A Clear or a Foggy Picture?

What foreign policy issues are raised in party election programmes?

Formulating the foreign policy content of its election programme is unlikely to cause a major headache for any of the political parties, because there are practically no conflicts between the rival factions in this respect. All political parties accept that the European Union and NATO form the cornerstones of Estonian foreign policy, while the UN and relations with Russia also receive some attention. They are united in the belief that Estonian foreign policy must be based on national interests, even though the interpretation of these interests might vary. This does not mean that I am accusing them of shallowness – it is a fact that election programmes are short documents, the format of which does not allow for the elaborate definition of every concept.
It has become common practice for the political parties to conclude their election programmes with chapters that deal mostly with national security or, in other words, foreign and defence policy. This is only natural as opinion polls have shown for years that the electorate considers the topic of national security to be very important, but not a top priority requiring immediate action. First things first: food and shelter, schools, pubs and hospitals. Defence and diplomacy are further down the list simply because everything is fine in those areas anyway. In short, foreign policy is not a vote-winning topic and that is why it is only referred to in the ‘endnotes’ of programmes. However, this does not mean that the parties do not think through their foreign policy platforms or do so offhandedly. In fact, the defence and foreign policy chapters are not in the last position in the programme of the new green party (full name: Estonian Green Party, EER) – their programme concludes with the education chapter. On the other hand, foreign policy has secured sixth place in the programme of the Reform Party (RE), even though only highly qualified Estonian political analysts could draw significant conclusions from that.
The great divide of the presidential elections has not disappeared
It is no secret that the Estonian political parties can be divided into two groups (on an east-west axis) according to their foreign policy belief systems, experiences and implicit and explicit aspirations. The resulting division strongly resembles the one that emerged before the last presidential elections, when the parties who considered the President to be Estonia’s leading figure in international relations, cooperating with the government in foreign policy making and actively implementing it (and who still hold the same view) supported their candidate because of his foreign policy competence; while others who preferred to emphasise the domestic role of the President as the Father of the Nation did not care about their candidate’s performance on the international arena, the level of which was already known by then. If government coalitions were formed on the basis of the foreign policy preferences and interests of the parties, there could be only two coalitions – the formation of the existing coalition, the last one and the one before that should not actually have been possible.
The party election programmes reflect these differences through subtle nuances, leaving much more unsaid than said. For example, there is a marked contrast between the use of the term ‘Baltoscandia’, as the Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica (IRL) does, and vague remarks about ‘the economic and environmental interests of the region that surrounds Estonia’, as does the Centre Party (KE). The Pskov and Novgorod Oblasts definitely do not belong to the Baltoscandia of IRL, while ‘the region that surrounds Estonia’ can accommodate the vast planes of Russia, stretching as far as the Urals.
The importance of foreign policy for each party depends mostly on two factors. First, is anyone among the leaders of the respective party personally interested in international relations and, second, has anyone from the respective party had a chance to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the last 15 years? With the exception of Riivo Sinijärv who was Foreign Minister in Tiit Vähi’s government in 1995 (incidentally, Sinijärv as a diplomat was more of an outsider and not a party activist), the foreign affairs portfolio has been permanently retained by the parties currently known as IRL, RE and the Estonian Social Democratic Party (SDE). KE and the People’s Union (RL) have never had a chance to even get close to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not to mention the post of the Prime Minister who plays a significant role in the implementation of foreign policy.
In terms of foreign policy, the best government was Mart Laar’s second government from 1999 to 2002 that simultaneously included three former Foreign Ministers (Jüri Luik, Siim Kallas and Toomas Hendrik Ilves) with the addition of Laar himself who is the embodiment of international relations, i.e. there were four ministers who had taken a direct and active interest in foreign policy and they all occupied key positions in the government (Prime, Foreign, Finance and Defence Minister). This government could count on the support of a remarkable President – Lennart Meri – the more so that all three coalition parties were involved in foreign policy making on equal terms. No Estonian government before or since has been in such a fortunate position to pursue foreign policy.
Of course, we could claim that after joining the EU every minister started to implement foreign policy in his area of responsibility. However, this kind of system does not actually allow Estonia’s programme to be conveyed uniformly and clearly to the EU, but rather renders us splintered like a feudal state. Maintaining a strong position in one’s ‘own sphere’, for example agriculture, will not compensate for the absence of a bigger picture. This tendency becomes apparent through closer scrutiny of the new election programmes.
All parties have realised the truth that the EU’s common foreign and security policy, and energy policy in particular, are useful for Estonia. At the same time, RE obstructs joint political action by claiming that ‘the EU must maintain its role as a union of nation states’, while RL wants the reformed EU to be ‘a union of sovereign states’. RE’s statement is obviously based on the fear that joint decision-making processes will start to influence Estonia’s tax policy sooner or later, whereas RL uses the foreign word ‘sovereign’ as a rhetorical device, the precise meaning of which is unknown to the electorate. It allows RL to fuel the dreams of its electoral base for total independence from all other countries in the world and especially in Europe – which is, however, impossible in the 21st century. In fact, the limits of Estonia’s sovereignty should be quite clear to RL in the form of the punitive bill for the stockpiles of sugar.
