A New Chapter in Regional Connectivity: The Armenia–Azerbaijan Washington Agreement

Trump’s recent obsession with winning the Nobel Peace Prize turned his focus to the South Caucasus. A trilateral meeting between the American President, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in the White House on 8 August saw the signing of an agreement which seeks to solve the issue of connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhichevan via the territory of Armenia.

While the agreement represents a positive step in the ongoing bilateral peace process, its significance does not lie in triggering major geopolitical shifts or delivering conclusive peace breakthroughs, as both remain premature to assess. Rather, its immediate impact is felt in the transformation of regional connectivity, establishing the first framework for international East-West transit through Armenia since its independence, with far-reaching implications for regional dynamics and the Middle Corridor in the South Caucasus.

From Bilateral to Trilateral

A realistic prospect for peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia had been on the horizon since March 2025, when the two states announced they had agreed on all points of a draft peace treaty. This was hailed as a historic development that seemingly left only the formal signing standing between the two nations and peace. However, despite this textual agreement, tensions continued escalating throughout the first half of 2025, with both sides reporting ceasefire violations and Azerbaijan showing increasing reluctance to sign. Baku began demanding far-reaching additional concessions from Yerevan: most notably the opening of an unhindered corridor, and a change of Armenia’s Constitution to remove what Azerbaijan claimed were territorial claims against it.

The peace process regained momentum following a bilateral summit in Abu Dhabi on 10 July, which demonstrated both states’ commitment to pursuing peace through direct negotiations rather than relying on third-party intermediaries, marking a departure from decades of standard practice. Yet throughout July, the Trump administration, consistent with its business-oriented approach to global politics, began expressing its interest in unblocking regional transport routes, particularly the unresolved Azerbaijan-Nakhichevan connection issue.

These discussions, combined with Trump’s reported pressure on Aliyev to join negotiations, culminated in the US president announcing he had brokered a “historic peace deal” between the two states in the days preceding the Washington meeting. While one should remain sceptical of Trump’s genuine understanding of the conflict’s complexities and his interest in durable peace versus a hasty agreement to enhance his reputation as “the great peacemaker,” credit must be given where due: Trump succeeded in compelling Ilham Aliyev to sign an agreement that required abandoning Baku’s most maximalist demands.

The Washington summit ultimately failed to deliver a peace treaty, but rather it initiated the peace process alongside a specific agreement addressing key unresolved issues. Most prominently, the so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) emerged as a US-engineered solution to connect mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Under this arrangement, a US-Armenian consortium gains exclusive rights to develop and manage the transport route, with American personnel handling operations while Armenian officials ensure compliance with Armenian law. This allows Baku frictionless access to Nakhichevan, while the route remains under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Yerevan.

Additionally, the agreement included both sides signing a joint letter expressing intent to abolish the OSCE Minsk Group, and Baku’s commitment to respect the Almaty Declaration’s principle of 1991 borders (although it did not mention any Azerbaijani commitment to withdraw from currently occupied Armenian territories). Both sides also agreed to remove third-party border monitoring, including EU observers, and to drop pending international legal cases. Moreover, parallel bilateral agreements saw the United States lift its 1992 arms sales ban on Azerbaijan and expand economic cooperation with Armenia.

Caution is Advised

From a global perspective, drawing definitive conclusions about the agreement’s geopolitical consequences remains premature. Trump’s track record as a somewhat unreliable and fickle mediator makes it difficult to estimate the extent of genuine US commitment to structural regional engagement. Without concrete implementation details and with Trump’s attention shifting to a new conflict on an almost weekly basis, the extent of America’s role in the South Caucasus remains unclear. This ambiguity raises the possibility that Trump’s role in the agreement was motivated less by geopolitical calculation than by domestic political considerations. Moreover, the notably mild responses from Iran and Russia, which would typically vehemently oppose increased US presence in the region, reflect their current preoccupations rather than acceptance of the new arrangements. Iran, still recovering from its 12-day confrontation with Israel and the United States, is currently not in a position to vocally oppose Washington’s role in the agreement. For the time being, its attention remains directed towards the unfolding situation in the Middle East rather than regional connectivity initiatives. Similarly, Russia’s restrained reaction likely stems from its preoccupation with Ukraine and reluctance to antagonise Trump in the context of the recent Alaska summit. Until Iran and Russia are able to engage with the agreement’s implications and the US demonstrates a concrete commitment to its implementation, broader geopolitical assessments remain speculative.

Nor should it be characterised as a revolutionary breakthrough. The agreement notably fails to address the deepest sources of animosity between the two states and their societies: displaced Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, Armenian landmines in the surrounding Azerbaijani regions, Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh officials currently detained in Baku, Armenian territory still under Azerbaijani occupation, and the absence of accountability for wartime atrocities.

