Vassal States

It is widely accepted in Russia that Estonia always was and will be dependent on others: if it is not Russia’s ‘vassal,’ it has to be an underling of some other state.

Different ‘languages’ can be used to explain the situation surrounding the statue of the Bronze Soldier. For example, Mikhail Lotman interpreted the events via the ‘language’ of semiotics, analysing inter alia the issue ‘why exactly is Russia doing this?’¹ I will consider the same question in this article, but through the prism of international law.
Equality between states vs. vassal states
International law has two histories: one is official, the other unofficial. The official history chronicles the equality of all states.² Since the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, official international law in Europe has been governed by the principle of the sovereign equality of states. Once a state’s sovereignty was recognised, it was considered legally equal to others, whatever its size (big/small) or state religion (Catholicism/Protestantism). Later on in the 19th century even its form of government (monarchism/republic) did not make any difference.
Though formally accepted, the principle of equality has not always been adhered to in realpolitik, as we know. The legal equality of states had to be constantly asserted. While most states have not officially disputed this principle, statesmen are constantly pondering such concepts as great powers and small states, hegemonic control and spheres of influence, vassal states and security guarantees. Yet, in times of turmoil, a few prominent researchers of international law have promoted the view that international law should have more regard for the normative force of facts (die normative Kraft des Faktischen in German) and the legal inequality of states.³
While admitting that the principle of the equality of states has in fact been persistently undermined, we cannot automatically conclude that international law with its equality principle has played an insignificant role in the construction of reality. A dominant position allows its holder to ignore not only international, but also national law. For example, the Estonian government and parliament, who constitutionally exercise ‘real’ power, have not always and with befitting speed endorsed the appeals of the Chancellor of Justice, who represents more ‘symbolic’ power, to end violations of the constitution. Moreover, reading the news, one sometimes cannot but feel that the city of Tallinn is legally an island where national legislation and the constitution apply only in theory. Furthermore, when party to legal proceedings under private law based on the principle that all persons governed by private law are treated equally in the courts, a wealthier person still has an advantage in asserting his or her rights.
Clash of two normativities
A clash of two normative worldviews gave rise to the events connected with the Bronze Soldier. On the one side there is Estonia, which naturally supports the principle of the equality of states under international law and dismisses all questions about size. Hence Estonia demands that the other side – Russia – recognise the illegality of the 1940 occupation and annexation under international law. I have thoroughly analysed the international legal status of and requirements concerning the Baltic countries and treated them in a wider international and theoretical context in my book Illegal Annexation and State Continuity: The Case of the Incorporation of the Baltic States by the USSR. A Study of the Tension Between Normativity and Power in International Law, the Estonian and Russian versions of which are publicly accessible on the Internet.⁴
But what are Russian normative views about the Republic of Estonia? For the time being, Russia has not dared to explicitly express its views, as they would not fit into the current framework of official international law, in particular the principle of sovereign equality of states set out in Article 2 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations. However, history and even some recent statements provide useful clues when interpreting Russia’s normative views about Estonia.
As Russian state history is a history of ‘land collection’ or the unification of smaller states and territories under Moscow’s rule, Russia is critical of the possibility that its smaller neighbours could actually be sovereign and independent. Russia invariably tends to treat its neighbours as dependent states: they are subjects either of Russia or of some great Western power which is probably hostile to Russia.
During those periods in history when Estonia did not form a part of Russia, Russia wanted to levy a tribute on Estonia, which it considers its vassal. It is mentioned in The Chronicle of Balthasar Russow that at the beginning of the Livonian War (1558-1583) the Russian delegation claimed that larger cities in Estonia had been founded by Russians or had paid tribute to Russians ‘in ancient times.’⁵ It may be assumed that the first written treatise on international law by a Russian author was written by Peter Shafirov, a Russian statesman and confidant of Peter I, and was published in 1717 during the Great Northern War (1700-1721).⁶ The main argument stated in Shafirov’s book is that Russia had a right to wage war against Sweden because Estonian and Livonian cities had previously paid tribute to Russia and were in effect its vassals.
