The 2026 National Defence Strategy: US-China Dialogue For Strategic Stability In A Shaky Environment

The US Department of War (DoW) has published its 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS), calling for a “decent peace” in the Indo-Pacific and “strategic stability” with China.

While the document highlights the importance of the Western Hemisphere, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will remain a strategic priority, albeit with different tactics on the US end.

A new focus is placed on encouraging communication between the US and Chinese militaries, aiming to avoid potential confrontations. Yet the situation in the Taiwan Strait is as tense as it’s ever been, and communication hampered by unseen domestic developments in the US and China, including the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) 24 January purge that reduced the CMC’s size from the original seven members to just two. In this environment, the 2026 NDS’ goal of fostering engagement between the US military and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA, 解放军) will be extremely challenging.

A Strategic Priority

A comparison of Washington’s 2022 and 2026 NDS editions shows that China remains a strategic priority across administrations. References to China and China-related security issues have remained consistent—perhaps even gained importance—from Biden to Trump. For instance, China was mentioned 13 and 24 times, respectively. Taiwan appeared four times in 2022 and three times in 2026, which can be interpreted as consistent, if not more frequent, given that the new strategy is far shorter. The same can be said for the Indo-Pacific: 17 times in 2022 vs 16 times in 2026.

Keywords in the 2022 and 2026 National Defence Strategies. Source: The author.

The PRC is still high on the agenda, just behind the newly prioritised Western Hemisphere but far ahead of the de-prioritised Russia

However, the wording surrounding Taiwan has changed, replaced by references to the wider “First Island Chain” (FIC), of which Taiwan lies at the centre. This may signal a de-prioritisation of specific flashpoints and a focus on the overall balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, indirect references to Taiwan could be one of the methods by which the US aims to tone down its self-perceived antagonisation of the PRC, thus fulfilling the 2026 NDS’ objective not to “humiliate” China. Regardless of this wording, the strategy’s attention to “defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China” shows that the PRC is still high on the agenda, just behind the newly prioritised Western Hemisphere but far ahead of the de-prioritised Russia. The strategic objective of sustaining “a strong denial defence along the FIC” persists.

Taiwan

While the FIC and Indo-Pacific will continue to be priorities, Washington’s tactics have shifted considerably: more communication and less confrontation with Beijing. On communication, the DoW hopes to engage the Chinese side and convey its vision of sustaining a “peaceful and prosperous future.” The US aims—through extensive military-to-military interaction—to decrease chances of escalation in the Indo-Pacific. Whether it can be achieved remains to be seen.

The PLA’s military activities around Taiwan reached record levels in 2025, culminating in the “Justice Mission–2025”(正义使命–2025) exercise in December. Currently, President Donald Trump seems unphased and “not worried,” adding that the PLA has been conducting such exercises for “20 years in that area.” However, if the PLA were to undertake an exercise that Trump did not consider ‘business as usual,’ dialogue efforts might be undermined and the US forced to double down on its deterrence by denial tactic, as well as further pressure Taiwan to up its own security.

Strategic stability stemming from greater US military–PLA engagement would certainly be welcome—but by no means a given

Taiwan may not be explicitly mentioned in the 2026 NDS, yet Washington’s expectations for Taipei to shoulder military expenses are implicit. On deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, contributions by “allies and partners” are seen as “vital to deterring and balancing China.” The US will incentivise and enable its treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines) and partners (Taiwan) to do more for collective defence. For Taiwan, this means not only spending more but also potentially taking a greater role in the strategic planning around deterring PLA forces in the Strait. For Taipei, strategic stability stemming from greater US military–PLA engagement would certainly be welcome—but by no means a given.

Shaky Prospects

Improving US military–PLA communications will be difficult, given unpredictable and sudden changes in China’s Central Military Commission, which heads the PLA. Just recently, Zhang Youxia (张又侠), the Vice Chairman of the CMC and China’s highest-ranking general, and Liu Zhenli (刘振立), a CMC member, were placed under open investigation for “grave violations of discipline and the law.” The 20th CMC, formed in October 2022, has now suffered multiple rounds of purges. The only two who remain are CMC Chairman and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and the CMC’s lowest-ranking member, Zhang Shengmin (张升民).

Gen Zhang Youxia’s removal, especially, will be a blow for US prospective engagement with the PLA. It was Gen Zhang Youxia who, in 2024, met with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in Beijing, acting as a key figure in bilateral military-to-military communications. With the previous point-of-contact gone and the CMC both shrunk and shaky, current intra-CCP dynamics do not seem conducive to improving US military–PLA communications.

To conclude, the strategic importance of China seems to have survived the revision of the US National Defence Strategy, even if the PRC is no longer the singular “pacing challenge” it was under Biden. It has been taken over by the new top priority, i.e., the Western Hemisphere. While still a strategic priority, tactics now favour communication and de-escalation between the US and the PRC. However, this goal may be too idealistic, given not only the record tensions in the Taiwan Strait but also an unstable CMC, which might undermine the prospects of regular US military–PLA communication. As the DoW pursues strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific, a shifting global security landscape, paired with unpredictable domestic political developments in both the US and China, leaves a shaky foundation for a “decent peace.”

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).