A More Autonomous Europe Will Need Ukraine On Its Side

Under the second Trump administration, US foreign policy – its underlying principles, vision of the global order and relations with both allies and adversaries – is profoundly changing. This implies an unavoidable overhaul of transatlantic relations; a shift from an enduring value-based alliance to short-term transactionalism and cynical realism.

These changes make Europe’s security situation, which was already in its most severe crisis after the Second World War before Donald Trump’s re-election, even more precarious. Yet two key factors remain the same: European security depends on the US, and Russia is a long-term, even existential threat to Europe as we know it.

The new and unprecedented uncertainty about the US commitment to Europe does not mean that those Europeans who have long called for strategic autonomy were always right. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, their slogans were counterproductive because they were not based on a shared threat perception among EU Member States and did not translate to credible action in terms of building up European defence capabilities. Today, a common understanding of the threat is much stronger, and there are signs of more serious action, particularly in the northern part of Europe, including Germany.

Europe’s dependence on the US has been exposed by the ongoing war in Ukraine and Russia’s growing military capability (while fighting a war) and persisting determination to remake the European security order. Europe lacks the critical capabilities it needs for defence, which for decades have been provided by the US, such as air defence systems, long-range strike and intelligence capacities. It will take five to ten years for Europeans to build up their own capabilities that would substantially reduce dependence on the U.S. Even then, Europeans are unable to fully replace some key elements of the US contribution, notably nuclear deterrence, where existing French and British capabilities, even if extended to European allies, will be nowhere near those of Americans or Russians.

In order to survive in the current geopolitical environment, Europe needs cleareyed realism and a rapid investment in its own hard power, the lack of which is undermining Europe’s soft power and ability to protect its values and way of life.

First, Europe needs to keep the US engaged, while acknowledging the changed nature of the alliance. Dependence on the US has become humiliating for Europe, but there is no shortcut to autonomy. The US has made clear that it will reduce its military presence in Europe; more precise plans are to be revealed later this year. It is in Europe’s existential interest to work for a managed, coordinated process and avoid an abrupt abandonment by the US, which would increase the risk of a broader war on the continent.

Second, Europeans have to strengthen their defence capabilities in the framework of NATO, which is the only organisation designed for Europe’s collective defence. The commitment made at the NATO Hague Summit by all allies to spend 5% of their GDP on defence includes 3.5% investment in military capabilities (and 1.5% in other defence-related expenditure), which is a reasonable level for Europeans to be able to take charge of their own defence. European leaders should not frame it as a promise made just to please Trump but should take it seriously for their own sake. The EU has an important complementary role to play in strengthening the European defence industry, investing in major multinational capability projects and enabling Member States to spend more on defence. Deeper integration has to be part of the answer to Europe’s defence needs, but it is not enough; rapid national decisions on defence investment are of key importance.

Third and finally, the most urgent test of Europe’s ability to take responsibility for its own security is Ukraine. Unfortunately, there is no sustainable peace in sight in Ukraine; Russia may continue to fight for years. Europe must take the lead in supporting Ukraine and be ready to replace the military assistance provided by the US, which is likely to end once the aid packages approved by the previous administration have been delivered. Europe cannot afford to let Ukraine be defeated, as it would lead to fatal domino effects in other parts of the continent. The EU’s credibility is measured by its ability to further increase the cost of war for Russia and secure a European future for Ukraine, making sure that Russia cannot win its brutal war of aggression. Looking ahead, the erosion of the transatlantic bond is creating a new geopolitical reality where Europe will need Ukraine on its side in order to be able to defend itself.

Read the full report by TEPSA: What future for Europe’s partnership with the United States? (European Council Experts’ Debrief: Issue XV)