The NATO Summit in The Hague will mark the two-year anniversary of the adoption of a new generation of regional defence plans, widely regarded as one of the most significant enhancements to NATO´s deterrence and defence posture.[1] This brief reviews the progress made in implementing the plans and the challenges that remain.
Download and read as a PDF: Brief 4. The Regional Defence Plans
NATO´s regional defence plans are a substantial step up from the previous generation of Graduated Response Plans. Their primary objective is to ensure swift deployment of Allied forces and effective defence in the event of an attack. They thus specify the forces, capabilities, and readiness levels necessary to defend various NATO regions, while also strengthening the Alliance’s command and control structure to ensure agility, resilience, and operational execution.
One major enhancement introduced by the new plans was the pre-assignment of specific forces to specific roles. This means that peacetime exercises can be better designed to reflect wartime tasks. Another enhancement was the direct connection of the defence plans to NATO’s capability planning process. Allies are thereby committed to fully resource the defence plans with the requisite capabilities.[2] The immediate focus of NATO capability planning is battle-decisive munitions and air and missile defence. Regular exercising, meanwhile, is intended to ensure that Allies are prepared for the high-intensity, multi-domain collective defence that the regional defence plans envisage.
One major enhancement introduced by the new plans was the pre-assignment of specific forces to specific roles
Alongside the regional defence plans, the Alliance has adopted a new NATO Force Model that provides up to 300 000 combat-capable troops at high readiness (compared to the previous 40 000) and a total of 500 000 troops held at graduated readiness levels from 10 to 180 days.[3] Increased readiness enables swift crisis response, minimising the time between threat identification and action. It also deters potential aggressors as the presence of well-prepared and rapidly deployable troops can dissuade hostile actions. However, achieving and maintaining high readiness requires substantial investment in training, equipment, and personnel, posing challenges related to budgets, manpower, and defence industrial capacity. Achieving consensus inside NATO regarding readiness commitments has proved difficult, as national priorities differ depending on the geography and threat perceptions of individual Allies.
Progress and Challenges
NATO has made notable progress since the regional defence plans were approved. First, Finland and Sweden’s accession has bolstered the Alliance in northern Europe but has also led to a need to amend the plans to fully integrate the new Allies at all levels. Second, the current cycle of the NATO Defence Planning Process includes new Political Guidance and military requirements which, for the first time since the Cold War, have been derived from a threat-driven security assessment. In June 2025, NATO defence ministers agreed on a new set of capability targets which, according to Secretary General Mark Rutte, “describe exactly what capabilities Allies need to invest in over the coming years […] to keep our deterrence and defence strong and our one billion people safe.”[4]
The requirements to fill shortfalls and increase force readiness have made the need for increased defence spending very evident. However, even with sufficient investment, doubts persist regarding whether Allies can coordinate their national plans to fill gaps coherently while ensuring interoperability. As the process of negotiating capability targets proceeded in early 2025, Allies began to focus less on the capabilities demanded by NATO and more on being able to deliver the required effects.[5] On the positive side, this may lead to shorter acquisition timelines and greater cost efficiency, especially in cases where defence industrial capacity is limited. On the other hand, NATO may be unable to ensure interoperability between different weapon systems and platforms and may need to reassess plans if the patchwork of effects-based solutions offered by Allies can no longer deliver the coherent defence laid out in the regional plans.
Implementation of the plans may also be hindered by Allies’ increased focus on hybrid threats and cutting-edge technologies. For example, in the Baltic region, since October 2023, at least 11 undersea pipelines and cables have been damaged, prompting concerns of deliberate sabotage.[6] In response, NATO launched Operation Baltic Sentry to deter further attempts to attack critical underwater infrastructure.[7] Alongside, Allies agreed to an initiative to deploy new technologies, including a fleet of naval drones.[8] Additionally, the German Navy’s new tactical maritime headquarters, Commander Task Force Baltic, commenced operations on 1 October 2024, charged with coordinating naval activities in the Baltic region and providing Allies with a comprehensive joint maritime situational picture.[9] These are positive developments, but how they will be integrated into the regional plans framework still needs to be seen.
Implementation of the plans may be hindered by Allies’ increased focus on hybrid threats and on cutting-edge technologies
Currently, national defence plans and investment priorities also tend to lean more in the direction of cutting-edge technologies. As one of the latest examples, based on lessons learned in Ukraine, the UK’s Strategic Defence Review 2025 underscores a commitment to investing in technologies, including AI, cyber capabilities, and autonomous systems.[10] Once again, it is not clear how these technological advancements will fit into the existing framework of NATO´s regional defence plans, and with agreements to deliver on capability targets already established with NATO. Allies agreed in Vilnius that the new defence plans would be “the main driver for the organisation of our forces and the specific military requirements NATO asks of them.”[11] New technologies, while welcome, must align with NATO’s strategic objectives and capability requirements, and new systems must be integrated with existing military assets to ensure interoperability across Allied forces. AI and autonomous systems need to support NATO’s regional defence plans, ensuring that they contribute to a cohesive and coordinated response to potential threats.
Defence Industry
The defence industry will also play a vital role in supporting NATO’s ambitions for enhanced regional defence and must be prepared to meet the growing demand for advanced military equipment and systems. Collaboration between Allies and with defence contractors will be essential to ensure that the necessary resources are available to efficiently fulfil NATO’s strategic objectives. Addressing supply chain vulnerabilities and fostering innovation within the defence sector will also be critical to meeting the challenges posed by a more contested security environment.
