When the Nordic and Baltic states joined NATO, whether in 1949, 2004, 2023, or 2024, the decision was primarily grounded in a desire to have the United States as an Ally. It was the transatlantic security ties to the global superpower and its extended conventional and nuclear deterrence that made the case for itself. In addition, having European Allies was certainly a positive benefit, but most likely not the driving force, behind the accessions.
Contemplating a world without American engagement in Europe, with significantly reduced—or even removed—extended deterrence, is therefore mindboggling. Nonetheless, with the Trump administration’s policies of apparent rapprochement to Russia, distrust (at best) towards Ukraine, and a mix of impatience, ignorance, and hostility towards Europe, European leaders are forced to reflect upon these questions.
While it was expected that Trump would pressure Europe to do more on defence spending and burden shift (that is, allowing the US to transfer key enablers from Europe to the Asia-Pacific theatre), the outright attack on European policies and values from Vice President JD Vance, the concessions given to Russia on Ukraine by Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and others, and President Trumps aggressive tariffs on Europe, make it difficult to see security and defence in isolation.
To its credit, the Administration has repeatedly stressed that it remains committed to NATO and Article 5 as long as the burden sharing and burden shifting materialise. The problem is that the distrust has spilled over from all the other policy areas into the security sector. There will be no business as usual in NATO if a trade war is raging. Furthermore, if the United States disengages from Ukraine and even lines up with Russia, it fails to see how crucial Ukraine’s survival is for the rest of NATO and how this directly undermines Allied cohesion. Abandoning Ukraine means abandoning Europe.
The most devastating moment for Allies’ trust in the United States thus far was when the Trump administration in March decided to cut intelligence sharing with Ukraine and block support for the Ukrainian F-16 radar jammers. Even if this reportedly only lasted for a few days, the damage was done: Europeans realised that not only could the United States pull down or out of European defence, it could also disrupt European military operations if it so desired. This resulted in somewhat frenetic headlines about a potential ‘kill switch’ on the F-35s. Even if this is an exaggeration, the major point remains the same: Dependence on American military kit can incur a risk.
From Dependence to Autonomy
Until now, Europeans have bought American gear partly as a way to “keep the Americans in,” to paraphrase Lord Ismay. Defence integration with the US has been good for the countries in question, for NATO, and for the American defence industry. Bilateral relations with the United States have been considered by many Allies as a supplementary security dimension in addition to (or even prior to) NATO. From this moment, however, this deep integration may be less desirable. Dependence on American systems can be a liability. Europe must be able to defend its values and interests without relying on American goodwill.
Strategic autonomy is, therefore, no longer only a French wet dream; it is a term one can now hear in London, Berlin, and Warsaw as well. This is a watershed change.
The question is whether NATO can survive without American political leadership, military mass, and nuclear umbrella. Or, more broadly, can Europe envisage security without the United States? The brutal answer is that Europe has no choice. The alternative to Europe building its own defence structure is Russian domination and European disintegration. Europeans must, therefore, prepare for strategic autonomy while still hoping that the Americans, despite everything, will remain engaged on some level and to some degree.
The immediate practical challenge is that the European and American defence industries are so closely intertwined that separation is almost impossible. NATO countries rely on a host of systems in command and control, communications, radars, satellites, intelligence, sensors and more, which are more or less American. For Europeans to operate not only without the Americans but with a potential American disruption of these systems is almost impossible. Obviously, the degree of dependence differs from system to system. Advanced air operations rely more on US technology than smaller infantry manoeuvres. Nonetheless, in today’s combined arms operations, all systems are supposed to work in a coordinated and coherent fashion. Full European strategic defence autonomy is, therefore, still a distant fantasy.
That said, the likelihood of American disruption of a European operation is not very high. It would not only be a major nail in the transatlantic security coffin, but it could also backfire on the United States. The F-35 programme, for example, is truly global, involving 10 countries in addition to the United States. These partners are not only crucial for the manufacturing of the aircraft but also for its maintenance and the provision of spare parts. In short, a theoretical US obstruction on European operations could have reciprocal effects. The same applies to other platforms and systems.
Europeans, therefore, need to focus primarily on the most immediate dependencies on American systems that are likely to be shifted out of Europe in the years to come. Just like a group of European Allies have come together to establish a European Air-to-Air Refuelling capacity under the European Air Transport Command, similar models can be used to gradually replace other American so-called key enablers.
How to Defend Our Own Neighbourhood?
Returning to the Nordic-Baltic region, what should be done to prepare for a reduced or diminished US footprint?
Firstly, the newly adopted NATO regional defence plans should be re-read with this in mind. Perhaps the force structure requirements and capability targets must be re-assessed. A problem is that NATO itself is unable to make a ‘Plan B’. The consensus-based organisation cannot officially make a second set of plans based on the presumption that a key Ally will withdraw or reduce its contribution. Furthermore, as these defence plans, as well as the capability targets, are classified information, drafting alternative plans outside of NATO is complicated. That said, as the EU ramps up its various initiatives to boost the European defence industry, it is likely that countries which are members of both NATO and the EU will be able to share the NATO capability targets with the EU to avoid unnecessary duplications. As an extension of this, perhaps alternative plans and associated alternative capability requirements can be drafted as well.
Second, and in continuation, the relatively small NB8 states—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden—need to ensure the engagement of some larger European powers in the defence of this region. Polish, German, British, French, as well as Dutch forces must be integrated into the regional defence and deterrence posture—probably to a greater extent than today. To this end, political-strategic discussions about these topics among regional states—for example, within NB8+, Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), Nordic Defence Cooperation (Nordefco), Northern Group (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), or similar formats—is possibly the best starting point.
It is important to note that such “coalitions of the willing” within NATO is nothing new. Even during the Cold War, clubs of able and willing Allies with a special emphasis on or interest in particular geographies or scenarios came together to plan and coordinate. This applied to the Mediterranean as well as to the High North. There is no need to wait for Article 5 consensus before a group of Allies decides to act in response to a regional crisis. Allies in northern Europe can do the same today.
Thirdly, it is probably wise to reflect on the relative strengths and weaknesses the Nordic-Baltic states possess compared to Russia. Drawing on experiences from Ukraine, creative thinking should be devised to exploit asymmetrical opportunities: how can a small state utilise its relative advantages to target Russian weaknesses? This could inform defence posture, weapons platforms (unmanned and autonomous systems, swarm drones, etc.), air defence capabilities, concepts, and doctrines, among other areas.
The capacity of northern European Allies to fight a war without direct US engagement should not be too hard to achieve—given targeted investments and smart plans. Perhaps the major obstacle is for politicians, generals, and military organisations to grasp the very idea that this is indeed needed. But the sooner this is realised, the better for the Nordic-Baltic security outlook.
This article was written for the Lennart Meri Conference special issue of ICDS Diplomaatia magazine. Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).