Baltic Cooperation: Past, Present and Future

For 15 years, the Baltic Assembly has unfailingly fulfilled the role of an international chat room. It now needs reforming. What kinds of reforms are necessary? How should the Baltic Assembly be reformed?

There was a festive mood in the air at the session of the Baltic Assembly (BA) held in Vilnius in December 2006, as it marked the BA’s 15th anniversary. It could be said that the BA was modelled after the Nordic Council, while the example of the Benelux Interparliamentary Consultative Council was also kept in mind. The aims of the BA are to promote unity and cooperation among the three Baltic states, to exchange information and to harmonise Baltic foreign policy.
Completely different histories
“The Baltic states” is a geopolitical label that is often used to refer to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is, however, artificial, as the histories of the three states have been completely different. At the beginning of the 13th century, Latgalians, Livonians and Estonians were subjected to foreign rule, while a united state was established in Lithuania and successfully fought against German and Russian expansion. The processes of national awakening and other pivotal events of the 19th century did not follow the same pattern. The Baltic nations only faced a broadly similar situation by the time of the 1905 revolution in Russia.
As part of the process of the formation of modern Europe after World War I, the three Baltic states could declare their independence. Yet they did not forge an alliance or realise the vision of a great Baltic Union that would stretch from Poland to Finland. The new states had managed to separate from Russia, but this fact belonged to the past and did not serve as a uniting factor. All three had a common border with the Soviet Union, but this did not constitute an acceptable basis for a permanent alliance. In the 1920s and 1930s, cooperation between the three Baltic states was limited or, to be more precise, non-existent.
The secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (MRP) concluded on August 23, 1939 and the following complementary agreement signed on September 28 sealed the common fate of the Baltic states: great powers had arranged for us to be included in the Soviet sphere of influence. In the beginning, the enforcement of the MRP did not proceed identically in the three states: Estonia and Latvia concluded mutual assistance pacts with their eastern neighbour whose future plans were unknown to them, while the USSR delivered to Lithuania its historical capital Vilnius and the surrounding areas from the grip of Poland.
Nonetheless, the events of the summer of 1940 followed similar scenarios. The percentage of military losses of the Baltic states from 1940 to 1945 was among the highest in Europe. Moreover, the three countries were the only ones that were deprived of independent statehood for half a century as a result of World War II.
Still, the Soviet occupation brought different results: post-war immigration was especially robust in Latvia and to some extent in Estonia, but quite weak in Lithuania; Latvians and Estonians who came from Russia played an important role in society from the 1950s to the 1970s, while practically no Lithuanians returned from Russia, meaning that local Communists took charge there; in the 1970s, the opposition movement grew quite strong in Lithuania, while it remained weak in Estonia; the role of the church was different; and so on. It seems that the Baltic nations started to develop closer ties in Soviet prison camps. Cultural and economic relations were strengthened in the 1970s: links were established between friendship cities, people travelled to other Baltic states to buy goods and joint student song festivals were organised.
A similar history
Even though we felt superior to our southern neighbour, it was in Latvia where Gorbachev’s perestroika first started to bear fruit: the protest movement against plans to construct a new hydropower plant on the Daugava River had already gathered impetus in Latvia in the autumn of 1986, while the so-called Phosphorite War broke out in Estonia only in the spring of 1987.
From 1987 to 1991, the development of the Baltic states was analogous and uniform: their goals were similar and they stood united in opposition to the Soviet central government. After that, their paths were parallel, while occasionally they exploited a special Baltic method of teamwork used in bicycle races, according to which there is a new leader in every stage of the race.
Yet again, Latvians were the ones who took the first political step: on June 14, 1987 the first large anti-Soviet rally was held in Riga in connection with the anniversary of the mass deportations carried out in June 1941. Estonians made their move on August 23 with a rally held in Hirvepark to mark the anniversary of the MRP, while Lithuanians were still going through the phase of journalistic discussions.
Estonians seized the initiative in the spring of 1988: first, in April, the Estonian state television ETV broadcast a proposal to establish the Popular Front (Rahvarinne) as a legal mass movement of opposition and, second, national flags were waved during the heritage protection days held in Tartu. In the summer and autumn of 1988, national flags were also raised in Lithuania (this was partly due to the participation of our students in the festival “Gaudeamus”) and later in Latvia. The autumn of 1988 brought the foundation of three popular fronts.
In 1989, the results of cooperation were beginning to show: in May, a joint forum for three Baltic popular fronts – the Baltic Assembly – convened in Tallinn, where the Baltic Council was established in order to promote cooperation. On August 23, 1989, the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Baltic Council organised its most important event – the Baltic Chain, involving approximately two million people joining their hands and demanding freedom for the Baltic states. This was the biggest joint action the Baltic nations have ever undertaken.
The most significant outcome of the parliamentary cooperation of the Baltic deputies elected to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies was the condemnation and denunciation of the MRP in Moscow at the end of 1989. By way of this declaration, the highest authority of the USSR acknowledged the fact that the Soviet Union had pursued criminal activities with regard to the Baltic states in 1939. At the same time, proposals for economic self-management formulated in Estonia undermined the planned economy system. In 1989, the aspirations of the Baltic states were publicised at the international level.
In 1990, Estonia passed the baton to Lithuania, as the new Supreme Council in Vilnius proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Lithuania on March 11. Moscow gave its answer in the form of an economic blockade, while Estonia and Latvia made feeble attempts to support their southern neighbour economically. The events in Lithuania were thrust into the international spotlight. On May 12, it was decided in Tallinn to renew the Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation concluded between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1934 and to set up the Baltic States’ Council, an association of the heads of state.