The European Commission’s White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 proposes measures to close critical capability gaps, outlining seven priority areas that align with NATO’s capability requirements: air and missile defence; artillery systems; ammunition and missiles; drones and anti-drone systems; military mobility; AI-quantum-cyber-electronic warfare, and strategic enablers; and critical infrastructure protection.[12] But the White Paper also notes weaknesses within Europe’s defence industry, highlighting fragmentation and underinvestment as well as legislative constraints, which will be major obstacles to implementing the regional defence plans and thus to achieving credible deterrence.
The Commission’s ReArm Europe Plan, meanwhile, focuses on facilitating national military budget increases and a degree of European coordination.[13] The plan may unlock as much as €800 billion in additional defence spending, but the actual figure will depend greatly on the political will of the European Allies.
If the US Leaves?
While there is no detailed public information on the US role expected by the regional plans, the heavy degree to which NATO deterrence and defence posture relies on military capabilities provided by the US is not in doubt.[14] In particular, Europe depends on US contributions to areas such as integrated air and missile defence, air and sealift capabilities, and essential enablers like command and control systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Furthermore, Europe has a shortage of combat forces capable of effectively responding to potential threats.[15] The US also holds a significant leadership role within NATO, politically but also militarily, with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who is dual-hatted as the commander of the US European Command.
The withdrawal of US forces from NATO operations in Europe would have profound implications for collective defence, at least in the short term. NATO would need to rely increasingly on European Allies to bridge capability gaps and bolster deterrence efforts, necessitating greater coordination and significantly increased defence investment.
Conclusion
Implementation of the regional defence plans will not only enhance NATO’s deterrence and defence posture but also strengthen the Alliance politically through the robust shared commitment it demands of all Allies. As the Alliance continues to navigate the complexities of a more contested security environment, Allies must remain focused on filling capability shortfalls, which will, in turn, require them to substantially increase defence spending.
The integration of Finland and Sweden has required plans to be amended to allow the capabilities of these two new Allies to be fully integrated into the regional plans framework and their own security needs to be properly addressed. Further amendments to either national or collective plans will also be necessary as Allies pursue solutions that may differ somewhat from the original intentions of the NATO planners. Most seriously of all, the possibility of a partial or even complete withdrawal of US forces from Europe may require a wholesale rewrite of the regional defence plans; one in which the European Allies assume greater responsibility for collective defence.
Enhanced coordination will be imperative. Both the huge costs involved and the need for greater interoperability on the battlefield should push the Allies further in the direction of collaborative solutions, perhaps taking advantage of incentives to work together provided by the EU.
The defence industry will have a key role in supporting NATO’s ambitions. The potential unlocking of substantial defence investments through initiatives like the ReArm Europe Plan can bolster production capacity and competitiveness within the European defence sector, which must, itself, foster innovation, adapt to the heightened defence material demand, and address vulnerabilities within the supply chain.
The withdrawal of US forces from NATO operations in Europe would have profound implications for collective defence
Above all, NATO must maintain its focus on this strategic alignment, and the Allies must ensure that they act cohesively and with commitment. There is no doubt that the potential of a weakened US commitment to European security presents a major challenge to the Alliance. But the regional defence plans are a new way of doing business for NATO. They offer a solid framework that will allow the Alliance to reinforce its position as an indispensable part of our response to this new era of defence and deterrence and as the cornerstone of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Endnotes
[1] NATO, “Vilnius Summit Communique Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius 11 July 2023,” press release (2023) 001, 11 July 2023, para 34. There are three sets of plans covering the north (the Atlantic and European Arctic), the centre (Baltic region and central Europe) and the south (the Mediterranean and Black Sea).
[2] NATO, “Washington Summit Communique Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. 10 of July 2024,” press release (2024) 001, 10 July 2024, para 7.
[3] NATO, “New NATO Force Model.”
[4] NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte following the meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence in Brussels,” 5 June 2025.
[5] Onno Eichelsheim at Lennart Meri Conference “Herculean Task: Can Europe Defend Itself,” video, 17 May 2025.
[6] Klaudia Maciata, “Fortifying the Baltic Sea – NATO´s defence and deterrence strategy for hybrid threats,” NATO Review, 5 May 2025.
[7] Dzirhan Mahadzir “NATO Launches Baltic Sentry Mission in Baltic Sea,” USNI News, 15 January, 2025.
[8] NATO, “NATO Launches ´Baltic Sentry to increase critical infrastructure security,” 14 January 2025.
[9] NATO “Commander Task Force Baltic Established,” 22 October 2024.
[10] Ministry of Defence (UK), “The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad,” 5 June 2025.
[11] NATO, “Vilnius Summit Communique,” para 34.
[12] European Union, European Commission, “Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030,” 19 March 2025.
[13] European Union, European Commission, “Press statement by President von der Leyen on the defence package,” 4 March 2025.
[14] Eitvydas Bajarūnas, “The Baltics Adapt to Trump,” CEPA, 13 March 2025.
[15] Scott Lee, Andrew Michta, Peter Jones, and Lisa Bembenick, “NATO 2027: European leadership will be key to deterrence against Russia“, MITRE/Atlantic Council, 15 May 2025.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation.
Read our series of briefs that examine some of the key issues of The Hague Summit.