Estonia’s Robust Security Posture: Dispelling the “Is Narva Next?” Narrative

Despite the ongoing geopolitical tensions in Europe stemming from Russia's aggression in Ukraine, Estonia's security remains firm. A multifaceted defence framework encompasses Russia’s military attrition, NATO’s collective defence principle, and regional cooperation, as well as Estonia's substantial defence capabilities and effective intelligence agencies. It thus forms a formidable shield that significantly mitigates the direct threat of military conflict.

The question of “Is Narva next?” has become a recurring theme in international journalistic discourse. The short answer is ‘no’.

The current geopolitical landscape fundamentally differs from that of 2014, and Estonia’s resilience stands in stark contrast to Ukraine’s position at that time. The Estonian city of Narva—an integral part of the country located within its sovereign territory—is protected by a secure border. An infiltration by the “little green men” into Estonia is a scenario that is doomed to fail, in part because substantial restrictions on cross-border traffic with Russia have been in place since 2022, enhancing the control measures within the broader Schengen Area.

This article elaborates on the fundamental elements of Estonia’s national security and highlights aspects often overlooked by international media. 

Russia’s Strategic Encirclement and Attrition in Ukraine

The Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has strategically entangled it in a protracted and debilitating conflict. This war has inflicted immense losses on Moscow, both in terms of personnel and military hardware, severely depleting resources essential for initiating a new large-scale aggression against a NATO member state.

Assessments by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service indicate that the majority of Russia’s ground forces are currently committed to operations in Ukraine, and their restoration to pre-war levels will require several years. Prior to 2022, the strength of Russia’s Western Military District (WMD, responsible for operations in the European direction) was estimated at approximately 300 000 soldiers. Since then, this number has dwindled. Although Moscow has been making efforts to expand its armed forces, this objective will not be achieved in the near future—it might not even be realistic given Russia’s economic woes. 

It is crucial to understand that even a potential ceasefire would not immediately free up all Russian units: a significant portion would remain deployed along the Ukrainian border. Furthermore, Russia’s compounding economic troubles have raised questions about its ability to sustain current military strength after the cessation of hostilities. This provides Estonia and the Allies with invaluable time to enhance defence and deterrence postures. 

Article 5 and An Immediate Retaliation

NATO membership serves as the cornerstone for Estonia’s security architecture. The Alliance’s collective defence principle constitutes a tangible deterrent and is reinforced by the presence of Allied forces in the region. A UK-led NATO battlegroup, stationed in Estonia, includes personnel from France (both nuclear powers) and is integrated into the Estonian division. In a crisis, the UK would augment its presence to a brigade-sized unit, comprising 3 000 to 4 000 soldiers.

Russia cannot prevail against NATO in a conventional conflict due to western technological superiority. Recent confrontations between Israel and Iran have underscored the effectiveness of western weaponry in neutralising Russian-designed systems. The Kremlin’s reliance on hybrid warfare against the west, in fact, signifies its self-positioning as the weaker party. In classic asymmetrical warfare theory, a weaker combatant typically employs unconventional methods to avoid direct confrontation with a militarily superior force. Through sabotage and terror attacks, a weaker party seeks to exhaust a stronger adversary and undermine its political will. This strategy mirrors Russia’s behaviour. 

In the context of Ukraine, Russia’s willingness to employ nuclear weapons has proven purely rhetorical. A nuclear strike against Estonia would be even more complicated, given the proximity to St. Petersburg.

A scenario in which Russia might test Article 5 through a limited attack on Estonian soil is improbable. It would severely underestimate Estonia’s preparedness and that of its Allies. Tallinn would not wait for the formal NATO decision-making process but would immediately, from the outset, counter any aggression with its full military capacity. 

A Deeper Dive into Regional Cooperation

However, Estonia’s Defence Forces (EDF) would not be repelling a foreign military aggression in isolation. Close defence cooperation with Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland ensures a swift and coordinated regional response. By the time Article 5 has been formally triggered, the aggressor would already be confronting the combined multi-national armed forces, rapidly augmented by the military might of the entire Alliance.

Albeit non-nuclear, Poland stands out as a rising military power in Europe, while Finland possesses formidable artillery and capable air forces. Significant investments by Poland and the Baltic states into their national defence, the capabilities Finland’s membership has brought to the table, and Allied presence in the region serve as a powerful deterrent.

In comparison to Russia’s weakened WMD, the combined active personnel of the defence forces of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland exceed 300 000 troops. (Conventionally, a successful military offensive is predicated on a 3:1 numerical superiority.) Additionally, Estonia can rapidly mobilise reservists, a capability successfully demonstrated in exercises. Its neighbours also maintain reserve forces, with Finland boasting the EU’s largest reserve army.

Any direct military aggression in the Baltic region would be repelled by significantly stronger and more integrated forces than the resistance Russia faced in Ukraine, which renders such an offensive exceptionally challenging and costly. 

Estonian Defence Forces: State of Play and Preparedness

Estonia has made historic investments in independent defence capabilities. Recent procurements have introduced, or are on the verge of introducing, world-class equipment into the EDF arsenal. For example, South Korean-made K9 Kõu (Thunder) self-propelled howitzers provide the EDF artillery with formidable firepower, while US-made HIMARS multiple rocket launchers allow precision strikes on targets up to 300 km away. These acquisitions add a strategic capability that significantly alters Russia’s calculations.

