The question of who would govern France hangs in the air, as no one has a majority at the National Assembly.
As is customary after such loss, Prime Minister Gabriel Attal has announced his resignation and Macron has accepted it. He declared himself available to serve his role until the new National Assembly is structured and would probably stay in charge until the end of the Olympic Games. An institutional blockade is possible, and several scenarios are on the table.
A Hung Parliament and Uncertainty about the Next Government
As none of the three main forces in the country clinched a majority, second-round results have left France with a hung parliament. The left coalition Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) — La France Insoumise (LFI), Le Parti Communiste Français (PCF), Les Ecologistes (The Greens), and Le Parti Socialiste (PS) — arrived first with approximately 31,5% of the votes. Macron’s party came second, winning approximately 29,1%; Rassemblement National (RN, the National Rally) was third with approximately 24,7%, having increased their share from 15,4% in 2022. The figures have not been updated yet, especially regarding the composition of the coalitions. As of now, the far-left party, La France Insoumise, is leading with 71 seats, which is four seats less than in 2022, yet far from having the majority within the left coalition, whereas the Socialists have doubled their seats from 31 to 65, and the Greens are at 34.
A coalition is in the works, but Macron has refused any agreements with the LFI, the largest party within the left coalition, whereas the left parties have refused to compromise with Macron. They are yet to announce their choice of prime minister, but many have already outruled Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s candidacy, seeking someone with a personality that could appease the country and govern for everyone. On the other hand, some still consider Mélenchon legitimate as he represents a political party that has won the most seats in the coalition. Despite staying united during the political campaign, the war within the left rages on: LFI has the will to govern only under its conditions, and the PS is open to seek allies beyond its borders. Tensions crystallise over the choice of Prime Minister, as LFI refuses proposals coming from Socialists, Greens and Communists but an agreement for a unique candidate has been found for the presidency of the National Assembly.
The election of the president of National Assembly becomes central in this disorientated political system. It was the first political test for the left as Macron waits for the National Assembly’s structuring to appoint a new prime minister. It was also a test for the National Assembly itself to gain more power over the presidential camp. Since laws can be passed only if the National Assembly agrees on them, its new president will have to make the different political groups coexist to reach compromise.
The center and center-right parties, comprising Renaissance (Presidential Party), MoDem (Democratic Movement) and Horizons (party of Edouard Philippe, Macron’s former Prime Minister), were divided on the question, sending two candidates for the job: Naïma Moutchou, from Horizons and Yaël Braun-Pivet, the outgoing president of the Assembly who got reelected. Their views diverge on who to collaborate within a coalition. While some closer to the left wing of the centre parties argue that the only possible majority is a coalition from the moderate left to the moderate right, others might listen to the sirens of traditional right figures (Les Républicains – LR), such as Gérard Larcher, president of the Senate, calling for any NFP initiatives to be blocked. This is the case of Edouard Philippe or Rachida Dati, the minster of culture in Macron’s government, both of whom argued for a bloc going from Macron’s party Renaissance to Les Républicains. As partnering with the right already helped re-elect the former speaker of parliament, one may think that further collaboration will make them the first coalition to have a majority to pass legislation. In this case, they could put pressure on the PS to negotiate on specific texts, so as to send the extremes back into their camps.
One could imagine that a coalition could benefit from making more inclusive and balanced decisions while respecting the will of the people and that energy could be directed toward goals and not at each other. It would also bring peace after seeing the RN getting as close to victory as ever. A minority government could happen, with the risk of being censored by the National Assembly and leading to successive governments. Lastly, a technocratic government with no party affiliation is an option, but some would claim that it goes against the will of the ballot box.
What A Coalition with the Left Means for France’s Foreign Policy
Regarding foreign policy, particularly NATO and Ukraine, one wonders how the left can collaborate as Ukraine has been the main bone of contention preventing the coalition between the Socialists and the LFI. The Socialist Party and the Greens have argued for unwavering support to Ukraine, providing it with weapons, and endorsing the enlargement processes. In contrast, the LFI and the Communists have campaigned for a “diplomatic solution to end the conflict.” The line adopted is closer to the PS and the Greens, which involves weapon delivery, cancellation of Ukraine’s foreign debt, and seizing of Russian oligarchs’ assets that enable the Russian war effort.
Sending troops to Ukraine is rejected by the LFI and the PCF, even though one may wonder how they would adapt to real-time events, to the inertia of Macron’s decisions, and to Raphaël Glucksmann, PS chief candidate during the EU elections as his position since the beginning of the war has been staunchly supportive of Ukraine. One must remember that while Macron was falling into the Kremlin’s discourse trap of thinking that peace entails negotiation with Putin and that Russia should be provided with security guarantees, Glucksmann was advocating a harsher stance on Russia, sending weapons to Ukraine, ending gas and oil imports, and banning tourist visas for Russians. In case of a vote on, for example, sending troops to Ukraine, the Socialists and the Greens could work with Macron, now that he has positioned himself as a leader by proposing to form a coalition of military instructors and sending Mirage 2000-5 to Ukraine.
Regarding NATO, the Socialists’ line is much closer to Macron than Mélenchon, known for his contempt towards both flanks of the organisation. Although the NFP programme does not talk about NATO, in 2022, the NUPES (Nouvelle Union populaire écologique et sociale, as the left coalition used to be called) asked NATO-related decisions, such as leaving NATO’s integrated command, to be consulted with the parliament. Before that, Mélenchon and his base, infamous for expressing anti-US and anti-Atlantic views, argued for France’s immediate withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command and then, in stages, from the Alliance itself.
