After months of efforts to persuade US President Biden to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of the ATACMS short-range ballistic missiles against targets in Russia, the best argument was eventually delivered by Comrade Kim Jong Un of North Korea. As his hermit kingdom de facto joined the war in Ukraine by sending thousands of troops, the incumbent president decided to climb one rung up on the notional escalation ladder and let the Ukrainians do what they had to do to impose costs on the aggressor.
Given the long delay, limited stocks, and remaining constraints, the use of missiles only against those targets on Russian territory that enable Moscow’s pending counter-offensive in the Kursk province will not be a game changer. It will only marginally help Ukraine address the most pressing challenges across the entire frontline. However, it gives a chance to influence the dynamics in the Kursk direction and retain this piece of Russian land as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. It has also opened the way for London and Paris to allow the use of Franco-British Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles against targets in Russia.
Having already made quick use of the new possibilities, Ukraine will be intensifying its missile and drone campaign in the coming weeks. For maximum effect, it will likely target command and control elements, ammunition stocks, supply lines, staging areas, and aviation bases. Their subsequent success may even force Comrade Kim to reconsider sending more of his troops to the grinder.
In retaliation, Moscow has resorted to its experimental intermediate-range ballistic missile Oreshnik to demonstrate its will and capability, which has more political and psychological value than a military one. Bundled with the unveiling of the long-touted changes to the nuclear doctrine lowering the first-use threshold and Putin’s aggressive nuclear signalling, this show of force was designed to restore the credibility of Russia’s nuclear threats, deter Ukraine from further strikes on its territory, and persuade the US and other allies to reduce, if not entirely cease, their support to Ukraine. Neither of those goals is likely to be achieved. On the contrary, the employment of Oreshnik has betrayed a degree of desperation in the Kremlin as it scrambles to find something of shocking value that has not already been thrown at Ukraine since 2022.
Nor does this mean an increased risk of the potential use of nuclear weapons, which would only be likely if the regime’s survival were under a direct and immediate threat. The doctrine has long been an instrument of information warfare rather than a prescriptive document guiding the Kremlin’s decisions, especially in a culture where what is being thought, said, and done are three different things. The dictator in this mafia-like regime is driven — as well as constrained — primarily by his own mental models, appetite for risk-taking, fears, and ambitions instead of some official documents and other legalities. Such formalities might, nonetheless, be important for window-dressing and legitimising the dictator’s decisions.
The previous iteration of the document already provides ample grounds for Putin to employ nuclear weapons in this war if he so desired. The updated doctrine, together with the missile theatrics, is aimed at shaping — directly and indirectly through the receptive groups such as MAGA extremists — the thinking of one man only, that is Donald Trump.
We are essentially watching a preview of how the ‘presidential emperor’ Putin in his pursuit of the ultimate prize — i.e., full subjugation of Ukraine and eviction of the US from the European continent — will try to gain the upper hand in his dealings with the ‘imperial presidency’ of Trump. Nuclear suasion will remain at the sharp end of those interactions, even though it will also be complemented by disinformation, deception, bribery, and plain flattery of Trump. When it comes to nuclear counter-suasion and if the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review conducted during Trump’s first term is any guide, the US under the next administration can respond in kind and will have plenty of cards to do so if it wishes.
First and foremost, it would do well to maintain a commitment that Biden made earlier this year and deploy ground-based intermediate-range missiles and ballistic missile interceptors to Germany. It could also publicly redefine the mission and reconfigure the recently inaugurated Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defence facility in Poland, as well as the older one in Romania, to counter the threat of intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Russia rather than Iran, as originally conceived.
Next, it could communicate to the Kremlin that future “test” or even combat launches of the IRBMs towards the targets in Ukraine will result in mid-course interception of the Russian missiles. This would be another strong step towards establishing escalation dominance over Moscow’s posturing. Similarly, it would help counter the agitprop line that ‘Russian wonder weapon cannot be defeated.’ It would, however, bring about a major reversal of the current (deeply flawed) policy that does not allow NATO air and missile defences to engage Russian missiles, even when they violate the Alliance’s airspace.
The question remains whether the incoming administration, which is eager to complete a strategic pivot towards Asia-Pacific, will bother acting tough against Russia in Europe or rush into a deal with Moscow in order to concentrate solely on Beijing. So far, it seems that Ukraine and Europe are — in the balance sheet of the real estate mogul — in the column of liabilities rather than assets, while Putin’s nuclear posturing helps to keep it that way. Europe needs to upend this balance by assuming a much greater role in helping Ukraine. At the same time, it needs to rebuild a robust defence and deterrence posture, including its nuclear domain, with or without US involvement. The next immediate step is up to Germany: send those Taurus missiles to Ukraine.