At the same time, Russians believe that Estonia and Livonia were treated quite liberally under Russian rule. The territories were not completely suppressed and were to a certain extent autonomous, i.e. the government system retained its vassal characteristics. We should not forget the special status of the Baltic region which was granted by Peter I and favoured the Baltic German nobility. Even after the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union, these three soviet socialist republics were still ‘special,’ as the central government did not root out all Westernism from the Baltic region. We should also bear in mind that according to the Soviet constitution the soviet republics were ‘sovereign states’ – this was the official legal position. In the eyes of Moscow, there was a point in printing the equivalent term for ‘rouble’ in the national language of every soviet republic on its banknotes. Now we may laugh at such matters, but they revealed the normative views of the central government, or at least the government’s efforts to create a certain impression.
Coming back to the present, we can quote President Putin and his famous ‘I drank a lot of beer at university’answer given to journalist Astrid Kannel: ‘Now, the issue of occupation. As far as I now, Russia and Germany made a deal under the Peace Treaty of Brest in 1918. In effect, Russia turned over some of its territories to Germany. The foundation of Estonia’s independence was laid at that time. However, Russia and Germany concluded a new agreement in 1939 and Germany returned them to us. These territories joined the Soviet Union in 1939 (sic – L. M.). It is pointless to discuss whether this was good or bad: such was history. I think that it was an agreement concluded at the expense of small states and nations. Regrettably, such were the realities of life, like Europe’s colonial past and slavery in the USA. What are we supposed to do now – let the dead have a hold on us and stop progress?’⁷
According to President Putin’s version of history, Estonia’s role in international relations was that of an object, not a subject. Estonia gained independence on account of a German-Russian deal, not as a result of Estonia’s actions, i.e. the War of Independence (which Putin did not bother to mention). Similarly, independence was taken from Estonia. Adhering to the moral code of international law, Putin pro forma condemned ‘the unjust treatment of small states,’ but in fact his views were based on ‘the realities of life.’
The issue of whether one state accepts another as its equal is of a highly subjective nature and depends on their bilateral relations. If one state does not recognise the other as an equal partner, the ‘unequal’ state is inevitably affected by such an attitude. That is why Estonians have to capture the essence of Russia’s normative worldview. It is widely accepted in Russia that Estonia always was and will be dependent on others: if it is not Russia’s ‘vassal,’ it has to be an underling of some other state. According to the Russian historical narrative, Estonia was the vassal of Germany in the 1930s and now it is controlled by the USA.
The actions of Russia during the crisis of the Bronze Soldier should be interpreted in this context: Estonia’s behaviour confounded Russia’s normative expectations. Estonia had acted in a way that Russia considers unacceptable for its former constituent parts or vassals – Estonia displayed self-determination (partially with regard to the West) and defied the Bronze Soldier as a symbol of Russia’s victory. The storm clouds had already been gathering: the Estonian and Lithuanian presidents had declined an invitation to join the celebrations commemorating the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War which were held in Moscow in 2005, while the Latvian president had abused the kind invitation and declared in Moscow that the 1944 liberation was not liberating at all. Moreover, the Estonian parliament had supplemented the 2005 Estonian-Russian border treaties with an explanatory statement that reiterated the mantra consistently repeated during the border negotiations by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the Tartu Peace Treaty as such (excl. the borderline) has never been rendered legally null and void. The aforementioned conflict of normativities leads us logically to the events connected with the Bronze Soldier. The opposing parties have been involved in predominantly symbolic and semiotic disputes, but from the legal point of view the most important aspect is the fact that Estonia has acted as an independent state, which holds its history and values in high esteem, and not as a vassal state.
What should Estonia do?
As we come into contact with Russian normative views, it is important for the future of the state of Estonia that we find an answer to the question historically popular in Russia: ‘What should we do?’ Can Estonia transform the Russian attitude according to which Estonia, a small state, has to be someone’s vassal?
The one major thing Estonia could do is not to act as a vassal state. While people in Estonia cannot forget the painful year of 1940, when Estonia was annexed and occupied by the Soviet Union, breaking earlier agreements and promises made during negotiations, the Russian side remembers the year 1939 when the Mutual Assistance Pact was concluded and Estonia was forced into the role of a vassal state. Obviously, Russia feels tempted to check whether this could be done again. The Estonian state and elite must take a stand here and firmly oppose all such attempts. Estonia has learned its lesson from the mistake of 1939 and will in future resist the lure of analogous opportunities offered by Russia. However, our friends in the West should also follow the advice not to act as a vassal; we do not have to support all the initiatives of the USA. Indeed, we have not always done that, for example when we quietly objected to the imperial views of the USA on the International Criminal Court and the European Union backed us.