There were other joint initiatives launched in 1990: more than 800,000 signatures were gathered in the Baltic states for the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). However, it was all in vain: the signatures were handed over in Paris, but the President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, requested that the Baltic foreign ministers – who were there as guests, not even as observers – leave the hall during the summit, so that they could only follow the proceedings in an adjacent room.
The escalation of tensions and the Kremlin’s threats targeting Lithuania resulted in a joint meeting of the Supreme Councils of the three Baltic states in Vilnius on December 1, 1990. It was decided to set up an ad hoc committee to promote parliamentary level cooperation. In January 1991, Soviet forces staged an unsuccessful coup in Vilnius. The heroism of the Lithuanians, their casualties and spilt blood gave Latvia and Estonia time to manoeuvre: there were fewer casualties in Riga, while Estonia had a lucky escape with no bloodshed.
During the spring and summer of 1991, the ad hoc committee was busy drafting the statutes, regulations and other documentation of the BA. In August 1991, the independence of the Baltic states was restored. The time had come for the formation of the BA: the founding charter was signed in Tallinn at a meeting on November 7-8. It was decided that the general assembly would include 60 parliamentarians and that plenary sessions would be held twice a year.
The activities of the Baltic Assembly
The first plenary session of the BA convened in Riga at the beginning of 1992. The first document adopted there was an appeal issued to the President and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation concerning the complete withdrawal of Russian military forces from the Baltic states. This topic clearly dominated the security policy pursued by the BA. In May 1992, an even more categorical demand was formulated in Palanga.
It was a bumpy ride for the BA in the 1990s: the time for joint actions mainly targeted against the Kremlin was over, parliamentary elections transformed the BA’s membership and it was not easy to achieve a consensus necessary for the adoption of decisions between the three delegations. There were frictions between the parliamentarians and the executive power: the BA drafted resolutions, but ministries of foreign affairs considered those resolutions impractical . Cooperation between Baltic ministers did not deepen as quickly as had been hoped: the Baltic Council of Ministers was formed in 1994, but the first plenary session with the participation of three prime ministers was held only in the spring of 1997. There were often objective reasons for such problems, for example differences in legislation: the President of Lithuania partly acts as the head of the executive power, while the Presidents of Estonia and Latvia fulfil representational duties.
There have also been those who entertained far greater hopes: for example, in 1993, Lithuanians explored possible avenues for the creation of a far more institutionalised Baltic Union. And there were some moments when it seemed appropriate to sing the requiem for Baltic cooperation (for example, in the spring of 1994, when Latvia concluded separate agreements for the withdrawal of Russian forces).
Indeed, doors have been slammed in each other’s faces, time-outs have been called and even the signing of final documents has been postponed for a few hours. There were ambitious plans for the creation of a Baltic common market; at the same time, the BA could not manage to regulate the small “Baltic herring war” between Estonia and Latvia without a night-time meeting between the two prime ministers. The three states have made reproachful remarks, accusing each other of “taking the lead alone”. A foreign minister said that it was detrimental to Estonia to be a Baltic state for the reason that we were all competitors and our southern neighbours committed blunders too often – this confusion had to be cleared up. Another foreign minister said that the road to Europe for Lithuania would lead through Poland and that Lithuania wanted to belong to Central Europe, not to be a Baltic state – these statements also needed further clarification. Discussions have been held over the Via Baltica and other great plans for cross-border rail connections. Illicit trafficking has been campaigned against. Mistakes have also been made, for example, when the BA earnestly debated the resolution concerning the reinstatement of historical names in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Military cooperation and joint projects have certainly yielded the best results. Among other things, an agreement was concluded to streamline the procedures for the cross-border movement of Baltic citizens.
The Baltic Assembly: Today and tomorrow
Lately, the BA has operated smoothly and effectively: plenary sessions are held once a year and the number of documents adopted is increasing steadily. From 19991 to 2005, the BA approved 186 political documents. Sadly, most of them have not brought tangible results.
It could be said that for 15 years the BA has unfailingly fulfilled the role of an international chat room, which now needs reforming. Yet, what kinds of reforms are necessary? The leadership of the BA is showing signs of decline: at first, there were the vice-presidents of the parliaments, then came the chairmen of (foreign) committees, whereas now we have deputy chairmen of committees or even ordinary parliamentarians who have been appointed to positions of leadership as a result of internal political games. The BA has usually been slow in its reaction to major events in foreign policy and if one Baltic state has come under diplomatic pressure from Russia, others have not offered it adequate support. The priorities of the BA are vague. The awarding of the BA prizes for literature and the arts has often passed unnoticed and there have been difficulties in translating the winning works.
On the initiative of Estonia, the size of our delegation was reduced. At the same time, all possibilities are being considered to increase the efficiency of the Presidium of the BA. The Riga Office of the Secretariat spends around a quarter of the budget of the BA. The changes that have taken place in the international community – we are now members of the EU and NATO – have facilitated increased communication between other organisations for parliamentary cooperation. However, it is doubtful whether it would be wise to dissolve the BA, because the discontinuation of parliamentary cooperation would influence the general atmosphere. It might lead to misunderstandings and disharmony in various other enterprises in which we are involved together and where we, the Baltic states, are treated as a joint group.