The next EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) will take office at a moment when European security and the global order are in turmoil. Her agenda will have to be global and aimed at securing the EU’s influence amidst great power competition that is visible in virtually all corners of the world, from the South China Sea to the Middle East, Venezuela, and the Arctic. However, there is no doubt that the top priorities will include Ukraine.
This is an issue where Kaja Kallas, as former Prime Minister of Estonia, has achieved a prominent international role after Russia’s full-scale invasion, relentlessly pushing the EU, NATO, and partners across the globe to maximise the cost of aggression for Russia and help Ukraine achieve victory. Entering her new position, Kallas is facing not only high expectations to further strengthen the EU’s contribution but also concerns in some member states as to whether a leader allegedly “eating Russians for breakfast” is too radical to help build a sustainable peace.
Taking leadership
Kallas, a former member of the European Parliament, became Estonia’s Prime Minister in January 2021 and stepped down in July 2024 after being nominated as a candidate for the next EU HR. She emerged as a leading spokesperson for Estonia and the Baltic states in 2021-22 when the security situation in Europe sharply deteriorated. From February 2022 onwards, Kallas has used the EU and NATO’s newly found desire to listen to the Eastern member states in her efforts to shape western response to the war. She has successfully advocated a number of concrete measures of supporting Ukraine and raising the cost of war for Russia, which she will be able to build on in her new position.
Under Kallas’ rule, Estonia was leading by example in providing military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.[1] The country was among the first to halt natural gas imports from Russia, pushed for a lower price cap on Russian oil exports, and urged harsher sanctions to limit Russia’s ability to fund its war effort. In December 2023, the Estonian government issued a strategy for Ukraine’s victory,[2] urging all Ramstein partners to commit 0.25% of their GDP during the next four years to support Ukraine’s defence – a goal that only the three Baltic states have thus far subscribed to. Estonia’s total contribution by now exceeds 1.4% of its GDP in military aid.
More recently, Estonia has been working within the EU to combat sanctions evasion and find a way to use Russia’s frozen assets for the benefit of Ukraine. On the latter issue, Estonia was the first EU country to pass relevant national legislation in May 2024. Furthermore, the country has been a long-term supporter of Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO, seeing it as a way not only to safeguard Ukraine’s security but also to enhance stability in Europe by eliminating grey zones that have been vulnerable to Russian pressure and aggression.
Changing Russia’s calculus
Now that the full-scale war is continuing for the third year and Russia is making slow advances deeper into Ukrainian territory, there is increasing talk in Europe about the need to make peace. Leaders vow to remain committed to long-term support of Ukraine’s war effort, but an increase in criticism of this policy has been visible in the context of recent elections in several EU member states.[3] Even more worryingly, there is huge uncertainty about the future role of the US in European security. The outcome of the US presidential elections in November is expected to change the political dynamics around the war, but the shape and direction of the changes is unpredictable. American support to Ukraine remains indispensable, although the amount of assistance provided by Europe has surpassed that of the US.
Despite calls for peace, there is no quick end to the war in sight. Amidst lingering pessimism over Ukraine’s chances to win the war, setting the tone matters. Kaja Kallas has been vocal in shaping the western narrative over the past years. As HR, she will have to keep reminding the European public about the long-term threat that Russia poses to European security and values. While there are other conflicts and threats that undoubtedly require the attention and resources of the EU, the case needs to be constantly made that Ukraine’s fight is a fight for Europe’s future. Furthermore, it is hard to overestimate the importance of this war for the future of international security order and balance of power, with authoritarian leaders across the world watching closely.
