In any election year, certain topics carry more weight in the minds of the American people and allies across the globe. Until June, it seemed that both major parties’ presidential candidates would be running as incumbents of sorts, with clear records on foreign policy and established courts of advisors. However, since Vice President Kamala Harris entered the race, new questions have emerged, and former President Donald Trump remains mercurial in his positions and commitments. On 5 November, Americans will make a decision with global impact.
The Pew Center reported that the top policy priorities for the American electorate going into the 2024 cycle are strengthening the economy (73%) and defending against terrorism (63%). Other foreign policy objectives listed range from strengthening the military (40%) to dealing with global trade (31%). Americans seem most concerned with foreign policy issues that affect them at home, with terrorism and the flow of drugs into the US ranking most important according to the Pew Center. Concern over adversarial regimes is not in the top five of Americans’ foreign policy goals, but limiting the power of Russia and China ranks sixth and seventh, with 50% and 49%, respectively. While the Pew survey suggests that foreign policy issues, particularly ones predicated on overseas engagement, are less poignant for domestic audiences, American foreign policy is crucial for partners, allies, and adversaries across the world.
Same old, same old
Trump’s first term was marked by significant foreign policy decisions ranging from America’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement to the signing of the Abraham Accords. Broader policy shifts included the Trump Administration continuing the American “Pivot to Asia” initiated during the Obama Administration and withdrawal from Afghanistan in an agreement with the Taliban. Strategically, the Trump administration proved a mixed bag regarding the level of thought and reliance on experts when making public statements and major decisions. Former President Trump faced major backlash for his statements praising the characters of autocrats like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jung Un, but also took a firmer stand against some rival powers, like China. While there are diverse plans floated as potential policies in a second Trump administration, a lone certainty is that Trump will speak his mind in public forums, regardless of the foreign policy implications.
Of particular interest is Trump’s vocal criticism of NATO financing, including statements such as “You didn’t pay? You’re delinquent?” and “No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You got to pay. You got to pay your bills.” Trump has remained firm in promoting the idea that only NATO members who contribute the required amount will receive protection from the Alliance. The strength and unity have been particularly important since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. Western resolve has kept Ukraine in the fight through the provision of weapons, training, and aid; however, many fear that as the novelty of the war runs dry, it would be increasingly palatable at home for the US to reduce support or even encourage a deal that would see Ukraine lose significant swaths of land.
China, China, China
Even before Trump selected JD Vance as his running mate, there was media reporting on Vance’s view that the US should limit its engagement abroad, including ending its support of Ukraine. In many ways, the choice indicates that Trump continues to espouse isolationism and the rejection of longstanding international organisations and agreements. Further, Trump advisors have stressed that the geopolitical threat that they would rather focus on is China. In particular, former deputy assistant defense secretary for strategy and force development Elbridge Colby said, “We want NATO to be active, but we want it to be with the Europeans in the lead… We can’t break our spear in Europe against the Russians when we know the Chinese and Russians are collaborating, and the Chinese are a more dangerous and significant threat.” Unfortunately, abandonment of Ukraine would draw into question other US agreements, as occurred when the US withdrew from Afghanistan, emboldening Putin to invade Ukraine. Ironically, it is likely China would gain the most from the US forcing a Ukrainian settlement, as it would set the geopolitical groundwork for Beijing to expand its aggression in the South China Sea.
The focus on Asia is evident in this campaign cycle. One article that received significant press coverage was former Trump National Security advisor Robert C. O’Brien’s “The Return of Peace Through Strength Making the Case for Trump’s Foreign Policy.” O’Brien wrote, “The navy should also move one of its aircraft carriers from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the Pentagon should consider deploying the entire Marine Corps to the Pacific, relieving it in particular of missions in the Middle East and North Africa.” This caused many to fret over the implicit abandoning of fronts where the US vies with Russia in the name of strengthening capabilities against China.
While O’Brien later backtracked on that particular statement, it is clear that foreign policy advisors in Trump’s orbit view China as the main threat to US interests. This is corroborated by Trump’s focus on China taking advantage of the US in trade and statements that the US must increase capabilities in the Pacific while reducing overall force, thereby suggesting that the US will move capabilities from the European front to Asia.
US policy towards China is also a focus of substantial disagreement between the Trump and Harris camps as each side attacks the other’s China policy. JD Vance criticised Harris’ VP pick, Tim Walz, saying, “We all know that Kamala Harris wanted to outsource our factories and jobs to China, but I didn’t expect her to outsource the selection of her running mate to China, too” (a reference to Walz history of teaching in China).
The Middle East
Middle East policy is perhaps more salient in 2024 than in 2020 given Hamas’ 7 October attack and the subsequent outbreak of conflict, with the Israel-Hamas War, Houthi activity in the Red Sea, and Hezbollah rocket fire from Lebanon. In the United States, this tension has turned into both campaigns jockeying for votes from demographic groups most impacted by tensions in the Middle East. Trump has tried to use the Harris campaign’s qualifications of support for Israel as a way to get approval from the Jewish community, a group that historically votes Democrat. The Trump administration made many meaningful changes to US-Israel policy, including moving the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Israel’s capital. The Trump administration also led the Abraham Accords, which built people-to-people, civil, and private collaboration and connection between Israel and the Gulf states.
