2014 witnessed a sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the West. The annexation of Crimea to Russia in March was a sweepingly bold action by President Vladimir Putin, and it was also a move strongly supported by a huge majority of ordinary Russians. In the following months, the role of Russian forces in Ukraine became more direct and overt, as the separatist forces were unable to cope on their own. Economic sanctions by the European Union and the United States were followed by Russian counter-sanctions. A new Cold War was at hand.
2014 witnessed a sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the West. The annexation of Crimea to Russia in March was a sweepingly bold action by President Vladimir Putin, and it was also a move strongly supported by a huge majority of ordinary Russians. In the following months, the role of Russian forces in Ukraine became more direct and overt, as the separatist forces were unable to cope on their own. Economic sanctions by the European Union and the United States were followed by Russian counter-sanctions. A new Cold War was at hand.
All this caused great unease in Helsinki where, for historical reasons, it had become an axiom to try and avoid taking sides in what could be seen as great-power conflicts. The definition of such a conflict had come to be one in which the Soviet Union, or now Russia, was involved. Over recent decades, some had come to see Finnish behavior as timid and evasive. Now, in some quarters, what was seen as a lukewarm Finnish reaction to Russian moves in Ukraine was interpreted as a case of “neo-Finlandization”.
Being placed between a rock and a hard place – Russian deliberate aggression in Ukraine on one hand, and the West’s desire to show support to Ukraine on the other – Helsinki chose to react with caution but to stick closely with the main EU line of action.
More in: Finland in 2014: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (PDF)