In Estonia, there is talk of war. Practical questions arise: What to do in the event of an airstrike or large-scale evacuation? How to ensure access to funds in a bank account? What can civilians do to be useful? Long-term personal considerations come into play: Is now the right time to purchase a house? Have a child? These are conversations that nations further from Russia are not having.
This article was originally published in Polish by OKO.press.
Yet, public opinion surveys reveal that it is not the fear of war that stands out but rather the stability of views regarding Estonia’s security and the safety of its residents. Between 2022 and 2024, an average of 55% of locals believed that Estonia was secure; around 70% felt personally secure. The primary concerns were the state of the economy, the cost of living, and tax increases. The war in Ukraine ranked fourth, while the threat of war in Estonia or Europe came sixth. Over 80% of locals supported the idea of armed resistance in the event of an attack against Estonia, and more than 60% were willing to contribute personally to national defence. Although the results from this year are yet to be published, I anticipate that, over time, they remain consistent. Envisioning ourselves as Russia’s next victim or becoming paralysed by fear helps no one.
For the past three years, Estonia, along with Latvia and Lithuania, has faced a complex and contradictory security situation. On the positive side, we are fully fledged members of NATO, the strongest military alliance in history, and the EU, the most successful initiative fostering peace and economic integration in Europe. In 2022, the Baltic states and Poland had an unprecedented opportunity to influence the foreign and security policies of both organisations. Russia’s war against Ukraine, aiming at regime change in Kyiv, validated our long-standing warnings about growing Russian hostility and its efforts to undermine the west. This Cassandra moment proved that our concerns were not the product of trauma or paranoia but an accurate perception of a genuine threat.
The Baltic Ball Rolling
As a result, NATO made significant strides during the Vilnius and Washington summits by adopting new defence plans, tailored to various regions in Europe, and identifying specific capabilities that allies need to develop to implement them effectively. After decades of focusing on crisis management and expeditionary anti-terror engagements, NATO returned to its traditional role of ensuring the collective security of its member states. Percentage-wise, Poland and Estonia lead the way within NATO in defence spending, even surpassing the United States. Additionally, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, a long-awaited development for the Baltic states, has closed the security gap around the Baltic Sea. It reduced the vulnerability of the Suwalki Gap, enhanced operational planning and joint training efforts, and created a layer of strategic depth to an otherwise isolated part of the Alliance. These are concrete actions that strengthen Estonia’s security.
At the European level, the selection of Kaja Kallas, a former prime minister of Estonia, as the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, was occasionally portrayed in the media as yielding to a hawkish and vocal, albeit minority, faction from the east. In reality, I would argue the opposite: her appointment signifies that our perspectives have become the new mainstream in Europe, contrasting with the more conciliatory tone emanating from Budapest and Bratislava.
Furthermore, Russia has stripped most of its bases in the Western (now Leningrad) Military District of its assets to redeploy them to Ukraine. This means that while Moscow is intensifying its use of tactics such as sabotage, GPS signal jamming, violations of territorial waters and airspace, election interference, and espionage, Ukraine has effectively tied Russia’s hands, preventing it from military aggression against any other country.
However, the risks to the eastern flank countries remain. The current regime in Moscow has demonstrated that it can severely miscalculate when believing its own hype, as exemplified by an assumption that a victory over Ukraine would be quick and easy. Thus, the Baltic states find themselves in a paradoxical situation: at the moment, we are more secure than ever from conventional threats, yet simultaneously race against the clock to strengthen our national defence and Allied presence, because as soon as the guns fall silent in Ukraine, Russia can re-direct its forces to new sectors.
A New Sheriff in Town
Since the inauguration of Donald Trump, a cascade of policy decisions and statements from the White House produced many explanations as to why the current administration appears more coercive towards its allies than the autocratic regimes intent on undermining the post-war global order. Some analysts seek a broader strategy behind these actions, suggesting attempts to either draw Russia away from China ahead of an anticipated Sino-American confrontation or to establish a balance of power reminiscent of the 19th-century Concert of Europe, thereby avoiding direct conflict among global powers. Others point to an ideological divide between Europe and the Republican Party, which now is closer to Russia or Türkiye than to any conservative party in Europe. Finally, these shifts are also being attributed to the psychological characteristics of Donald Trump himself, JD Vance, or Elon Musk who now lead the United States.
Nevertheless, the situation appears clear: the US is now more focused on placating Russia than on helping Ukraine, likely aiming to normalise relations with Moscow, with little regard for the cost of this endeavour. JD Vance justifies this policy by asserting that Russia holds a numerical advantage in both manpower and materiel—an advantage that will persist despite further military aid. From the White House’s perspective, Ukraine is losing the war, as three years of western support have not yielded a success. Therefore, it would be preferable to cease fire along the current frontlines rather than risk the collapse of the Ukrainian front. According to Vance, this outcome would also alleviate pressure on American statecraft tools, from military stockpiles to sanctions. Essentially, this reflects a restrained view of US foreign policy rooted in the belief that limited American resources have been overstretched by previous administrations and that Washington should concentrate on America’s security and national interests.
It is still too early to determine the precise trajectory of the US’ new political course. But in less than two months, this White House has upended many long-held notions about American power and values. By questioning Ukraine’s significance for European security and re-evaluating America’s relationships with Canada and like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific, the US has effectively redefined its policy towards all countries that previously considered themselves steadfast American allies and partners, with perhaps the sole exception of Israel.