Paradoxically, those who are the strongest in foreign policy are also most aware of their own weaknesses and possible pitfalls. IRL’s programme aims ‘to develop our expertise’, ‘to increase our capacity’ and ‘to support the establishment of think tanks dealing with foreign and security policy’. SDE promises to improve ‘national competence in important areas of foreign and security policy’. These statements reflect their willingness to listen to the opinions of others, i.e. of those who are independent, and to bring more significant topics into the open in order to analyse them in public, not only on a political or intra-agency level. It seems that other parties do not need the expertise of anyone else, as they think they already have all the knowledge necessary.
The countries that are talked about and the countries that are not
IRL, SDE and RE want to carry on helping Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. In addition, RE underlines the support given to the opposition of Belarus and the countries of the Western Balkans. Moreover, IRL states that the door to EU membership should be kept open for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. However, KE and RL do not mention the provision of assistance to these countries, i.e. the continuity of Estonia’s foreign policy is not important to them.
The election programmes have a special way of dealing with the issue of Turkey or, to be more precise, of avoiding it. Not a single party dares to use the ‘T’ word, despite the fact that Turkey is a negotiating candidate country for EU membership. Among others, SDE does not mention Turkey, whereas its statement ‘we support further enlargement of the EU and NATO’ leaves a little less room for ambiguity. The present coalition has officially adopted a cautiously supporting position with regard to Turkey, whereas the programmes of the three coalition parties do not delve into this topic. Why on earth should this be? Are we afraid that the electorate associates Turkey with Islam, terrorism and other negative issues? Whom are we fooling? Apparently, far more Estonians have visited Turkey than, for example, Serbia in recent years and they have not returned with stories about Turkey still living in the dark Middle Ages. Moreover, many decisions concerning Turkey’s relationship with the EU will have to be taken during the next four years. Knowing that this issue will not go away, all the parties should publicly declare their intentions in connection with Turkey.
The UN receives relatively modest coverage in the election programmes. IRL and SDE do not mention it at all, while KE acknowledges the existence of the UN by way of the Security Council as the authority which gives mandates to military missions. RL pledges to ‘intensify cooperation with the UN and its affiliated organisations’ without specifying how exactly it intends to do this. However, as RE considers the UN an important institution, its message is quite clear: Estonians have to get jobs at the UN in order to influence developments all around the world; there is no better place than the UN for dealing with international terrorism, nuclear threats and other global problems. EER also pays tribute to the UN (under the condition that it must be reformed and larger countries must lose their privileged position) and suggests an interesting approach to global environmental problems: in order to achieve a breakthrough, environmentalists should follow the lead of traders and create a World Environment Organisation that would have as extensive powers as the World Trade Organisation has.
Finally, Russia. KE does not mention its friend by name. Instead, it speaks euphemistically about ‘unprejudiced cooperation with all our neighbours’ and, as already stated above, ‘using every opportunity to defend the economic and environmental interests of the region that surrounds Estonia’. It remains unclear whether KE plans to defend the economic interests of Russia at every opportunity, as all the rest of our neighbours are members of the EU whose joint interests are represented by Brussels.
SDE relies on the EU’s common policy for dealing with Russia. EER does not mention Russia in the foreign policy chapter of its programme, but emphasises in the security chapter that its defence policy takes into account ‘the worst case scenario of a possible military attack against Estonia’. Thereafter it is stated that such an attacker would not be an ally, implying that it can only be Russia.
For IRL, the starting point of Estonia’s relations with Russia is the Tartu Peace Treaty, the content of which renders any improvement of relations impossible. RE also states that our relations must be based on ‘core democratic values’ which are, as we know, unacceptable for Russia. However, RE’s support to ‘the building of a new Narva bridge as soon as possible’ is not compatible with its overall foreign policy directed towards Russia. It is hard to escape the feeling that one of the party’s sponsors has simply paid for this line to be inserted in the programme.
RL points out that we need ‘quick progress to normalise bilateral economic relations with Russia and to achieve the enforcement of the border treaty’. Yet again, assuming that the leadership of Russia will not change fundamentally, we all know the price we would have to pay for such progress. In short, RL is either completely incompetent in foreign policy or reveals the naked truth about its definition of ‘national interests’.
It is clear from the above that some government coalitions could be effective in terms of foreign policy and some could not. The score is still two against all other combinations. Taking the foreign policy competence of the President into account, there is a chance that we might again reach the record level of effectiveness that we achieved six to eight years ago. Of course, it is hard to predict whether foreign policy issues will be discussed at all during coalition talks after the parliamentary elections.