The Trump administration committed significant effort to developing United States-Saudi relations, approving arms sales to the country and building a rapport with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. While it had some of its most notable successes in the Middle East, it also set the groundwork for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, which ultimately proved a tremendous failure. The juxtaposition in success rate and negotiating partners demonstrates perhaps Trump’s business and political ethos that what matters is what he stands to gain in a transaction rather than the outside ramifications.
The Trump Style
The main accomplishments, real and ceremonial, of the Trump administration largely revolved around developing personal relationships with foreign leaders. In anticipation of a potential second term, it is important to understand Trump’s style of handling foreign affairs, along with his anticipated regional priorities.
The value of interpersonal relationships for Trump was highlighted by David Graham’s The Atlantic article in November of 2017 titled “For Trump, the Interpersonal is Political.” Graham details how Trump’s conversations with foreign leaders often focused on “the personal” rather than “the language of international diplomacy.” An observation that is particularly relevant for understanding Trump’s attitude towards foreign relations is the notion that he seeks friends in foreign leaders and appears easily distracted by the approval and praise of others, even if he was previously critical of the leader and their state’s policy.
Mark Rutte, NATO’s new Secretary General, evidently learned from Trump’s first term and has worked to build a relationship with him. According to Trump’s ambassador to the Netherlands, Pete Hoekstra, Rutte gently countered Trump, embedding humour in his resistance to Trump’s assertions about the US and the Netherlands’ trade deficit. This friendly banter is alleged to have created a collegiality, which Rutte could use in his new role as Secretary General to encourage continued support of NATO, especially given the boost in funding that NATO has received from European members consistent with the 2% spending target.
Who are All the President’s Foreign Policy Men?
In a Foreign Policy article which looked at the most influential foreign policy experts in Trump’s orbit, Eldrige Colby, cited above, was described as “a once and possible future Trump administration defense official, [who] is the loudest and perhaps most cogent voice in Washington advocating a complete shift away from Europe, NATO, and Russia and toward the growing challenge from China.”
The article further details how Colby’s theory of the United States’ role in international affairs is reminiscent of US grand strategy during WWII that focused almost exclusively on the European theatre. Colby’s promotion within the Trump circles from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to a more senior role, like National Security Adviser, would signal a significant shift in US attention, likely to the benefit of allies in Asia and sacrificing the integrity of allied interests in Europe. Robert O’Brien, mentioned earlier, is similarly expected to have a prominent national security role, should Trump win a second term. Like Colby, O’Brien supports a foreign policy agenda primarily focused on combating China.
Another key member of the Trump camp who is a likely candidate for a role in a potential second term is Mike Pompeo. Pompeo served as first CIA director and then as Secretary of State during Trump’s first term. Unlike other members of Trump’s inner circle, Pompeo has been a staunch supporter of Ukraine, advocating for arming Ukraine and having visited Kyiv in April.
In July, Pompeo co-wrote a Wall Street Journal article titled “A Trump Peace Plan for Ukraine,” where he claimed that Trump would strengthen European defence, with major policies like a $500 billion “lend-lease” programme for Ukraine and lifting restrictions on the types of weapons that Ukraine can purchase. Pompeo also specifically notes that a policy to improve European security is increasing NATO member countries’ annual contributions to 3% of GDP.
Pompeo also speaks about strong security policy in Europe as being connected with strong policy elsewhere, viewing deterrence against Russia and China as linked and the importance of rebuilding alliances with Israel and Saudi Arabia for the more direct goal of combatting Iran, but also to build up Saudi Arabia as an alternative to Russian oil. Pompeo’s views on European security diverge from other members of Trump’s inner circle, but he brings a perspective that perceives conflicts and adversaries as interconnected rather than distinct geographic issues, meaning that there is a level of overlap in Pompeo’s policy perspective with the more commonly held beliefs in Trump’s camp. Pompeo was also a key architect in setting Trump’s firm stance against China, demonstrating a level of uniformity among potential advisors in the tone for policy in the Indo-Pacific.
One potential advisor who pushes the bounds of convention, even for a Trump appointee, is Richard Grenell, who held an assortment of appointee positions in Trump’s first term. Grenell has indicated to others within the Trump orbit that he has been promised the office of Secretary of State should Trump win, but others in that circle have pushed back on this claim. Further, Grenell has a reputation for loose ethical standards beyond what many consider permissible, even among Trump appointees. After Trump selected Grenell to temporarily serve as the acting director of national intelligence, in 2020, Senate Democrats were so concerned that they issued a request to the Department of Justice to investigate Grenell for violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. They alleged that Grenell did not disclose working in the US on behalf of foreign governments, specifically for Hungary and a Moldovan oligarch. Grenell’s promotion within the Trump camp through a prominent official role would likely indicate a Trump administration willing to further politicise foreign policy decisions and a conscious decision to ignore potential conflicts of interest of appointees.
With the 2024 US election just days away, the global community must brace for potential shifts in American foreign policy, particularly under a second Trump presidency. Trump’s willingness to make significant policy changes—often with little regard for traditional diplomatic norms—could lead to a change in the United States’ role on the world stage. His focus on personal relationships with foreign leaders and unique perspective on foreign policy issues poses both risks and opportunities, should he return to the White House. Ultimately, the direction of US foreign policy will hinge both on Trump’s personal decisions but also on the dynamics and viewpoints of those within his inner circle. The outcome of this election may redefine not just America’s foreign policy, but the future of the liberal international order.