For the time being, there is no reason to believe that Russia would be ready to negotiate about anything except Ukraine’s capitulation. Moscow is still hoping that western support will wane and that Ukraine can be forced to an outcome where its sovereignty is constrained so that Russia can re-establish control over the war-torn country. It is up to Ukraine’s supporters to change Russia’s calculation by making clear that, first, their support is long-term and sufficient for pushing back Russian aggression; second, Ukraine is provided credible security guarantees to prevent future attacks; and third, Ukraine’s path to membership in the EU and NATO is irreversible. In other words, the west should strive for a situation where Russia no longer believes that it can make further gains by continuing the war. Such circumstances would allow for meaningful negotiations – not about Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but about the modalities of a ceasefire and settlement.
No quick gains
Whether such circumstances will emerge depends to a large extent on the next US administration. That said, the EU can do a lot to strengthen Ukraine’s position and pave the way towards a sustainable settlement. It is a complicated task for the new HR to prepare the EU for possible peace negotiations and an eventual settlement. The EU cannot be a mediator in possible negotiations since it is firmly on Ukraine’s side in the conflict. However, it must be engaged in the diplomatic process as an actor that has much at stake and much to contribute, with the HR in a leading and coordinating role. Whether this will involve at some point a seat at the negotiating table obviously depends on whether a negotiation framework involving various external actors, with the US and China as major contenders, will ever materialise. In any case, European diplomatic involvement should not be left to France and Germany, whose contribution to the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 left Ukraine vulnerable to continued Russian pressure on its independent statehood.
In order to strengthen Ukraine’s position with a view to eventual settlement, the new HR together with relevant Commissioners will have to bring forward an array of ambitious policies introduced in recent years:
- Increase the EU’s military support to Ukraine with a stronger focus on strengthening Ukraine’s own defence industry. Over €11.6 billion has been approved for Ukraine under the European Peace Facility, but there is an urgent need for more funds.[4]
- Integrate Ukraine fully into EU defence cooperation. As a future EU member, Ukraine will be a major long-term contributor to European defence.
- Keep working on possibilities to use Russian frozen assets for the benefit of Ukraine’s self-defence and reconstruction.
- Reinforce the implementation of sanctions against Russia, working with third countries as well as member states and private companies. Sanctions evasion, e.g., through oil products refined from Russian crude oil,[5] feeds Russia’s war machine.
- Carry through the EU’s commitment to deliver up to €50 billion of financial support for Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction, and modernisation during 2024-27, and the fresh commitment of up to €40 billion in new loans to keep the country’s economy functioning.
- Ensure a credible perspective of membership for Ukraine (and other candidate countries). Move ahead with Ukraine’s accession negotiations and gradual integration with the goal of full membership as soon as the conditions are met. Persuade member states to streamline EU decision-making on enlargement.[6]
- Continue efforts to make Russia bear responsibility for the war crimes committed in Ukraine.
On all these issues, the HR needs to coordinate the work of other Commissioners, build consensus among 27 capitals, and push both member states and the EU’s external partners to do more. To ensure better coordination within the Union, the HR’s role as Vice President of the Commission overseeing different strands of EU foreign policy should be strengthened.
There are no quick gains to be made for the new Commission and HR regarding Ukraine and Russia, but persistent work needs to continue on this long-term priority. The new Commission can bring fresh energy to supporting Ukraine, with Ursula von der Leyen remaining as a vocal leader on this matter together with Kallas. The HR will have a critical role to play in securing determined European and transatlantic efforts towards Ukraine’s victory, allowing the country to prevail as an independent state and a major European nation fully integrated into the west.
[1] Grasping the opportunity for small state leadership: Estonia’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine – Kristi Raik, Merili Arjakas, 2024 (sagepub.com)
[2] Setting Transatlantic Defence up for Success: A Military Strategy for Ukraine’s Victory and Russia’s Defeat | Kaitseministeerium
[3] The meaning of sovereignty: Ukrainian and European views of Russia’s war on Ukraine | ECFR
[4] Ukraine, the European Peace Facility and additional financing (europa.eu)
[5] West funding Putin’s soldiers with growing Russian fuel purchases, report warns – POLITICO
[6] Unblocking decision-making in EU enlargement | Clingendael