2026: Europe’s year of bad choices

The United States is reshaping the international order in ways Russia has long dreamed of. Washington’s recent military operation in Venezuela leaves little doubt that in today’s world, it is force—not law—that prevails. Europe, including Estonia (as part of European decisions), is facing a year of difficult choices that will test its ability to shape its own destiny. The most difficult choices will come not from the east but from the west.

Before new global leaders, who will seek to restore order and bring balance to the current chaos, emerge, major powers will be grabbing what they can. The ones with formidable military power and political will to use it—notably, the US, China, and Russia—have each set a clear course to consolidate their spheres of influence. The US, guided by its National Security Strategy, prioritises reasserting dominance in the Western Hemisphere. China has its own regional ambitions, chief among them the subjugation of Taiwan.

Russia, meanwhile, takes a degree of satisfaction in the collapse of the rules-based order that, for decades, obstructed its imperial ambitions. But it has never been international norms that held Moscow back. Rather, it has been the strength of its adversaries and the limits of its own resources. The fact that the US has demonstrated a willingness to use force brutally and unexpectedly, and has done so more skilfully than Russia, does not strengthen Moscow’s position.

Today, the Kremlin is no closer to bending Ukraine to its will than it was a few years ago, let alone dominating the rest of Europe. While Europe is not a geopolitical actor on par with the three major powers, as it is too fragmented and too dependent on US security guarantees, this dependence is being reduced. The balance of power in Europe will continue to shift to Russia’s disadvantage if only Europe can accelerate its efforts to strengthen military capabilities. Ukraine and Europe as a whole must generate sufficient force to stop Russia’s aggression, even if US support ends completely. This can be achieved if Europeans show enough political will and self-confidence.

Europe’s Growing Appetite for Re-engagement with Russia

Maintaining unity on Russia will not be easy and will likely become even harder this year. It is possible that a fragile ceasefire in Ukraine will be reached on terms that are far from ideal for Kyiv. If this happens, Europe’s security will not improve—it will become more precarious. Political forces already eyeing normalisation of relations with Moscow are likely to gain ground.

Even now, some western European commentators are expressing frustration with the Baltic states and Poland, portraying them as ‘troublemakers’ who obstruct ‘adults in the room’ from negotiating compromises with Russia. The brief moment after Russia’s full-scale invasion, when it was fashionable to declare that one should have listened to the Baltic states, has passed. Once again, dialogue with Russia is discussed in a simplistic black-and-white manner, with many western European leaders seeing it as always good and necessary. Putin is not in international isolation. The US is also talking to Russia, and cutting off dialogue has not brought peace any closer. Some, including Angela Merkel, even argue that the end of dialogue helped trigger the war.

Estonia should avoid adopting a rigid counter-position claiming any engagement with Moscow to be inherently wrong or dangerous. Such a stance will not help shape Europe’s future Russia policy. Instead, it is important to call for clarity about what Europe wants to achieve in its relations with Russia and under what conditions, and from what position it would be prepared to resume contact. Russia will remain the most serious threat to European security even after the war in Ukraine ends. Europe must not give up the leverage it currently holds to exert pressure on Russia through frozen assets and other sanctions. If the invasion of Ukraine has taught us anything, Europe should maintain a common understanding—beyond the war—that resuming dialogue (which will happen at some point) must not come at the expense of continued investment in defence capabilities or efforts to contain Russia’s military potential.

The Erosion of the Transatlantic Alliance

Returning to the United States, the true test of European unity will be the transatlantic relationship. For Estonia and other countries that rely most heavily on US security guarantees, it offers little comfort—when watching President Donald Trump’s operation in Venezuela or his threats against Greenland—that the US has used military force to defend its interests, also in the past. The post-Cold War period was indeed an exceptional era in world history in terms of the US-led international community’s attitude towards the use of force. And that period was extraordinarily favourable for Estonia, allowing us to rebuild our state and bind ourselves closely to the western world. Now, it is over.

During the Cold War, NATO weathered several crises, but there was never any doubt that the US supported the freedom and territorial integrity of its European Allies. Today, however, Trump covets Greenland, part of the territory of a loyal Allied state. There is no reason to assume that he will not continue to pursue his aim of bringing Greenland under US control in one way or another. This is obviously a very different case from Venezuela, and the US approach is different, but Europe has every reason to take Trump’s ambitions seriously. In the case of Venezuela, Europe could afford to remain a bystander, and in any case, the ousting of Nicolas Maduro from power was controversial from the perspective of European values. This does not apply to Greenland. Calls have already been heard in Europe to deploy EU forces to Greenland, but these can hardly be considered serious policy initiatives. The US is unlikely to carry out a Venezuela-style military operation in Greenland.

Yet from the perspective of European security, the Greenland issue offers only bad choices. The Venezuela experience may have reinforced a view within the Trump administration that the US neither needs Europe nor has any reason to take European positions into account. Europe has struggled so far to have an impact on Trump’s Ukraine policy. Now, it is seeking to influence US positions and prevent worst-case scenarios in Greenland. Perhaps, strengthening NATO’s presence in Greenland could help to address the US concerns—not entirely unfounded—about Greenland’s security, as well as the influence of China and Russia in the Arctic.

In any case, Europe is increasingly being forced to make difficult choices to defend its interests in situations where the positions and actions of its strongest Ally undermine European security. More and more, the question arises: when does maintaining the Alliance at any cost become more damaging than distancing oneself from it? The mere fact that the US threatens to use military force against an Ally inevitably weakens the Alliance and European security as a whole. NATO and the EU could not possibly continue to operate as before if one NATO country were to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an Ally that is also an EU member.

Out of Chaos, a New Order will Emerge

Unfortunately, in the current global environment, appeals to international law do not protect Estonia or Europe. We should not, however, stop upholding the international law or lose faith that the time will come when rules are reinstated. Unrestrained use of force by great powers does not offer sustainable solutions to anyone’s security concerns and, over time, becomes too costly and exhausting. After major upheavals and conflicts, the time will come to shape a new order. This may be more regionally based than the world divided between two superpowers after the Second World War, or the US hegemony that followed the Cold War. Whether Europe, and Estonia as part of it, will be able to influence the emerging new world order depends on the choices Europe makes in 2026.