Europe faces thorny dilemmas in the field of defence and struggles to find common responses. It is imperative not only to keep the US engaged in Europe but also to prepare for a possible abandonment by the biggest ally. The two goals are not easy to reconcile.
The Nordic-Baltic countries and Poland have been the strongest proponents of pragmatic engagement, seeing their own strong defence spending as a critical factor in maintaining the US commitment to their security. Their leaders have been reluctant to talk about loss of confidence in the transatlantic relationship, at least in public. But the limits of pragmatic engagement have been repeatedly exposed by President Trump’s positions, be it on Greenland, Ukraine, or tariffs, just to give some examples.
Preparing for the Inevitable?
At the same time, Europe is preparing for an eventual US withdrawal. As reported by The Financial Times, France, Germany, the UK, and Nordic countries are working on a plan to replace most US capabilities over the course of five to ten years. If successful, this burden-shifting might help to avoid a sudden withdrawal of the US and allow Europeans to take more responsibility in a managed way, keeping the NATO framework with limited American contribution.
In the frontline states, public discussion of such plans has raised concerns that Europe might actually push the US to withdraw by signalling that it expects this to occur. Yet the French and the Germans are not crying wolf when they say that the US might abandon Europe — the risk is real. Moreover, the US commitment to Europe is quite certain to dwindle in the long term. The daunting prospect that it may happen sooner and in an abrupt manner, however, has grown.
Public communication on this risk is an utterly delicate and controversial matter. Since Europeans are not ready to defend themselves without US engagement, it would be suicidal to do anything that might encourage or precipitate US departure. Yet not preparing for such an eventuality would be irresponsible and short-sighted.
Not Yet on the Same Page
Controversies around the EU’s fresh decisions on defence reveal persisting differences among European states. The plan announced by the European Commission to mobilise up to 800 billion euros of additional funding for defence in coming years has set the level of ambition high and signalled awareness of the seriousness of the situation. However, its implementation depends on member states, who continue to hold diverse threat perceptions. Some southern European countries, in particular, have been struggling even to reach the NATO target of 2% of GDP.
Different national contexts necessitate different communication strategies. In some cases, stoking fear may have a paralysing effect. For instance, the claims that pushing back Russia in Ukraine may lead to the Third World War have been received in very different ways across Europe. Many in Germany and other western European nations have been petrified by such threats. In the frontline states, on the contrary, people fear that it is a failure to defeat Russia in Ukraine that may bring us to the Third World War.
In some countries, leaders must speak about the loss of confidence in the US in order to make the case for increased defence spending. The US policies under the second Trump administration have come as a bigger shock to many western Europeans than Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The clearest example is Germany, whose first attempt at Zeitenwende in 2022 failed to deliver significant results. Now, the collapse of trust in the transatlantic Alliance has prompted the expected next Chancellor Friedrich Merz to make truly unprecedented decisions on strengthening Germany’s military power.
By contrast, in the Nordic-Baltic states and Poland, there is a broad understanding in societies about the necessity to reinforce national defence. Local politicians don’t need to convert public opinion by highlighting the new level of uncertainty in the transatlantic relationship. There is fear, but not of a paralysing kind — on the contrary, it pushes countries to do more. The Baltic states are following Poland in their efforts to raise defence spending to 5 % of GDP.
Will this be enough to keep the US engaged? These days, there is no such thing as certainty when it comes to US foreign policy.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).