To enhance the mobility and protection of infantry brigades, CV90 infantry fighting vehicles have been procured. Deliveries of new Spike SR and Spike LR anti-tank missiles are underway, and existing stockpiles of Javelin systems are being replenished. Estonia has established a potent coastal defence capability that is able to threaten enemy vessels along the entire shoreline. For instance, the Blue Spear anti-ship missile system—a fifth-generation anti-ship system jointly developed by Israel and Singapore—is among the most advanced in the world; missiles launched from these mobile platforms have a range of nearly 300 km. 

As one of its largest defence procurements, Estonia, together with Latvia, is set to receive medium-range IRIS-T SLM air defence systems from Germany’s Diehl Defence. This system can intercept aircraft, helicopters, drones, and cruise missiles at a distance of up to 40 km away and an altitude of 20 km. It is a critical component of a multi-layered air defence, protecting both civilian populations and strategic assets. 

Learning and Adapting: Best Tech and Best Practices

The Estonian government and the EDF have engaged in extensive communication and exchange of information with Ukrainian counterparts, which enables the continuous implementation of the lessons learned. 

In particular, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has demonstrated the criticality of drone warfare. While innovation is part of any military conflict, Ukraine has been exhibiting remarkable ingenuity in drone technology. This experience is highly relevant to Estonia, with a Ukrainian drone unit invited to participate in this year’s international large-scale military exercise SIIL (Hedgehog).

Furthermore, Estonia’s first drone training centre has been launched earlier this year. It is meant to support the activities of the EDF, Estonian Defence League (EDL), and Allied units. The drone centre will contribute to strengthening electronic warfare and drone combat operations, both critical in contemporary military conflict. 

Beyond Weapons and Borders

Technology, however, represents only one facet of the security equation: the training of the EDF personnel and Allied forces should be maintained at the highest standard. The Estonian reserve army model enables rapid mobilisation of a large and motivated force, while its functionality and the comprehensive defence capability are regularly tested with exercises.

Such exercises are meant to simulate the defence of the country, rapid unit formation, and cooperation with Allies in realistic conditions. For instance, in May 2025, the SIIL exercise brought together over 16 000 troops: reservists, active-duty EDF personnel, members of the EDL, and Allied forces from more than ten member states. Additionally, the annual BALTOPS naval exercise practices rapid deployment and interoperability of Allied forces. The most recent BALTOPS25 involved 16 allied nations, over 40 vessels, 25 aircraft, and approximately 9 000 troops, thus demonstrating NATO’s capabilities to defend the Baltic Sea.

The EDF is the process of establishing a military campus in Narva that will accommodate up to 1 000 personnel. This historic step signifies Estonia’s commitment to all its regions, as well as its capacity for rapid response and supporting the Police and Border Guard Board.

A further contribution to the defence of the eastern frontier is the new operational centre of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in Narva-Jõesuu. Its opening represents both a symbolic and practical demonstration of European solidarity and a shared commitment to the security of the common border. The centre coordinates border surveillance operations in the Nordic and Baltic countries, bringing international expertise and additional resources to the region. This step affirms that Estonia’s eastern border is the external border of the entire EU, and its protection is thus a shared European interest and responsibility. 

Calming the Alarmists

The Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO) possesses a comprehensive understanding of Russian special services’ attempts to conduct influence operations, establish intelligence networks, and sow discord within Estonian society. KAPO has an outstanding record of exposing and neutralising Russia’s covert actions. The Foreign Intelligence Service and the Defence Forces Military Intelligence Centre continuously monitor military and political developments in Russia, providing timely early warning to decision-makers in Estonia and Allied nations regarding any potential threats. The security services’ daily operations ensure that the country will not be caught by strategic surprise. Estonia’s intelligence picture is clear and consistently shared with Allies, enabling adequate and rapid responses to changes in the security environment. 

Nonetheless, it is important to address various scenarios of a Russian attack on Estonia circulating in international media. Opinion pieces and interviews are often based on incomplete information and are primarily aimed at explaining the Russian threat to their respective domestic audiences.

For instance, German Professor Carlo Masala describes a scenario where Russian special forces have infiltrated Estonia in advance, and an attack is launched simultaneously with conventional units. According to this thought experiment, the city of Narva and the island of Hiiumaa would be captured within hours. Professor Masala has been a critic of German politicians’ naivety towards Russia and a strong supporter of military aid to Ukraine. Regrettably, however, he has not taken into account the factual basis outlined in this article. 

German intelligence chief Bruno Kahl went even further, stating that Russian officials were planning confrontations that would fall short of military intervention and test whether the US would honour its mutual assistance obligations under Article 5. He suggested that merely sending “little green men” to Estonia allegedly to protect “oppressed Russian minority” would suffice. This opinion might also have been primarily directed at the German audience. Estonian and other regional intelligence agencies are likely to possess a far more up-to-date overview of Russian plans and would thus prevent any unexpected incursion. 

Peace through Strength

As long as Russia remains engaged in an aggressive war against a European nation fuelled by its imperialistic ambitions, Estonia has no grounds to fear a direct military threat. Our security is multi-layered and resilient. Estonia’s membership in the European Union and NATO provides both economic stability and military protection. 

Comprehensive national defence, ironclad relations with the Allies, and preparedness will continue to underpin Estonia’s security. Sustained investment in defence, maintaining high-level training, and incorporating lessons learned from Ukraine are essential contributions to deterrence. Moreover, Estonia’s immediate neighbours have been pursuing similar strategies and currently rank among Europe’s leaders in defence investments.  

While vigilance is always warranted, there is certainly no need for undue concern in Estonia. At the same time, our focus must remain on the paramount objective: the continued and unwavering support for Ukraine. By assisting Ukraine in achieving victory, we ensure that Russia’s imperialistic ambitions receive a decisive blow, thereby reducing the threat to broader European security for many years to come.