the region.

For Saudi Arabia, joining the BRICS might be part of the kingdom’s growing perception of the Middle East entering a post-American era, where actors such as China, India, and Russia become just as influential as the US and Europe. This would represent continuity in the monarchy’s embrace of a non-aligned foreign policy; although with the kingdom’s top leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman not expected to attend the summit in Kazan, membership remains in limbo. Like the UAE, Saudi Arabia hosts western military forces on its soil.

For the UAE, BRICS membership reflects the country’s enduring interest in leveraging development aid and financing, as well as trade and investment for power projection across Africa and Asia. Moreover, all other BRICS members have also been long-standing UAE partners in trade and security, so membership represents continuity in these engagements. In addition, the UAE has been active in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, so the enhanced access to Ethiopian officials through BRICS events will enhance this vector.

How does it look from the outside?

For the west, the BRICS remains a puzzle. Indeed, western capitals can sense a streak of non-alignment, as countries seek to avoid participating in the emerging China-US rivalry or taking sides in the Russo-Ukrainian war. The most anti-western members — China, Iran, and Russia — might represent a powerful bloc within the BRICS, but the organisation still needs the consent of non-aligned members to claim global relevance. Brazil, for instance, will be the association’s only Latin American member for the foreseeable future. In turn, many global south countries wish to join the group to highlight their relevance and not to be left out of what might become a force in shaping global governance.

However, the BRICS will continue to be worrisome for the west because of Russia’s membership and the anti-western camp inside the group. Indeed, for all western states, Moscow is an illegitimate dialogue partner due to its aggression against Ukraine, and its growing aggressiveness towards the west in general. As the chief of German intelligence stated on 14 October, Russia could attack NATO by the end of the decade “at the latest.” How would the BRICS react to such an event? The group’s response to Moscow’s unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine — both in 2014 and 2022 — offers a disappointing precedent.

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