Moldova at the Crossroads: The Bear at the Gate and the Winds of the West

Elections are always a pivotal moment in any democracy, the ultimate expression of citizens shaping their country’s future. But for Moldova, the stakes go far beyond domestic politics. These parliamentary elections will determine not only who governs, but also whether the country drifts closer to Brussels or becomes entangled in Moscow’s orbit. Moldova, then, is not simply heading into another election—it is confronting a fundamental choice about its place in the world. Will the winds of Europe carry it forward, or will the shadow of the Russian bear hold it back?

The key question haunting voters is whether Russia can still slow down—or even derail—Moldova’s westward course. But the struggle is more complex than a simple binary choice between east and west. Russian disinformation campaigns continue to sow fear: from stoking anxieties about war reaching Moldovan soil (echoing the line used in Georgia that “the collective west is dragging the country to war”), to inflaming culture-war rhetoric about the West “forcing liberal values,” all the way to real bread-and-butter concerns like energy insecurity, inflation, and governance failures. Moldova’s political arena is not just about parties and programmes—it is a battlefield of narratives.

An Electoral Puzzle

While it is difficult to make a prognosis of what’s to come after these consequential elections, pre-election poll results give some indication. The September polls underscore how fragmented and uncertain the landscape is. Pro-European President Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) leads with 38.8%, followed by the Russian-leaning Patriotic Bloc of Communists and Socialists—an alliance of former president Igor Dodon and fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor—at 26.9%. Our Party, led by former Bălți mayor Renato Usatîi, stands at 14.1%, while the Alternativa Bloc of Chișinău mayor Ion Ceban and presidential candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo, who ran against Maia Sandu in 2024, stands just below the 7% threshold for electoral blocs. It is important that 26.8% of respondents remain undecided, and the survey excludes both the Moldovan diaspora and voters in the Transnistrian region—groups that have historically tipped results.

For PAS, the path to governing after the 2025 vote runs through two difficult fronts: winning over that large undecided bloc at home and mobilising the diaspora, which has traditionally leaned strongly toward Sandu’s party but cannot be taken for granted. Without an outright majority, PAS would need to build a coalition—an exercise fraught with political risk. Sandu has declared she will not approve any government that shows “even minimal sympathy for Russia,” a red line that sharply narrows the pool of potential allies and raises the prospect of protracted negotiations or even political deadlock if PAS falls short. On the other hand, if the opposition block manages to form a coalition, this would mean tense relations between the Parliament and the President, potentially halting EU accession processes.

Moldova’s civil society also has a strong stake in the composition of the new Parliament. Georgia’s recent trajectory illustrates the risk: there, the adoption of “foreign agent” law and other restrictive measures has steadily narrowed civic space, marginalising independent voices and eroding institutional checks on government power. If Moldova’s next legislature follows that blueprint, a similar law could emerge, curbing the ability of NGOs, watchdog groups, and independent media to act as vital guarantors of accountability, transparency, and fundamental rights in the country’s democratic system.

Russia in the Shadows

Alongside a web of financial schemes—ranging from wire transfers and the distribution of prepaid debit cards to the use of cryptocurrency—financed by Moscow to funnel money directly to voters and political intermediaries, Moldovan authorities are also fighting an uphill battle against a coordinated and well-funded Russian hybrid warfare. It is aimed at penetrating Moldova’s media and social spheres and swaying voters through smear tactics, disinformation, and fear-mongering—all designed to erode trust in the country’s pro-European course and in the governing party itself.

Russian influence operations have tainted every recent vote. During the 2024 presidential election and EU-membership referendum, there were countless documented cases of coordinated disinformation, deep-fake videos, and covert financing of pro-Russian parties and social-media networks designed to depress turnout and undermine trust. Authorities accused Ilan Șor of funnelling Russian money into protests and “charity” events to sway rural voters. Despite these efforts, Sandu won re-election with about 55% of the vote, and the EU referendum passed by a smaller margin of 50.35%.

