The prospects for the first-ever UK-EU Summit are positive. Russia’s continuing aggression in Ukraine and the new uncertainties in transatlantic relations have created an unprecedented opportunity to rake up some of the embers of the Brexit bonfire. In many areas, the UK is now one of the EU’s closest partners, sharing the same values and interests in a rapidly changing world.
Never Waste a Good Crisis
Following leader-level discussions in London between Prime Minister Starmer and Commission President von der Leyen, the Summit will be dealing with a wide range of trade, economic, and people-to-people issues which are of strategic importance to both sides. The decisions taken on 19 May will mark the start of a process involving detailed negotiations and a turning point in cross-Channel relations.
A key issue for the Summit will be whether the UK and EU can develop a strategic framework for European defence and security cooperation which would enable them to work together as equals; a structure that goes beyond the planned annual summitry. While a formal agreement may be considered unnecessary, given that non-EU states like the UK already act in concert with the EU on foreign and security matters (cf. sanctions against Russia and the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ format for Ukraine), it is, nevertheless, vital that some structures and procedures for regular dialogue and crisis management are put in place.
Proceeding without formal arrangements would not make the UK an equal partner in the development of future European military capabilities through instruments like the EU’s new Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence investment fund and the European Defence Industrial Programme. More fundamentally, failing to lock in tighter institutional cooperation before resurging isolationist populism has an opportunity to reassert itself in UK politics would risk sending the bilateral relationship back into reverse.
For trust to be restored between the cross-Channel partners, it is crucial that some structures are put in place so that pragmatism and flexibility reinforce strategic policies and remain within the boundaries of British sovereign interests and the autonomy of the European Union, which were so bitterly defended during the divorce proceedings.
While time may seem in short supply to develop these permanent guardrails, the wheel need not be reinvented. The blueprint for a Security and Defence Partnership was drawn up five years ago and would need only a few tweaks to account for the policy innovations which have, in the meantime, occurred on the side of the European Union.
The Unfulfilled Promise of Brexit
The initial version of the Political Declaration (PD) flanking the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement foresaw a bilateral ‘Security Partnership’ as part of “an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership across trade and economic cooperation with a comprehensive and balanced Free Trade Agreement at its core”.
While the UK and the EU agreed in principle on the aims and scope of their future cooperation in foreign policy, security and defence, their opening negotiating positions on the operational details could not have been further apart. In fact, the gap proved so wide that they ended up not agreeing on the inclusion of a specific chapter relating to foreign and security cooperation in the final Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA).
Whereas the UK cited security interests to support its argument for a ‘bespoke’ security partnership that would go beyond any existing EU third country arrangement and allow for almost unrestricted access to, and participation in, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decision-making structures, the Union’s position was framed by the 2017 guidelines of the European Council and its determination not to let Brexit affect its constitutional identity and autonomy.
As a result of what can only be described as an erratic negotiation style of successive UK governments during the withdrawal process, the EU became much more defensive of the core principles defined by the European Council and more reticent in tweaking the existing arrangements of institutional cooperation with third countries, irrespective of the alleged importance of Britain as a global actor. This attitude is enshrined in the December 2020 version of the Political Declaration that accompanied the Withdrawal Agreement: the envisaged security partnership would have to respect “the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and the autonomy of the Union” (PD, 78).
The hallmark of the future partnership was that the UK and the EU would pursue independent foreign, security, and defence policies “according to their respective strategic and security interests, and their respective legal orders” (PD, 92). The parties would, therefore, also conduct independent sanctions policies (PD, 97). While the UK and the EU envisaged the possibility of joint outcomes and statements to support each other and “deliver external action and manage global challenges in a coherent manner” (PD, 96), no systematic alignment of positions was foreseen, or any decision-shaping procedures at all for that matter.
The security and defence segments of the Political Declaration envisaged more standard contractual arrangements of third-party state cooperation with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to flesh out the prospective EU-UK security partnership. The most emblematic of these is a ‘Framework Participation Agreement’ for the UK’s case-by-case inclusion in CSDP missions and operations (PD, 99).
With respect to the development of defence capabilities, the Political Declaration envisioned cooperation “to the extent possible under the conditions of Union law” (PD, 102). The reference here was to a standard ‘Administrative Arrangement’ with the European Defence Agency and adherence to the basic conditions for third states’ involvement in PESCO. The participation of eligible UK entities in the context of the European Defence Fund was also foreseen but, as with PESCO and presumably SAFE, subject to demanding criteria. This is logical since non-associated countries do not contribute to the EU general budget.