Secondly, Estonia must point out that a normative worldview involving vassal states is anachronistic as such. It is not only that the UN Charter – the foundation of current international law – defines the principle of the legal equality of states and does not accept the existence of vassal states, but also that the interpretation ‘small state = impotent, weak, dependent’ is simply out of place in our contemporary world and against the background of modern socio-political theory. A strong state takes care of its citizens as much as possible – it maximises their welfare, security and, at the same time, their freedom. A weak state cannot bridge the significant gap between the rich and the poor and does not respect individual freedom. What is the use of armies, natural resources and a glorious past, if, for example, human development indicators are at dangerously low levels?
Thirdly, it is not helpful just to condemn Russia – Estonia should also promote understanding in Russia. Estonia’s relationship with Russia can be positively transformed only if Estonia (with its Western allies) manages to persuade Russia that Estonia (the West) is not inherently hostile towards Russia and that Estonia is not going to be anyone’s vassal in future. Science and education, in particular, offer ample opportunities for leading a constructive dialogue with Russia, generating new ideas and reaching a higher level of understanding. Thus, it is essential for the very survival of the Republic of Estonia that we increase our efforts to conduct high-quality and interdisciplinary research connected with Russia.
Among other things, we should learn to adopt a wider historical and legal perspective for tackling our problems. Our ever-repeated argument that Russia intimidates Estonia is not particularly impressive. The world is interested in wider implications and analogies, i.e. what is the point of what we are saying? It would definitely bring benefit to the Estonian cause if a comparative analysis of similar historical cases were undertaken, thereby emphasising that smaller states have forced larger ones to disregard their normative logic involving the concept of vassals. For example, the Korean Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910) was in a tributary relationship with the Chinese empire and the king of Korea had to perform a special ‘submission’ ceremony every year; and Norway, in personal union with Sweden was, as late as in 1904, bullied to retain its status as a vassal state.
History is full of examples of states which gain independence for a few decades or half a century and disappear or are taken over thereafter. Yet practically all small states in the world, from Switzerland and Finland to – why not – Korea and Singapore, have suffered growing pains and come into contact with hegemonic normative logic opposed to their views. The beginning has been hard for every small state, but time and success – a state’s ability to cope – are on their side and defy hegemonic logic. The future might hold new challenges for our statehood, but if we overcome them effectively, one day Russia will regard Estonia’s independence as amicably as it does, for example, Finland’s sovereignty.
______
¹ Mikhail Lotman, ‘Võimusemiootika eesti ja vene kultuuris,’ Postimees, May 19, 2007; ‘Miks Venemaa seda teeb,’ Postimees, June 2, 2007.
² See e.g. Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000.
³ See e.g. Vladimir Grabar, professor of international law at Yuryev (Tartu) University, Начало равенства государств в современном международном праве, Yuryev: E. Mattisen, 1911 (1914 in French). Internationally renowned works on similar legal issues: Heinrich Triepel, Hegemonie – Ein Buch von führenden Staaten, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1938; Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte – Ein Beitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991 (originally published in 1940).
⁴ See Lauri Mälksoo, Nõukogude anneksioon ja riigi järjepidevus: Eesti, Läti ja Leedu staatus rahvusvahelises õiguses 1940. a—1991. a ja pärast 1991. a, Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2005; Советская аннексия и государственный континуитет: международно-правовой статус Эстонии, Латвии и Литвы в 1940–1991 гг. и после 1991 г. On the Internet: http://www.iuridicum. ee/index.php?page=36.
⁵ On the arguments related to international law in connection with the Livonian War, see Ants Piip, Rahvusvahelise õiguse süsteem, Tartu: Loodus, 1927.
⁶ See Peter Shafirov, A Discourse Concerning the Just Causes of the War Between Sweden and Russia: 1700-1721, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1973. See also Pärtel Piirimäe, ‘Russia, the Turks and Europe: Legitimations of War and the Formation of European Identity in the Early Modern Period,’ Journal of Early Modern History, 2007, Vol. 11, pp. 63-86.
⁷ SL Õhtuleht, May 12, 2005.