Washington’s focus on connectivity as a potential conflict catalyst proves valuable, yet other potential catalysts remain unaddressed. Questions about long-term commitment further complicate assessments of the agreement. While Armenia’s government has offered unilateral concessions over recent months, Azerbaijan continues to employ hostile “Western Azerbaijan” rhetoric alongside documented attacks on Armenian villages, raising doubts about whether this agreement will fundamentally alter Baku’s approach. Meanwhile, Pashinyan faces elections in 2026 amid declining popularity, creating uncertainty about Armenia’s sustained willingness to make concessions. Additionally, it remains unclear whether the Trump administration considers its peace-making mission accomplished or views this as the beginning of sustained mediation. Until there is clarity about solving other, more painful unresolved issues, and until there is clarity about both states’ genuine commitment to peace, one should be careful to call this agreement a breakthrough.

Connecting the Caucasus

The Washington agreement’s most immediate and tangible significance lies in the regional implications of its connectivity agenda. For the first time since it regained independence, there is a legal framework, via the TRIPP, for international and Trans-Caucasian East-West transit across Armenia.

To understand the impact, one must first grasp the Middle Corridor’s strategic importance: this transport network connects Europe to Central Asia and beyond via the Caspian Sea, deliberately avoiding both Russian and Iranian territory. The traditional Northern Route through Russia, the primary land link for EU-Asia trade, has become increasingly problematic and unpopular since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, making alternative options essential for European and Central Asian economies seeking reliable overland trade routes.

The existing Middle Corridor currently runs from Caspian ports through Azerbaijan, then through Georgia to reach Türkiye and European markets. However, the TRIPP alters this equation by creating a new branch: a direct connection from the Caspian Sea through Armenia to Türkiye, bypassing Georgia. Beyond expanding the Middle Corridor, this route is also regionally significant because it strengthens the direct link between the region’s closest allies: Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The TRIPP should, therefore, be considered more than a bilateral peace project: it is a potential new pillar of Eurasian connectivity. This strategic value, within the wider Middle Corridor, provides Armenia, Azerbaijan, and by extension, Türkiye with incentives to ensure its functionality, which could, in turn, foster broader regional normalisation. However, one has to note that in order for the TRIPP to play a significant role in the Middle Corridor, there would have to be massive investments in its capacity and efficiency, the development of which will take both considerable time and political capital.

For Armenia, the TRIPP can be seen as the first concrete achievement within the government’s Crossroads of Peace initiative, which ambitiously aims to open up Armenia’s borders through normalisation with Türkiye and Azerbaijan and unlock Armenia’s economic potential in global connectivity. Although the TRIPP does not in itself open Armenia’s borders, it is a significant step in the right direction. In recent months, Pashinyan has already moved closer to Türkiye, and a meeting between him and Turkish President Erdogan reinforced the growing consensus that Turkish-Armenian normalisation and border opening are closer than ever, with Ankara reportedly awaiting Baku’s approval before proceeding. The Washington agreement’s emphasis on connectivity brings the prospect of a green light closer, potentially encouraging Türkiye to press Azerbaijan for progress, given the substantial economic benefits that border opening would generate for both Türkiye and Armenia within the Middle Corridor framework. In this sense, the Washington agreement could turn out to be the prelude to the broader opening of Armenia’s borders, which would be a genuine game-changer for the South Caucasus.

The picture looks less positive for Georgia. Until now, Georgia’s chief regional asset has been its role as the key link between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and by extension, between the Caspian Sea and Europe. The prospect of a functioning alternative route through Armenia undermines this position, reducing Georgia’s leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Beyond regional leverage, Georgia’s international relevance also suffers. Its role in the Middle Corridor has been one of the few remaining pillars of international significance under Georgian Dream’s increasingly isolated regime, yet this, too, is now challenged by the TRIPP. The Washington summit further underscored Georgia’s growing marginalisation: while Aliyev and Pashinyan deepened ties with Washington and, in the case of Azerbaijan, saw old sanctions lifted, Georgia’s leadership faces impending US sanctions under the Megobari Act, alongside existing personal sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili. Both in its outcomes and as an event, the Washington summit, therefore, underlined Georgia’s growing international isolation.

From Paper to Practice

Taken together, the Washington agreement’s real significance lies less in establishing peace or geopolitical shifts than in its regional impact on connectivity. By opening a legal framework for East–West transit across Armenia, it reshapes dynamics in the South Caucasus, giving Armenia its first tangible gain within the Crossroads of Peace, strengthening the Azerbaijan–Türkiye link, and reducing Georgia’s long-held leverage as the region’s key transit state.

Yet, whether this framework evolves into a functional and durable reality depends on two factors: the political will of Yerevan and Baku to follow through, and the determination of the United States to sustain its role beyond a symbolic diplomatic moment. History offers many examples of agreements that came close to peace only to be broken soon after. Without lasting commitment, the Washington agreement risks joining their ranks.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).