Mélenchon has also expressed derogatory feelings towards the “Balts.” For instance, he claimed that they had problems with Russia for over a thousand years and that as soon as a Baltic country had another issue with Russia, Europe would be dragged into a war. On the one hand, one could ponder on the consequences of this position in the case of a Russian attack on a Baltic state. Some politicians in France have been unaware or unwilling to consider the possibility of an attack, whereas NATO’s eastern flank is and Allied countries, such as Estonia, anticipate a conflict within a decade. On the other hand, an alliance between the socio-democratic wing of the coalition with the centre would render his position and votes mute.
What to Expect from the National Rally
The strong showing of the RN in the European Parliament elections last month left the party and its supporters emboldened. Many saw it as opening the door to the prime ministership for the Rassemblement National as early as this summer, as RN’s president Jordan Bardella claimed Macron could not remain deaf to the message from the French.
The RN prepared a strategic plan to reach Matignon (“The Matignon Plan” alluding to the residence of the Prime Minister) but their campaign only revealed that many of their candidates were xenophobes, homophobes, and racists. They also appointed extremist individuals, including phantom candidates who were elected without campaigning, convicted candidates, a candidate who had taken a mayor hostage, and pro-Kremlin candidates who had previously observed ‘elections’ in Donbas and Russia. Moreover, the Kremlin openly supported the RN, which reminds us once again that even if Russia targets different parties and individuals, the National Rally remains its private turf. Violence has spiked after a far-right website published a list of lawyers to kill, and 51 elected representatives have been assaulted.
Although many interpret the outcome of these elections as a stop on the line in extra time that has saved democracy, one must remember that the RN has reached an all-time high. They won 143 seats (or 24,8% of the total number), thereby increasing by 55 the number of seats they had before the dissolution and becoming the most represented party in the parliament. If one counts in the voters of Ciotti from Les Républicains (The Republicans), who defected to the RN, they have won the support of 10,65 million people.
We could see the National Rally keep taming its position on Russia until and during the next campaign, while statements would contradict actions. During this campaign, Bardella tried to erase the RN’s pro-Russian stance by saying that he didn’t “plan to question the commitments France has made on the international stage” if he took power as “credibility towards European partners and NATO allies is at stake”. On Monday, the 8th of July, one day after the defeat, the Rassemblement National quickly showed its true self: Bardella was elected the leader of Patriots for Europe, a new far-right party at the EU Parliament, that unites Hungary’s Orban, Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), Czech Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (Akce nespokojených občanů, ANO), Italy’s La Lega, Geert Wilders’ Patry for Freedom from the Netherlands, and Spain’s Vox. This confirms that the “Melonisation” of the RN was a mere electoral posture and not an ideological transformation.
The Russian Influence
As evident in the second round, when the Russian embassy in Paris endorsed the RN, it remains the party of the Kremlin in France. It is worth noting that official government statements are a pillar of the Russian disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. The next elections will be the same old story, albeit possibly exacerbated. The Directorate-General for External Security (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, DGSE) fears that it would be kept at arm’s length by the Allies — wary that the information might reach the Kremlin’s ears — regarding intelligence sharing on the Russian threat.
Russia’s support for the RN through its embassy is no mere opportunism but part of a global scheme in the French ecosystem, exemplified by the far-right candidates campaigning shamelessly for Putin. More than 15 elected officials at the European level and parliamentary candidates — either remunerated by Russian authorities or Kremlin-linked associations — observed elections in Russia and Donetsk between 2018 and 2021. Among them are Thierry Mariani, a co-president of the French-Russian Dialogue, and Pierre Gentillet, a candidate who won during the 1st round but lost the 2nd in his constituency, and who is in the French secret services’ crosshairs for his proximity with Moscow.
Following the Rassemblement National’s victory, Russia’s foothold in France will be tremendous, with candidates campaigning more for Putin’s influence than against their French counterparts. As Bardella questioned the loyalty of dual nationals, some of the RN candidates modified their names to sound less Russian, such as Svetlana Quellier in Mayenne now being referred to as Géraldine. Regularly interviewed on CNews or far-right channels such as Radio Courtoisie and TVLibertés, Guillaume Bigot and Charles Henri-Gallois, for example, spread sexist, climate-sceptic, anti-vax, and pro-Russian narratives. Lastly, many are linked with Cifal, a Moscow-based business specialised in international trade, with Rémy Berthonneau, or Nadeja Remy, wife of Cifal owner,
Apropos
Even though negotiations are still ongoing, the left should come up with a candidate for the prime minister’s position who will be able to appease and govern on behalf of a larger part of the population and who will not come from the LFI’s ranks, which many would find inconceivable. Having won the election of the president of the National Assembly while collaborating with the right, one might think the centre would, likewise, form a coalition with them. However, not taking the opinion of voters on the left into account threatens to polarise the political system further, meaning that an extended version of the coalition with the moderates from both sides would be a more sensible decision.
As divisions on NATO and Ukraine are salient, one can expect the Socialists and the Greens to form coalitions with Macron. His party would probably use the argument of an unnatural alliance on foreign policy between the socialists and the far left. We could, therefore, describe the results of Macron’s dissolution as ending up in a status quo. The socio-democrat wing’s progress has increased the potential support for France’s dynamic regarding Ukraine, and a steady number of seats for Mélenchon would probably not give the latter a greater influence than he already had.
French people have had a glimpse of what living in a fascist society could look like: i.e., violence against elected representatives, as well as phantom, extremist, violent, racist, and on-the-margin-of-society candidates. In three years, many civil servants could again face the same dilemma of serving that kind of government. In the meantime, the Rassemblement National remains the Kremlin’s stronghold in France and now is a leader among pro-Russian parties in Europe. For the sake of France’s domestic political culture, defence against Russian interference, and for the sake of Ukraine, impeding the far-right’s ascent to power must be on everyone’s minds and lessons from this short parliamentary campaign drawn.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).