The Security Predicament
The dilemma this presents is that, for many, there is currently no alternative to the United States, as their security has relied on American guarantees, whether through a formal alliance such as NATO or via close bilateral relations. This predicament is acutely felt in Estonia. On the one hand, the pressure Washington is now exerting on European Allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security is welcomed here, as previous wake-up calls have often fallen on deaf ears and defence expenditure minimums agreed at summits have been ignored. This is not to suggest that western Europe has done nothing since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Yet, it is also true that in many countries west of the Oder River, it has been easier to declare an existential threat to Europe than to act upon such declarations. The hope here is that perhaps the shock therapy from Washington can now achieve what three years of Russia’s war against Ukraine have failed to achieve.
On the other hand, if a truce is reached in Ukraine in a manner that proves to Russia that aggression is an effective means to pursue its imperial ambitions, it will only embolden Moscow. This will grant Russians time to train and rearm for future confrontations, whether in Ukraine or against other so-called ‘Russophobic’ countries. This would also free up their resources to launch hybrid attacks against European nations, testing our institutions and exerting psychological pressure on our democracies, which are inherently more vulnerable to such tactics because of their open nature. Hence, it is not merely a ceasefire that we seek in Ukraine but a path to a just and lasting peace, while Washington’s goals seem to be increasingly at odds with this perspective. (Although that can change abruptly when Trump realises that Putin is not interested in making a deal.)
For 30 years, the nightmare scenario for Estonia has been a rift between the United States and European countries. Disagreements have always existed: ranging from trade to approaches towards China, as of late. Yet, few could have foreseen such an abrupt deterioration of the transatlantic relationship. On 11 March, former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves shared an article by an American political scientist Eliot A. Cohen on X (formerly Twitter), with a comment that President Trump, senior advisor Elon Musk, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio had, in just six weeks, eroded 85 years of trust between America and Europe.
In contrast, a week earlier, following a clash between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, incumbent Estonian President Alar Karis stated in an interview that Trump is not an enemy of Estonia and that the transatlantic relationship remains crucial for both sides. The apparent discord between the statements of the two Estonian presidents is less pronounced than it may initially seem. Incumbent officials, mindful that their words carry the weight of the state, generally still refrain from strong criticism of Washington—unwilling to provide any justification for abandoning Estonia. The six weeks have yet to overturn a long-held Estonian presumption that a strong relationship between the US and Europe is the second pillar of our security next to our own defence forces.
History Unfolding Before Our Eyes
The public debate, however, quickly accepted that the America we once knew no longer exists. Nevertheless, there is significant overlap between the two viewpoints: instead of despairing over Washington’s actions (or inactions) and drawing hyperbolic conclusions from every statement, we must focus on what Estonia and Europe as a whole can do to ensure the protection of our people and to support Ukraine.
In some ways, the mood in Estonia now mirrors the anxiety of early 2022: the awareness that history is unfolding before our eyes, but its trajectory remains uncertain. Yet there is also a sense of resolve and a perception that Estonia is in a much better situation than in the early days of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when Russia was advancing rapidly. “Right now, we still have the chance to make efforts to prevent a potential war. The next two to five years will be crucial in convincing Russia that aggression against us will fail miserably,” warned the Maj. Gen. Andrus Merilo on 24 February 2025 in his first Independence Day speech as Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces.
Over the past three years, we have not been idle. Even though Estonia has consistently spent 2% of its GDP on defence since 2015, the government has, since 2022, allocated extra funds to purchase ammunition, build reserves, acquire new capabilities, and meet targets much faster. Estonia’s maritime capabilities have been strengthened by the Blue Spear mobile anti-ship missile systems. We have steadily fortified our eastern border to counter potential hybrid attacks and collaborated with Latvia and Lithuania on the Baltic Defence Line project. Similar to Poland’s East Shield, this initiative aims to deter Russia from swift military action. Additionally, the Baltic states have acquired advanced weaponry to enhance their long-range fire capabilities, recognising that true deterrence lies in Russia’s belief that any war will result in significant losses on its own territory.
War as Any Other Crisis
At the home front, Estonia’s government has had to strike a delicate balance: encouraging crisis preparedness without inciting unwarranted panic. The approach has been to treat the possibility of war like any other crisis, such as a prolonged outage of electricity, heat, water, or communication systems. While the causes of these crises may vary—from natural events and accidents to hostile activities ranging from hybrid attacks to conventional war—the appropriate response is the same, at least for non-reservists: be prepared, maintain basic supplies at home, develop contingency plans with family members, and know where to find accurate information. To support these preparations, the Estonian Rescue Services have been conducting awareness campaigns.
This approach reflects a broader understanding in Estonia: national security is not solely the responsibility of distant entities, such as the Estonian Defence Forces or foreign allies, but rather a collective effort requiring everyone’s contribution. This perspective is significantly bolstered by the fact that Estonia’s military has been conscription-based since the restoration of our independence in 1991, and up to 30 000 Estonians participate in voluntary national defence organisations—the Estonian Defence League and its affiliates.
In 2018, Estonia’s nature conservation and cultural associations selected the wolf as the national animal. However, that is just plain wrong: Estonia’s national animal is a hedgehog. Hedgehogs are small, solitary, and independent creatures, known for their persistence and hard work in preparing for the long winter. They can be easily irritated or grumpy, but they pose no threat to others. However, when in danger, hedgehogs curl up into a ball, exposing only their protective quills. We have always known that we live next to a bad neighbour, one that only takes us seriously when we show our quills.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).