Estonia and Japan may be geographically far apart, but their views on international security and major powers—China, Russia, and the US—have been pushed closer together by the turbulent global environment. Russia’s war against Ukraine and the erosion of the rules-based international order have motivated a closer security partnership, which is strengthened by the ongoing upheaval in US foreign policy.
I paid my first-ever visit to Japan in February this year,[1] landing in Tokyo straight from the Munich Security Conference at a moment when Europe was exasperated about the end of the transatlantic alliance as we knew it. Weeks after the start of the second presidency of Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance used the MSC to express support for Europe’s radical right, while disregarding the war in Ukraine and the Russian threat to European security.
Japan turned out to be a perfect place for taking some distance and reflecting on the broader scale of changes sweeping across the world. Many of my Japanese interlocutors shared the sense of anxiety and were keen to discuss the interconnectedness of security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific in this new, dangerous world.
Trump’s America: A Learning Curve
Japan has benefited greatly from the rules-based order and free trade built under American leadership after WWII. Estonia made the most of the same US-led order after restoring its independence in 1991. Both countries have relied on the US for their security and made an effort to be useful allies: for example, Japan has been hosting the largest overseas deployment of American troops, while Estonia has contributed actively to the US and NATO-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Aware of their dependence on the US, both countries have been seeking pragmatic engagement with Trump 2.0, trying to keep the US committed to their security and have some influence on the positions of their biggest ally. The experience of both countries from Trump’s first term was rather positive: the US contribution to the security of NATO’s Eastern flank countries, including Estonia, increased, while Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, built a close relationship with Trump through golf diplomacy.
However, the ability of allies to influence US policies promises to be weaker during Trump’s second term, which has embarked on radical and chaotic change. Arguably, the US still needs like-minded allies, but it no longer seems to care about international norms of security and free trade, as shown by Trump’s claims on Greenland, his readiness to acknowledge—de jure and not just de facto—Crimea as Russian territory, and his tariff war against the whole world. Allies have been taken aback by the way Trump has been treating close friends such as Canada, Denmark, and Ukraine.
Japan was initially expecting to find a swift solution to the tariff issue but has since had to moderate its expectations and is now hoping to reach a deal by the G7 summit in Canada in June. Estonia is seeking an optimal response as part of the EU. It would be wise for Japan and the EU, together with other actors wishing to preserve rules-based free trade, to coordinate a response rather than rush for separate deals. Both Europe and Japan may even draw some gains from the global decline of trust in the US and the dollar-based economy. More importantly, they share an interest in strengthening ties with like-minded partners within and between Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
Shared concerns about Russia and China
Turning to another major power, Russia, the views of Estonia and Japan have come much closer after February 2022. Following the annexation of Crimea and the start of war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Japan continued its policy of active engagement with Moscow, which stood in contrast to the Baltic states’ calls for isolating and sanctioning Russia. Prime Minister Abe was hoping to secure a compromise over the contested Northern Territories and finally achieve a peace deal with Russia. However, his hopes of Russia making any concessions in the territorial dispute turned out to be futile.
After 2022, Japan has become a major supporter of Ukraine and has joined western efforts to increase the cost of war on Russia. The full-scale war in Ukraine also resulted in a strategic realignment of Japan with NATO, with Tokyo becoming the closest partner of the Alliance in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the EU and Japan have agreed on a security and defence partnership—the first ever between the EU and an Indo-Pacific country—that foresees broad cooperation.
Furthermore, Japan and Estonia have developed a similar perception of the risks posed by China’s growing global influence. In particular, both countries have a keen interest in understanding the deepening partnership between Russia and China and its implications for European and Indo-Pacific security. China’s support to the Russian war effort reflects the broader shared goal of the two authoritarian powers to undermine western unity and the global leadership of the US. Now that the US itself seems to be contributing to these Sino-Russian aspirations, the need for Europe and like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific to deepen cooperation is all the more evident.
Stronger Together
The Japan-NATO partnership has so far prioritised maritime security and cybersecurity. During my visit to Tokyo, Japanese colleagues were particularly keen to discuss the protection of undersea infrastructure. It has become an acute shared concern following several incidents in the Baltic Sea with alleged Russian and Chinese involvement, as well as China’s activities in the South China Sea. Another promising area of cooperation is defence technology and innovation, where contacts between the Estonian and Japanese defence industries have already been established. Both countries are making efforts to strengthen their defence capabilities under pressure from the US administration and geopolitical shifts. As a sign of deepening defence cooperation, Japanese observers and instructors recently participated in the Estonian Defence Forces’ exercise Hedgehog 25 that involved more than 16 000 troops from 14 countries.
Estonia and Japan can build on these positive steps as they are seeking new ways to adapt and be secure in a world where old alliances and norms are under unprecedented pressure. For sure, there will be no shortage of mutually relevant topics for continued research cooperation between the ICDS and Japanese colleagues.
See also the programme of the Baltic Indo-Pacific Forum 2025 organized by the Japan Chair at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) on 11 June in Tallinn.
[1] I am grateful to the Japanese MFA for excellent organisation of the trip.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).