Bidzina Ivanishvili, leader of the Georgian Dream (GD), announced in mid-September the intention to apologise, after the October 26 parliamentary election, to the South Ossetians for starting the 2008 war. He also wants to hold a “Nuremberg trial” for leaders of the then-governing United National Movement party, alleging they were incited by outside forces. Many Georgians were offended by Ivanishvili’s statement, especially those who had lost family members in that war.
It is a historic statement in many ways. After all, Georgia itself — as well as its western partners — has so far insisted that Russia dragged the country into the war. The version that might be closest to the truth is that then-President Mikheil Saakashvili started the attack, whereas Russia started the conflict in the broader sense by systematically provoking Georgia for the six months leading up to the outbreak. Indeed, Saakashvili stepped into the trap, believing that he would get help and that he could win. The report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, the so-called Tagliavini Report, commissioned by the EU in 2009 and led by Swiss Diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, is still considered controversial. In particular, it criticised Tbilisi for launching the attack and, therefore, recommended Georgia issue an apology.
Apology vs Integrity
Attribution and apology are one thing, but territorial integrity is a different matter. Georgia always reiterates that 20% of its territory is occupied, which is why Georgia and Russia have had no diplomatic relations since 2008 — an apology would hardly change that. Ivanishvili has also been very careful, talking about apologising to the “South Ossetian brothers and sisters” yet not once mentioning the de facto rulers of South Ossetia or the Russian Federation.
Restoring territorial integrity has undoubtedly been a long-term foreign policy priority for Georgia. This would also allow for the normalisation of relations with Russia. A similar thought seems to be lingering in the minds of the Russians. There is speculation that this is one of the points in possible hidden negotiations between the current leaders in Tbilisi and Moscow ahead of Georgia’s parliamentary election. Could the opposition’s speculation that Ivanishvili has been flirting with a Russia-imposed solution in exchange for maintaining his power turn out to be true? In such a scenario, the occupied areas would probably continue to be de facto managed by Russia. Let us recall the Kozak Memorandum of 2003 (and the preceding Primakov plan of 1997), a Moscow settlement plan for the Transnistria conflict which aimed to create the “United States of Moldova.”
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has already announced Russia’s readiness to assist Georgia in negotiations with the so-called authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia — whereas Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman Maria Zakharova added an important clarification — “which would allow the demarcation of the border between the three countries to begin.” It has been suggested that the ultimate goal is the future of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as “independent states” in a federation with Georgia, which would, likewise, require recognition from Tbilisi.
Catch-2024?
This would also present foreign countries with a dilemma, as they would face the choice of whether to do the same. In any case, the democratic world would once again find itself in a new reality, where international law has been shifted a step further in the wrong direction. So far, only a handful of countries have officially recognised “Abkhazia” and “South Ossetia” as states. Ivanishvili has not publicly mentioned the idea of a federation. At the very least, he will continue to avoid openly entertaining the possibility of recognising these territories as independent states before the election — which would, otherwise, be a red flag for too many Georgian voters. Nonetheless, Ivanishvili has repeatedly mentioned the need to change the Constitution after the elections for several reasons, one of those being “to align Georgia’s governance and territorial structure with the new reality […] in a peaceful way.”
It is unclear how Russia would succeed in pressing the increasingly stubborn Abkhazians into an alliance. Russia’s decision, at the beginning of September, to withdraw budget support from its de facto government was supposedly related only to the Abkhazians’ desire to limit Russian investments and land purchases. The Abkhaz so-called authorities have also demanded Georgia apologise for the 1992-93 war.
The reaction from South Ossetian de facto rulers was that, in addition to an apology, concrete steps from Georgians were expected. For this purpose, there should be a binding document that explicitly states that Georgia will not use force against “Abkhazia” and “South Ossetia” in the future. Such demands are nothing but demagoguery: all parties except Russia have already committed to it in writing. For instance, Mikheil Saakashvili did so in 2010. At the Geneva International Discussions, the negotiations on an agreement on the non-use of force (NUF) have dragged on for years and have remained stuck for the very same reason. Although Russia participates in these negotiations, it denies being a party to the 1992-93 and 2008 conflicts, thereby claiming that it is exempt from the obligation not to use force.
It would be an interesting intellectual exercise to estimate how many countries and nations, in a similar situation, have apologised. For example, in the Western Balkans. When it comes to such painful issues, an apology would be a self-conceit for anyone, especially for southerners. The bigger question, however, seems to be whether it would be a trade-off.
Russia could have probably de jure annexed “Abkhazia” and “South Ossetia” long ago if it really wished to. Why hasn’t it done so? Perhaps because these areas are a lever with which Russia can bind Georgia into a federation while de facto controlling some of its parts.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s). This article was first published on Diplomaatia.