Iran Developments as Impetus for Beijing to Increase Coordination with Moscow

On 28 February, joint US-Israeli strikes hit Iran, bringing strong condemnation from Beijing and Moscow.

Iran and China have been comprehensive strategic partners since 2021, and Iran and Russia have been since 2025. While ongoing developments will affect Tehran’s relations with its main strategic partners to its north and east, implications for Sino-Russian relations can also be drawn.

Official Position

On 1 March, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson called the attacks on Iran “a grave violation of Iran’s sovereignty and security”, saying that “China firmly opposes and strongly condemns it”. Beijing urged a cessation of military activities and return to negotiations, as did Moscow, based on the Chinese and Russian press releases following the call that Wang Yi and Lavrov held on the same day. According to the call, China and Russia are ready to step up coordination and communication to send out clear-cut messages through platforms like the UN and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Increased Chinese Energy Reliance on Russia

China is the largest crude oil importer in the world. In 2025, China purchased an average of 1.38 million barrels per day of Iranian oil, accounting for 13.4% of China’s total oil imported by sea. If the US is able to affect the destination of Iran’s oil exports (as it has with Venezuela’s), over a tenth of Chinese crude imports are at serious risk. Furthermore, China’s other Middle Eastern crude suppliers have already been affected. Saudi Aramco’s largest oil refinery in Ras Tanura has been hit by Iranian drone strikes and has halted production. Additionally, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz means that crude imports from not only Saudi Arabia but also Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait will struggle to reach China. These non-Iranian suppliers account for at least another 25% of China’s oil imports. Who could plug this gap? The obvious answer is Moscow.

If Beijing views the Middle East as an unstable import source, its short-term and medium-term answer may be to decrease reliance on the region in exchange for importing more Russian crude. For Moscow, this would come at an opportune time, given Delhi’s pivot away from Russian oil. At the same time, Beijing will view its long-term push for green energy as the correct geopolitical move, as this energy source is not reliant on volatile global supply chains. However, for now, an increase of Chinese crude imports from Russia could strengthen Russia’s international position, not only giving Moscow some leverage over Beijing in an otherwise China-dominated bilateral relationship but also plugging the gap of falling crude revenues as other countries curb Russian oil imports.

Shakeup of China–Russia–North Korea Dynamics

Beijing and Pyongyang may need to reconfigure their current support for Moscow’s war effort if they are to keep the frontline status quo in line with their strategic interests, following the removal of Tehran’s support. In 2025, Wang Yi reportedly told Kallas that China does not want to see Russia lose its war in Ukraine. If this is the case, China may choose to increase its support. However, China has restricted itself to giving Russia non-lethal and dual-use support. This potentially leaves North Korea to fill the military support gap left by Iran.

Iran’s military support has been significant. From 2022 onwards, Iran has supplied Russia with missiles, drones, artillery shells, ammunition, explosives and other military supplies. Sales of missiles, including Fath-360 missile launchers and short-range ballistic missiles, have reportedly totalled US $2.7 billion. Tehran has also transferred Iranian drone technology to Moscow, although Russia is no longer reliant on Iran for this, as Shahed (aka “Geran” in Russia) drones are now produced domestically in Russia without Iranian assistance. Iran may have supplied around 1 million rounds of ammunition and 300,000 artillery shells to Russia, as well as explosives. Russia’s Caspian port of Olya has been identified as a major transport hub for incoming Iranian military supplies. If Iranian support is lost, Beijing and Pyongyang may step in to compensate, with Beijing increasing non-lethal, economic support while Pyongyang increases lethal support. In this way, Beijing and Pyongyang can support their favoured outcome in Ukraine – that is, one in which Russia does not lose. Therefore, removing Iran from the equation could lead to the further tightening of the perceived three-way partnership, which first came to the forefront with the Xi–Putin–Kim photo op in September 2025 at Beijing’s Victory Day parade. If Beijing and Pyongyang are either unwilling or unable to make up for lost Iranian support, Russia could face new difficulties on the battlefield.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).