Macron adds European flavour to French deterrence

President Macron's speech this week set out how French nuclear forces might play a central role in a more autonomous European defence. By increasing the number of nuclear warheads and showing willingness to implement a 'forward deterrence' posture to European partners, Macron delivered a strong vision of a Europe ready to defend itself in face of uncertainty from the east and the west.

President Macron delivered the traditional presidential address on defence and nuclear deterrence on 2 March at Île Longue naval base. A preparatory video and a background dossier had been published earlier to explain the fundamentals and outline the key points of the doctrine and France’s nuclear force. The speech had also been coordinated with some European partners, to ensure its acceptance as a reference point that would be difficult to reverse, whoever is in power after 2027.

The location for the speech was far from coincidental. Île Longue represents the heart of France’s maritime nuclear component, a signal that any evolution in doctrine, including a stronger European dimension, would be grounded in the existing, independent, and fully operational nuclear deterrent, and anchored in the long-standing tradition of France’s nuclear strategic approach. France portrays itself as a responsible nuclear power, committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The President reaffirmed that the state’s nuclear arsenal is strictly defensive, designed to prevent war rather than wage it, and intended as a last resort to protect France’s vital interests. He also reaffirmed the key role of conventional forces in supporting nuclear forces in a coherent and interdependent manner.

For Macron, France’s nuclear deterrence ensures the state’s independence and sovereignty in decision making and action. He reiterated that Paris will not consider under any circumstance the sharing of its nuclear decision-making authority. Nuclear release decisions will remain strictly national, under the authority of the President of the Republic.

Forward deterrence

An important and highly anticipated part of the presidential address revolved around the European dimension of France’s vital interests. Since the launch of the military nuclear programme in the early Cold War, successive presidents have stated that France’s vital interests include a strong European component and that the French force de frappe (strike force) contributes directly to the security of the continent. President Macron has consistently advocated this interpretation. During his first mandate, he proposed a “strategic dialogue” with European partners on the role of France’s nuclear forces in Europe’s collective security. Until recently, however, this idea generated limited enthusiasm in European capitals. The sharp increase in geopolitical tensions on the continent and the erosion of trust in US extended deterrence commitments has prompted neighbouring states (such as Germany and Poland) to reassess this position. France’s European partners looked to Macron’s speech to provide reassurance and predictability, on what they consider a lack of doctrinal clarity.

The President, however, maintained that the precise scope of France’s vital interests must remain ambiguous for strategic reasons and cannot be defined in advance. He did, though, signal a move toward what he calls “forward deterrence” and indicated what this might mean in practice: France will allow several European countries, including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, to participate in nuclear exercises with their conventional forces. It may also deploy nuclear-capable forces temporarily to their territories, but decision-making authority over their use would remain exclusively in French hands.

European allies would not be required to contribute financially, but Macron stressed that partner capabilities for early warning, air defence and deep strike would need to be strengthened to support French nuclear assets. Ongoing joint initiatives such as the Franco-German Joint Early Warning for a European Lookout, the Franco-Italian SAMPT/NG air defence system, and the multinational European Long Strike Approach, could play a part. In effect, this approach Europeanises what until now has been conceived within a strictly French context.

More Warheads

Critics have cast doubt on France’s nuclear approach, particularly as it concerns European nuclear cooperation, because of the relatively limited size of its arsenal, which currently comprises fewer than 300 warheads. Since the beginning of this century, France has reduced its nuclear inventory and been transparent about its size. Macron’s speech broke both traditions. He announced that France would increase its nuclear warhead arsenal, but from now on, elements regarding its size would not be disclosed.

He justified this expansion by the rise of global threats, Russia’s renewed nuclear assertiveness, and the unpredictability of future European security challenges. Predicting that the ‘coming half-century would be an age of nuclear weapons’, he argued that an increase would be required to maintain credible deterrence in a rapidly evolving strategic environment.

Legacy concerns

Macron’s announcement of a very cautious form of cooperative nuclear deterrence is, nonetheless, a significant update to France’s nuclear doctrine, ‘Forward deterrence’ emphasises the projection of deterrence beyond France’s borders and signals to adversaries that threats to European security could trigger a French nuclear response.

Macron’s powerful, European-focused speech will form part of his legacy. The new nuclear posture is yet another illustration of the European strategic autonomy and the efforts to share a common strategic culture he has promoted since his first term in office. In establishing a ‘high-ranking nuclear steering group’ to deal with this very sensitive area, France is moving closer to Germany, complementing its recent rapprochement with the UK (the only other European nuclear-armed state),

The speech also echoed Macron’s longstanding interest in another of his legacy concerns: a new security architecture for Europe. He underlined the need for Europeans to discuss this question and, once common interests to reach strategic stability are defined, be able to participate to discussion regarding European security rather than seeing it being defined by others, and ultimately pave the way to discuss a new, broader security framework, at first with Russia, and then with the US and China.

On the basis that growing threats and uncertainty require a more autonomous European defence, Macron has offered partners a small step towards European-based nuclear deterrence. Ultimately, his legacy here will depend on how far partners are prepared to follow this ambitious lead. In linking this with a grand scheme for a new European security architecture, and foreshadowing discussions about this with Russia, over the US and China, he may make his task harder with the EU and NATO’s eastern members even though he has been clear about the urge to strengthen Europe first – “In order to be free, we must be feared. In order to be feared, we must be powerful”.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).