Japan’s Highly Successful Electoral Gamble: What are the Dividends?

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi won a sweeping victory in Japan’s general election, delivering the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) a commanding two-thirds majority in the Lower House. Her decision to dissolve the chamber in mid-January—just three months into her tenure—and call a snap election proved to be a highly successful gamble. She now holds a robust mandate to advance her domestic reforms and pursue her foreign policy agenda.

On 23 January, Sanae Takaichi formally announced her decision to dissolve the Lower House and call a snap election for 8 February. In a government statement, the coalition between the LDP and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) explained that, since the Cabinet’s inauguration in October, its attention had been concentrated on tackling rising prices and shaping economic measures to support Japan’s recovery.

Shifting the Gears

The government argued that, having first taken measures to support households and businesses, the time had come “to shift into a higher gear in order to successfully execute major policy shifts.” Because these shifts could divide public opinion, the Takaichi administration considered it essential “to put [them] forward candidly for consideration by the people and seek a popular mandate immediately” in the form of a general election.

Takaichi also noted that the general election would serve as a test for the new governing coalition. A fresh mandate was necessary, she argued, because the coalition’s policy pledges differ from those presented by the previous LDP-Komeito government in the last election. Furthermore, strong public support bolstered her decision. Eight major Japanese media organisations carried out public opinion polls in January. Even though approval rating dipped slightly—with only one major outlet now recording support above 70%, compared to three in December—Takaichi still enjoyed significantly higher backing than her two immediate predecessors, Fumio Kishida and Shigeru Ishiba, had ever achieved. Takaichi hoped to translate this high approval rating into a substantial parliamentary majority, which she views as essential for advancing major policy shifts in the months ahead. Takaichi had been explicit that her own political future hinged on the coalition securing a majority of seats. Had the election resulted in a serious setback for the ruling bloc, she indicated she would have resigned.

The LDP’s Grip on the Lower House

Voter turnout in the 2026 snap election was 56,25%, a noticeable increase compared to the turnout in the 2024 snap election held after Shigeru Ishiba became prime minister. Japan’s ruling party, the LDP, secured a two-thirds majority in Sunday’s elections. The party expanded its representation in the Lower House from 198 before the vote to more than 310, surpassing the supermajority threshold. This outcome provides the LDP with all committee Chair positions and ensures a majority in all Lower House standing committees. Additionally, if a bill is rejected in Japan’s Upper House, the Lower House can still enact it with a two-thirds override. Unsurprisingly, numerous Japanese newspapers characterised the election results as a landslide.

Japan’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, struggled to hold onto all 34 of its pre-election seats. If this partnership with the LDP proceeds, the governing coalition would control 352 seats, or 75%, in the Lower House, clearing the political space to pursue ambitious policy issues, including potential reforms to security legislation.

Japan’s opposition, especially the new Centrist Reform Alliance, created through the merger of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) of Japan and Komeito, lost a significant number of seats. Several prominent figures within the party also failed to regain their seats, raising questions about whether the merger strategy was an effective approach to counter LDP dominance. In the aftermath, the party’s co-leaders, Yoshihiko Noda and Tetsuo Saito, announced their resignations. By contrast, smaller parties such as Sanseito and Team Mirai gained seats compared to the pre-election period, while the Social Democratic Party failed to secure a single seat. 

Translating Votes into Policy

What are the main ramifications of the election result for Japan’s domestic politics and its international posture? First, the landslide victory—delivering the largest majority in the Lower House in the post-war era—further entrenches the LDP’s dominance in Japanese politics. The result marks a decisive rebound for the party after the recent slush-fund scandal involving the misuse and misreporting of campaign funds by senior party members. By contrast, the main opposition force, the Centrist Reform Alliance, failed to mobilise voters effectively and fell short of establishing itself as a credible counterweight to the ruling party. With Sanseito gaining additional seats and the Team Mirai party winning their first seats in parliament, Japan’s party landscape becomes even more fragmented.

Second, Takaichi’s strong popular mandate gives her substantial political capital to advance her domestic reform agenda. The LDP campaigned on promises of increased public funding and targeted tax cuts, raising expectations that the government would deliver an economic turnaround. Voters will look for concrete progress in curbing inflation and strengthening protections for households whose living standards have been strained by rising prices. Japanese firms will expect support for SMEs and investments in strategic growth industries such as AI and semiconductors.

A third key issue is immigration. The LDP campaign—and the first few months of the Takaichi government—placed growing emphasis on tightening immigration regulations. The push for stricter controls is intended to address public anxiety over unlawful activities involving foreign nationals. At the same time, Japan faces an urgent need for skilled foreign workers, particularly in elderly care, to mitigate the effects of population decline. Even so, Takaichi is expected to move ahead with further tightening measures for foreign nationals, including a tougher stance on unpaid pension and health-care contributions, a stricter enforcement of visa conditions, and a tightening of real-estate purchasing rules.

A fourth essential issue is foreign and security policy. While Japan continues to rely heavily on the deterrence provided by its defence alliance with the US, Takaichi has already signalled her intention to strengthen Japan’s own military capabilities, increase defence spending, and ease restrictions on the export of defence equipment. With a renewed public mandate, she is now positioned to take concrete steps by updating the three key strategic documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defence Strategy (NDS), and the Defence Buildup Programme (DBP). Takaichi is also a long-standing advocate of constitutional revision, including formally recognising the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as a national military, and introducing provisions for declaring a state of emergency. The LDP’s conservative security agenda, and its emphasis on deeper defence cooperation with the US, is warmly received in Washington. Her most complex foreign-policy challenge remains China, which views her conservative historical stance with suspicion and reacted sharply to her recent remarks on Taiwan, triggering a diplomatic confrontation with Beijing.

The election outcome in Japan could also open new avenues for cooperation with Europe. In an increasingly turbulent international security environment, Tokyo is likely to deepen ties with like-minded partners committed to upholding the rules-based order. Japan’s growing focus on strategically important domains—such as defence and economic security—creates additional opportunities for engagement with the EU. The institutional foundations for this cooperation are already in place, notably through the Japan–EU Competitiveness Alliance, which covers supply chain resilience, critical minerals and submarine cable projects, and the Security and Defence Partnership, which includes defence industry dialogue, cybersecurity, and maritime security. Together, these developments could help translate a shared strategic outlook into more concrete collaboration between two traditionally ‘civilian’ powers that now find themselves compelled to invest more heavily in defence and economic competitiveness.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).