The current parliamentary race has only intensified those hybrid warfare tactics. Watchdog groups report a surge of Telegram channels and Facebook pages accusing PAS of corruption, planning to sell farmland to foreigners, or dragging Moldova into NATO—all familiar Kremlin narratives. AI-generated content on social media and deep-fake videos circulate widely before fact-checkers can respond.

Moldova’s Profile and Internal Fault Lines

Understanding these stakes requires a look at the country itself. A former Soviet republic, Moldova has spent three decades balancing between east and west, oscillating between reformist governments and Moscow-leaning coalitions.

Moldova declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, with inherited deep linguistic and political divisions between a Romanian-speaking majority and sizable Russian-speaking minorities. The country lost control of Russian-backed Transnistria after the war in 1992, while the region of Gagauzia secured autonomy in 1994 with the right to secede if Moldova unites with Romania. Decades of corruption and oligarchic rule of figures like Vladimir Plahotniuc and Ilan Șor kept the state fragile, yet pro-European reforms advanced: a 2014 EU Association Agreement and visa-free travel to the Schengen area deepened ties with Brussels. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Moldova accelerated its westward course, gaining EU candidate status in 2022 while still contending with Russian troops in Transnistria and persistent Kremlin influence.

The April 2024 census counted about 2.4 million residents, with Moldovans making up roughly three-quarters of the population, alongside Romanians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Russians, Bulgarians, and Roma minorities. Parliament’s 2023 decision to replace the “Moldovan language” with Romanian formalised a long-running debate about national identity, yet Russian remains a common lingua franca, especially in Gagauzia and the breakaway Transnistrian region.

The Moldovan diaspora, scattered across the EU and Russia, plays an outsized role in national politics. Remittances provide about 12% of GDP, and diaspora voters have repeatedly swung elections in favour of pro-European parties, securing Sandu’s presidential victories in 2020 and 2024. Yet mobilising these voters requires efficient logistics, confidence in mail-in and consular voting, and a sense that their ballots will truly shape the country’s future. PAS cannot assume automatic turnout: economic hardship abroad and disinformation campaigns in host countries, particularly Russia and parts of Europe, can dampen participation.

Opinion data show a country tilting west but far from being unanimous. Surveys in 2024–25 find solid majorities for EU membership (59%) but continued resistance to NATO. 2025 polls indicate that 54% of Moldovans choose neutrality as the best option to guarantee security. Regional and demographic cleavages persist: Gagauzia and Transnistria remain strongly pro-Russian, whereas urban centres, younger voters, and the diaspora lean firmly European.

Ambition Tempered by Reality

Economically, PAS has delivered mixed results under extreme pressure. Moldova remains one of Europe’s poorest states, with heavy dependence on remittances and agriculture. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine upended trade routes and sent energy prices soaring; household bills doubled in the winter, and inflation topped 30%. PAS negotiated emergency gas and electricity purchases from Romania and secured EU-backed financing to avert blackouts, stabilising supplies but leaving many families struggling with stagnant wages and high costs. The government has sought to diversify markets toward the EU, but small farmers and provincial towns have yet to feel sustained benefits.

Governance reforms show a similar pattern of ambition tempered by reality. PAS campaigned on anti-corruption and justice-sector reform, pushing constitutional amendments to vet judges, creating an Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, and recovering part of the infamous 2014 “bank-fraud” losses. Yet Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Moldova only 84th of 180 countries—better than a few years ago but still far from EU norms. Critics cite political appointments and slow enforcement as evidence that deeply ingrained corruption remains hard to uproot.

As Moldovans head to the polls, the question is no longer whether Russian interference exists but whether the electorate believes that European integration offers enough tangible improvement to outweigh economic pain and relentless disinformation. The outcome will decide not only who forms the next government in Chișinău, but also whether the European project can withstand Moscow’s hybrid warfare on its eastern frontier.

The publication expresses the views of the author only and does not represent the views of any organizations the author is affiliated with. This article was first published on Diplomaatia.