Will China shed tears over Maduro?

Diplomatically and economically, Beijing has invested significantly in relations with Venezuela. And so has Xi Jinping in his personal rapport with Nicolás Maduro. Now, as the US plans to “run” the country, China's economic and energy security interests in Venezuela are at risk, while the implications for Sino-Russian relations, the BRICS, and beyond are many.

On 2 January 17:30, Nicolás Maduro met with Xi Jinping’s special envoy to Venezuela, Qiu Xiaoqi 邱小琪 —Maduro’s final public appearance before American choppers landed at his compound a little over 8 hours later. At the meeting where the Sino-Venezuelan strategic partnership was discussed, Maduro remarked that the Year of the Horse was coming next and announced to the Chinese delegation, “I am a Tiger” (Yo soy Tigre, his zodiac sign).

An underperforming investment

For China, Maduro’s capture is a big blow. The PRC’s official statement at the UNSC emergency meeting strongly condemned US actions as “illegal” and chastised US hegemony by saying “no country can act as the world’s police,” reflecting Beijing’s longstanding wish to move from a ‘unipolar’ to a ‘multipolar world’. On the US’ use of force, China’s representative said “military means are not the solutions to problems”—although just a week earlier, on 30 December, the People’s Liberation Army concluded its own Justice Mission 2025 (正义使命—2025), the PLA’s largest-ever military exercises around Taiwan. China has not ruled out the use of force against the island.

On a personal level, Xi likely feels negatively about an abrupt end to his long-term relations with Maduro—the two began their presidencies just nine days apart, Maduro on 5 March 2013 and Xi on 14 March 2013. Furthermore, Venezuela has been high on Xi’s diplomatic agenda from the beginning, with the Chinese leader paying a state visit to Caracas in 2014, just one year into his first term. Over a decade later, their personal ties have remained firm, with Xi and Maduro holding a bilateral meeting in May 2025 in Moscow, on the sidelines of Russia’s 80th Victory Day celebrations. Diplomatically and economically, Beijing has invested significantly in relations with Venezuela.

However, China’s economic and energy security interests in Venezuela are now at risk. This includes not only the USD 6 billion annual bilateral trade relationship, but also China’s over USD 60 billion worth of investments in and loans to Venezuela since 2000. With the US planning to “run” the country, there is a question mark over whether Venezuela will continue servicing its debt to China. Until now, Caracas has been paying in oil—for China, Venezuelan crude constitutes 5% of its total oil imports. If Beijing continues these purchases, it may have to acquiesce to Washington’s demands and start using US dollars rather than Chinese yuan. Alternatively, Beijing may decide to replace the approximately 800 000 barrels a day with other suppliers, like Russia, but this would decrease China’s oil import diversification, undermining PRC energy security.

The shockwave and the aftershocks

Both positive and negative implications for Sino-Russian relations can be derived from Washington’s capture of Maduro. On one hand, Beijing and Moscow may feel a more acute US threat as Venezuela, a strategic partner in South America, sees domestic Sino-Russian influence uprooted by force. This could lead the two not only to grow their oil trade but also give them an impulse to tighten ties in other fields, like military cooperation, even further. On the other hand, the Chinese perception of Russian weakness could affect bilateral relations. As one Chinese internet user wrote: “Russia has waged a four-year war to resolve the Ukraine problem, and the war is still ongoing; to resolve the Venezuelan problem, the US needed just one hour, problem solved.”[i] From Beijing’s perspective, this may reinforce the view of Moscow as a junior partner in the bilateral relationship and as an international player that is incapable of realising its strategic objectives. Such perceptions could hurt Russian pride and cause tensions.

International consequences include the weakening of the BRICS and other non-western organisations in the Western Hemisphere. If Washington can maintain political control over Caracas, Venezuela’s BRICS aspirations will be crushed. Furthermore, if the US is able to cut Venezuelan oil exports to Cuba, a BRICS partner, and thereby pressure the country, BRICS’s standing in the US’ immediate periphery will diminish and Chinese and Russian influence in the region will decline. Likewise, Chinese cooperation with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) may suffer setbacks, as may the conceptual China-CELAC Community of Common Destiny (中拉命运共同体), should Latin American leaders begin to take the repercussions of partnering with US adversaries seriously.

Conversely, Beijing and Moscow could interpret the US move as a green light to expand influence in their own ‘peripheries’. As one Chinese internet commentator pointed out after Maduro’s capture: “The US controls the Americas, Russia controls Europe, and China controls Asia.”[ii] Some Chinese netizens have even suggested that China should learn from Washington’s move: “The US dares to unsheathe its sword, this is something China must study and reflect on!”[iii] and “We can copy America’s approach this time!”[iv]With little doubt, they are referring to a future PRC attack on Taiwan. In Moscow, a similar thought process is probably underway regarding Russia’s own targets, which presents severe challenges for Estonia and NATO’s entire eastern flank.

In a world where military might is decisive and spheres of influence are cemented as a new norm, Europe must understand that the rules of the game have changed. For Europe to survive, this underscores the urgent need to bolster autonomous defence capabilities, cohesive defence plans, and a shared understanding of security threats.

[i] The original comment: 俄罗斯为了解决乌克兰问题发动战争一打就是四年，战争还在继续； 美国为了解决委内瑞拉问题只需要一个小时，问题解决.

[ii] The original comment: 美国控制美洲，俄罗斯控制欧洲，东大控制亚洲.

[iii] The original comment: 美国还是敢于亮剑，值得中国研究和深思!

[iv] The original comment: 美国的这次作业我们可以抄!

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).