Despite the political constraints imposed on the Brexit negotiations, the final text of the Political Declaration thus provides the policy potential and technical detail that should be explored now that the highly charged relationship has had time to cool down. The first bilateral Summit should lay the groundwork for more level-headed and sensible discussions on how to realistically achieve flexible yet structured cooperation.
Flexible Yet Structured Cooperation
Such cooperation could have different expressions. One example pertains to established practice whereby foreign dignitaries may be invited to take part in informal ministerial ‘Gymnich’ meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (PD, 97). In fact, David Lammy not only participated in such a recent meeting in Warsaw; he was the first Foreign Secretary since Brexit to attend a formal meeting of EU foreign ministers in October.
Another indication concerns sanctions policy, where the Political Declaration states that: “Where foreign policy objectives that underpin a specific future sanction regime are aligned between the Parties, intensified exchange of information at appropriate stages of the policy cycle will take place, with the possibility of adopting sanctions that are mutually reinforcing” (PD, 98). While this formula falls short of introducing a joint decision-making mechanism, the UK and EU may well seize on their well-established practices against Russia to put their cooperation on a more permanent footing.
A third example concerns the intensified interaction and exchange of information at relevant stages of the planning process of CSDP missions and operations, “proportionately to the level of the [UK]’s contribution” (PD, 101-2). As a contributor, the UK could then participate in the Force Generation Conference, Call for Contributions, and the Committee of Contributors meeting to enable the sharing of information on the implementation of the CSDP mission or operation. All this would allow the UK “to best tailor its contribution and provide timely expertise” to specific CSDP missions and operations and use the EU as a force multiplier for British interests (PD, 100).
Drawing on the British aspirations espoused in a ‘technical note on consultation and cooperation on external security’ published by the then ‘Department for Exiting the EU’, the final version of the Political Declaration envisaged “flexible and scalable cooperation that would ensure that the United Kingdom can combine efforts with the Union to the greatest effect, including in times of crisis or when serious incidents occur” (PD, 92). To this end, the parties foresaw that the future relationship would “provide for appropriate dialogue, consultation, coordination, exchange of information and cooperation mechanisms” (PD, 93), as well as the secondment of experts when serving a mutual interest.
While attractive at first glance, the operationalisation of such scalable engagement would be complex, especially given the degree of resistance among EU Member States and the European Commission alike to cater for new forms of British exceptionalism in relation to the EU. After all, while a taste for more intensified cooperation might be easily accommodated, a renewed diminished appetite on the part of the UK to contribute to the future security partnership would require a reverse mechanism to again downgrade British access to EU structures. This is something which—as the Brexit divorce proceedings show—is a different kettle of fish altogether.
In the immediate wake of Brexit, the European Commission sought to give full effect to the promise of the Political Declaration and put forward as early as 12 March 2020 a full text of a draft ‘Agreement on the New Partnership between the EU and the UK’, including a dedicated section on foreign policy, security, and defence. This draft treaty was built on the precedents of EU association agreements with deep and comprehensive free trade areas negotiated with other neighbouring countries such as Ukraine but included adjustments to account for the peculiar situation of the UK’s desire to erect, rather than tear down, barriers. As a result, the draft was over 400 pages long.
The UK government, however, adopted a much narrower approach to the ensuing negotiations, proposing a standard free trade agreement, with potential side deals on security and other sector-specific aspects. As a result, a dedicated political and security chapter did not see the light of day in the eventually agreed TCA. This amounted to a clear reversal of key elements contained in the Political Declaration. It came as no surprise that the EU saw this as a breach of good faith. In view of Downing Street’s intransigent position and the countdown marking the end of the transition period running down to the wire, the EU cut its losses and settled for a narrow and shallow agreement.
Rebuilding Trust
Bilateral cooperation on foreign and security matters has so far been left to informal mechanisms. The first EU-UK Summit presents a pivotal opportunity to shore up trust on both sides of the ‘English Channel’ and move beyond the legacy of Brexit toward a renewed pragmatic partnership rooted in shared values and strategic interests. While full alignment remains politically sensitive, the UK and the EU now have a chance to reverse Brexit in security and defence and reserve the possibility to conclude a bilateral agreement in the near future. In today’s fragmenting world, operationalising flexible cooperation in security and defence is best served by creating formal structures and following agreed procedures that protect sovereign interests, ensure inclusive participation, and build European strategic autonomy, with the UK.
Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).