European Energy Autonomy: Is There Content Behind the Concept?

Europe’s reliance on US LNG is deepening just as it seeks to lessen its broader energy, economic, and military dependence on increasingly unpredictable Washington. Despite Europe’s struggle for energy independence, the continent has instead become more dependent than before.

With secure gas supply now central to Europe’s economic stability and strategic autonomy, its ability to chart an independent course remains constrained without American LNG, underscoring the need for a pragmatic view of energy realities alongside ambitious renewable‑energy goals.

An Energy Conundrum

The US–Israeli joint military operation against Iran severely affected the global oil and gas markets, as shipments depend on the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian strikes disrupted neighbouring production sites and tanker transit. Meanwhile, Qatar was compelled to suspend gas production, putting at risk one of the world’s largest liquefaction capacities, which accounts for roughly one-fifth of global LNG supply.

Markets’ reliance on US LNG intensifies precisely at a moment when Europe seeks to distance itself from economic and military dependence on its principal transatlantic partner

Globally, markets’ reliance on US LNG intensifies precisely at a moment when Europe seeks to distance itself from economic and military dependence on its principal transatlantic partner. This ambition has been reinforced by tensions surrounding Greenland and growing criticism of the military operation in the Persian Gulf. And so, calls to revive the long-standing idea of EU strategic autonomy have resurfaced in policy discussions. Albeit popularised by French President Emmanuel Macron, the concept underlying strategic autonomy dates back to General Charles de Gaulle, who sought to build a European geopolitical power – firmly western yet autonomous from the United States.

Although the idea seems to have been vindicated, in principle, and may even sound appealing, the structural conditions that shaped de Gaulle’s vision for Europe have changed profoundly. Over the decades, the European industrial base has been steadily weakening due to rising production costs and growing competition from Asia. In recent years, these trends have accelerated amid rising energy prices and carbon fees. If energy-intensive industries continue to struggle, European states would face additional challenges when developing credible military capabilities.

Mounting Problems

Instead of moving towards more autonomy, Europe has become increasingly energy‑dependent. Its largest gas field in the Netherlands has been shut down, UK North Sea production has fallen sharply, and hydrocarbon extraction in countries like Denmark and Germany has continued to decline. Coal, the largest available domestic resource in Europe, also sees a gradual sunset.

Rising geopolitical tensions have prompted calls to end dependence on hydrocarbons. Those were based on the assumption that stronger climate ambition amid the turmoil would rapidly displace fossil fuels from the European energy mix. However, the reality proved far more complex. This nuance is reflected in the greater volatility—prolonged negative prices are expensive for electric power systems, while periodic spikes hurt consumers—and concurring rapid expansion of renewable power generation. The subsequent vulnerabilities were exposed in 2021, when the first major crisis unfolded, triggered by reduced global LNG output in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and exacerbated by Russia’s withdrawal of surplus gas from European markets, thereby provoking a genuine price shock.

Gas price impacted market dynamics. Since gas‑fired generators often have the highest price margin in competitive electricity markets, overall power prices tend to be extremely sensitive to gas costs. Thus, when supply tightens, their generation costs rise, pushing electricity prices higher. As an alternative, utilities can switch to coal to ensure necessary back-up, especially to weather-dependent renewables, but rising carbon fees make coal-generated electricity equally expensive, reinforcing the upward pressure. Gas and carbon prices move largely in tandem. Even as gas demand in European power generation declined, prices continued to drive both electricity and carbon costs. In this context, secure gas supply emerged as a cornerstone of European economic stability, industrial capacity, and ultimately the pursuit of strategic autonomy.

Trading one energy evil for another?

Supply stability has faded after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Driven by the EU’s commitment to phase out Russian fossil fuels and the REPowerEU Plan, European utilities have been purchasing LNG to replace Russian volumes. Yet this shift primarily reduced Europe’s reliance on Russian pipeline gas. At the same time, Russian LNG continued to flow into the EU—often at even higher volumes than before the war—prompting the Union to introduce restrictions on such imports.

Needless to say, the replacement of Russian gas volumes with LNG was made possible largely thanks to American supplies, which reshaped Europe’s import structure entirely. By the end of 2025, the US accounted for nearly 60% of EU LNG imports, while the UK sourced as much as 75% of its LNG from across the Atlantic. In Belgium, France, and Spain, however, US LNG represented only 40–45% of imports, reflecting, among other factors, the continued presence of Russian exports in their supply mix.

At the same time, implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has remained difficult. For example, biomethane deployment—which could physically replace conventional gas—continues to fall well short of the 35 bcm target by 2030 (roughly 10% of total European gas demand). Current European output stands at only around 7 bcm.

Europe has effectively traded dependence on Russia for one on the United States

With a political shift in the US, expert communities warn that Europe has effectively traded dependence on Russia for one on the United States, while progress toward diversifying domestic fuels has been slower than expected.

A Strategic Reassurance

Genuine energy‑security risks are better assessed by examining the export structures of producing states rather than relying solely on import volumes.

Guided by this logic, ahead of the 2024 US presidential elections, Gelber & Associates, a Texas-based consulting firm, presented a report analysing potential political risks associated with US LNG policy. It underscores that concerns had already emerged at that time when the Democratic administration sought to revise permit allocations for future LNG export capacity, although the initiative was swiftly challenged and overturned by the courts.

The existing system effectively shields American exporters from political shifts in Washington, as Europe remains their preferred destination. Business prospects are equally reassuring: between 2026 and 2028, the US LNG export capacity is projected to expand further, reinforcing the critical bridge that underpins European energy security and economic competitiveness.

To sum up, Europe’s chance to achieve strategic energy autonomy would be constrained in the absence of American LNG. True autonomy, therefore, depends on maintaining this transatlantic trade link, while a pragmatic view of energy realities is crucial for evaluating the role of domestic renewable‑energy policies in meeting today’s geopolitical challenges.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).