The EU’s Intelligence Debate: Capability First, Structures Last

Brussels’ proposal for an EU-level intelligence “cell” has created headlines but not answers.  Europe’s challenge is not the absence of an intelligence structure—it is the absence of synthesis, integration, and the trust required for member states to share meaningfully. Without fixing the analytical gaps inside INTCEN and the EU Military Staff, a new body risks becoming another node in a system that already struggles to produce coherent, actionable assessments. Intelligence power comes from trust and capability, not new signs on office doors.

The EU’s intelligence landscape rests on two existing pillars: the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) within the European External Action Service, and the Intelligence Directorate of the EU Military Staff (EUMS INT). Both are staffed by experienced professionals and supported by Member States. What they lack is genuine integration. They operate in parallel silos with separate leadership, products, and production cycles, and no authoritative mechanism for fusing their assessments.

The Structural Problem: Parallel Systems Without Synthesis

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented her proposal for an EU intelligence “cell” as a response to Europe’s vulnerability to hybrid threats—foreign interference, cyber operations, economic coercion, and disinformation campaigns that blur the line between internal and external security. These are domains where the Commission has policy responsibility but limited intelligence capacity.

The problem she is trying to address is real:  EU institutions often operate with incomplete situational awareness, especially where civilian, economic, and security domains converge. But the proposal assumes the obstacle is structural—an absence of an EU-level body—rather than functional: the lack of integration, synthesis, and authoritative analytical processes in the structures that already exist.

In other words, von der Leyen correctly identifies the symptoms, but misdiagnoses the disease.

The consequences are predictable. INTCEN remains largely a fusion hub, collating inputs that Member States choose to share without the mandate or authority to weigh them or produce consolidated judgements. EUMS INT conducts its own military analysis, also in isolation. The EU has information, but not synthesis. A new “cell” simply adds a third node to a system that has not yet solved its first-order problem.

The contrast with NATO is instructive. A decade ago, NATO faced a similar challenge—parallel civilian and military intelligence bodies delivering competing assessments. The Alliance addressed this by creating a unified Joint Intelligence and Security Division, enabling it to generate a single strategic picture. This reform proved decisive in the run-up to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. NATO intelligence provided unified strategic warning, helping Allies act with cohesion and speed. As Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg wrote, “intelligence became a foundation for unity and a catalyst for collective action.”

The EU has never taken a comparable step.

The Institutional Culture Problem: Intelligence at the Periphery

Structural fragmentation is reinforced by institutional habits. For more than a decade, INTCEN has struggled to establish itself as a central actor within the EEAS. Its assessments are respected but not consistently used to shape policy preparation, crisis response, or strategic planning. At times, senior EEAS figures have bypassed INTCEN entirely, relying on informal channels with national capitals or NATO instead.

This undermines the very logic of EU-level intelligence. Intelligence has impact only when it informs decisions—when it moves policymakers from insight to action. When Member States see the EU’s own leadership under-using its intelligence structures, it naturally reduces their willingness to share sensitive reporting. Trust weakens, and information flows tighten.

The EU has not yet developed a political culture in which intelligence is treated as an indispensable input to strategy and policymaking.  Without that habit, no new “cell” will alter Member States’ behaviour. Intelligence must be used to matter.

Sovereignty and the Kallas Principle

EU High Representative Kaja Kallas captured the central truth when she publicly rejected the Commission’s proposal:  intelligence is the core of national sovereignty. Even the most integration-minded states treat intelligence as the final domain in which they will resist pooling or delegating authority.

Crucially, Member States do not share intelligence to improve analytical elegance; they share when doing so advances national objectives, influences allied decisions, or supports their preferred policy outcomes. They accept risks to sources and methods only when the political return is clear and the decision-making environment is trusted.

Here the EU faces an inherent constraint. Unlike NATO, which focuses on military-strategic issues, the EU’s remit includes domains where political sensitivities are greatest: domestic politics, sanctions, economic competition, energy resilience, and internal cohesion. These are precisely the areas where Member States are least willing to expose intelligence that could affect internal political dynamics or economic leverage.

Selective sharing with INTCEN is therefore rational. Until the EU demonstrates that its intelligence is analytically authoritative, politically influential, and responsibly handled, Member States will continue to share sparingly—regardless of new institutional designs.

What a Real EU-Level Intelligence Capability Would Require

If the EU genuinely seeks a more credible intelligence capacity, the requirements are functional, not architectural. The most effective steps are practical, sovereignty-compatible, and achievable:

1. Integrate INTCEN and EUMS INT into a single analytical enterprise.

A unified production cycle, shared leadership, and coherent processes would move the EU from parallel reporting to consolidated assessment.

2. Build true synthesis—not just fusion.

Collation is not analysis. The EU needs analytic tradecraft, quality control, and the authority to produce integrated judgements.

3. Embed intelligence in decision-making.

Assessments must feed directly into EEAS planning, crisis-management structures, and Commission policy development. Intelligence must have a place in the policy rhythm.

4. Demonstrate credible protection of sensitive reporting.

Member States will not share more unless they trust that their contributions are protected—politically and technically—and used responsibly and purposefully.

5. Strengthen the link to NATO.

Twenty-three EU Member States are also NATO Allies, meaning they already participate daily in a mature analytical ecosystem that has demonstrated its strategic value. The EU’s challenge is not access to intelligence but the absence of pathways to integrate existing insights into EU deliberations.

None of these improvements requires constructing an “EU CIA.” They require discipline, leadership, and political commitment. In Intelligence, form must follow function—not the other way around.

Strategic Implications and Conclusion: Trust Before Architecture

Europe’s intelligence debate risks falling into a familiar trap: assuming that new institutions will deliver the capability that existing ones have never been empowered to develop. But intelligence effectiveness comes from trust, synthesis, disciplined use, and the repeated demonstration that shared reporting leads to better decisions—not from new acronyms or buildings in Brussels.

Before constructing something new, the EU must fix the system it has. A politically appealing “cell” cannot substitute for analytic depth or institutional integration. Europe does not need an “EU CIA.”

Europe needs a more capable, integrated, and credible intelligence enterprise—one built on habits of cooperation, not headlines.