Typhon – An Effective Step Towards European Long-Range Strike?

Germany has expressed an interest in procuring the Typhon missile system from the US. This would break a three-decade-long absence of long-range strike systems from Europe's armies, with implications for European security and transatlantic relations.

The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty prohibited both the US and the Soviet Union from fielding ground-launched missiles with ranges of 500 to 5 500 km. By 1990, systems such as the Soviet RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20) and US Pershing II and BGM-109G Gryphon had been decommissioned, as had (although not included in the INF Treaty) Germany’s Pershing Ia missiles. Russia, however, later deployed and tested new missile systems that the US ruled to be a violation of the INF Treaty, leading to its abandonment by President Trump in 2019.

Today, Russia possesses a broad arsenal of cruise and ballistic missiles, which it has used extensively in its aggression against Ukraine. In addition, it has deployed S-400 Triumf long-range surface-to-air missile systems and K-300P Bastion-P supersonic anti-ship missiles along its border and in the Kaliningrad exclave. These weapon systems can hold NATO assets at risk over several hundred kilometres, giving Russia the ability to hinder NATO forces from accessing areas along the eastern flank.

Responding to the Threat

Europe’s deteriorating security environment has led NATO Allies to acknowledge the importance of long-range conventional weapons in establishing a credible defence and deterrence posture against Russia. While countries including France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK have agreed to develop systems under the European Long Range Strike Approach (ELSA), at present, only the US possesses long-range standoff systems that can be launched from land. It will be at least 7-10 years before Europeans can field home-grown solutions.

To address this precarious situation, the US and Germany agreed in July 2024 that the Americans would, by 2026, temporarily deploy to Germany a Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), comprising a Mid-Range Capability (MRC) battery and a Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) battery, as well as other units for air defence, intelligence, and electronic warfare. The MRC battery will be based on the Typhon system, which employs Tomahawk cruise missiles (with at least 2 000 km range) and SM-6 multi-mission missiles. Each battery consists of four launchers that can collectively fire up to 16 Tomahawks and SM-6s simultaneously.

The potentially more significant deployment of the LRHW Battery, including Dark Eagle missiles, has largely been overlooked in the public debate. From late 2025, the US Army intends to equip its MDTFs with four Dark Eagle launchers, each designed to accommodate two missiles. With an officially disclosed range of 2 775 km and a hypersonic glide vehicle capable of manoeuvring at speeds of at least Mach 17, Dark Eagle is exceptionally difficult to intercept. Neither Tomahawk, SM-6, nor Dark Eagle has a nuclear warhead option.

Burden-Shifting or Burden-Sharing?

President Trump has advocated a reduced US role in European security. Furthermore, as MDTFs are specifically designed to contain China in the western Pacific along the first island chain, they are an important part of America’s military strategy in this now prioritised region. It is thus possible that a US MDTF, which was in any case intended as an interim solution until European forces could field their own standoff capabilities, will not deploy to Germany after all.

Europe’s deteriorating security environment has led NATO Allies to acknowledge the importance of long-range conventional weapons in credible defence and deterrence posture against Russia.

In these circumstances, German-operated Typhons (Defence Minister Boris Pistorius signalled Germany’s interest in acquiring the Typhon system when he first met his US counterpart, Pete Hegseth, in July 2025) would then serve as a substitute for, rather than a complement to, US assets. A robust US-German burden-sharing collaboration would be replaced by a burden shift toward Germany. While no decision appears to have been taken yet, Pistorius and Hegseth have agreed to coordinate closely on this issue, and on possible reductions of US troop levels in Germany more broadly.

German Typhons, however, would only be a partial replacement for a US MDTF, which includes complementary strike capabilities such as cruise missiles, and the LRHW and HIMARS, providing hypersonic and ballistic missile options.

The effectiveness of cruise missiles in modern conflict, especially high-end versions like the Tomahawk, is uncertain. Data from Ukraine suggests that the general performance of (Russian) cruise missiles has been rather grim, falling significantly short of that of ballistic missiles: sources estimate neutralisation rates of cruise missiles to be well above 60%, sometimes as high as 80%, while faster ballistic missiles have neutralisation rates around or below 25%. Continuous efforts aimed at improving the Tomahawk’s survivability have not prevented the US and other nations from looking into more cost-effective alternatives, such as mini cruise missiles and platforms like Rapid Dragon, designed for saturation attacks.

But Russia’s combined use of ballistic and cruise missiles alongside kamikaze drones has demonstrated how such systems can mutually reinforce one another against an opponent’s air defences. If the Bundeswehr is to attempt to replace a US MDTF deployment, a similar combination of systems would seem to be necessary. A single German Typhon system, or even a group of them, would be less potent, especially as the SM-6, used by the Typhon as a ballistic missile for engaging surface targets, has limited range (about 500 km) and a comparatively small warhead more suited to anti-ship duties in the Indo-Pacific than land targets in the European theatre. Until Germany or other European powers can field a diverse arsenal of cruise and ballistic missiles, long-range drones and hypersonic weapons, the US remains essential to offset these capability gaps.

If the US honours the agreement of the previous administration, German Typhon systems would constitute a meaningful addition to NATO’s defence posture in Europe.

If the US honours the agreement of the previous administration, however, German Typhon systems operating alongside a US Army MDTF stationed in Wiesbaden would constitute a meaningful addition to NATO’s defence posture in Europe. As these assets can reach deep into Russian territory, German Typhons could provide enhanced deterrence for Europe, and especially for Allies on the eastern flank. Iskander brigades located around the Baltic states or command centres near Moscow, for example, would be vulnerable to US–German standoff capabilities.

In the longer term—perhaps within the next decade—mature ELSA projects could enable a complete burden shift to Europe. Meanwhile, Europe’s foremost task, besides advancing its own technologies, will be to ensure continued US commitment to the continent’s conventional defence posture. In this regard, Boris Pistorius’s interest in US-made strike systems could be an important step towards a new chapter of US–European burden-sharing. But it could also foreshadow a more radical US disengagement, necessitating a sudden, rather undesirable, and perhaps unachievable burden shift.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).