Nobel Prize Brings New Attention to the Venezuelan Crisis: What is Europe’s Role?

The 2025 Nobel Peace Prize award to Venezuelan politician María Corina Machado brought new global attention to the South American country. Troubled by domestic repression and foreign conflict, Venezuela has fallen off Europe’s radar. Yet, the crisis remains profound.

Domestically, the country has been ruled by Nicolás Maduro since 2010, who ramped up the authoritarian system built by his predecessor, Hugo Chávez. Economic mismanagement and growing reliance on illicit trade have turned a once relatively prosperous state into one of the poorest in Latin America, with an estimated half of the population surviving on less than $3.65 a day (just over €3). Escaping poverty and repression, Venezuelans make up one of the largest nationalities living abroad in the world (7.9 mn), ahead of Ukrainians (7 mn) and Syrians (3.9 mn).

The Troublemaker

The paltry human rights record and the increasing reliance of Maduro on organised crime have made his regime a perceived threat across the Caribbean. In Colombia, Caracas has patronised guerrilla movements to gain leverage in its relations with Bogota. Neighbouring Guyana (with a population of 800 000) has been a target of territorial claims by Venezuela, which Maduro played in the past to overcome discontent against his regime in 2015, 2023, and 2024. Usually friendly, Brazil-Venezuela relations have been strained in recent years, featuring tariffs and border closures.

For the United States, the approach to the Venezuelan regime has been a source of debate between cautious engagement and increased pressure. With the country under sanctions for gross human rights violations since 2015, President Donald Trump even contemplated launching a regime change operation during his first term. Joe Biden briefly attempted a bargain, where holding free and fair elections would have led to an easing of sanctions. The repression wave around the 2024 elections—in which Machado was barred from running—set back this fledgling rapprochement.

Today, Trump has resumed his coercion campaign on Venezuela. Notably, on 2 September, the US military struck a small vessel which—they claim—was part of a drug-running operation in the Caribbean. According to recent reports, the strike was exemplary of Trump’s new strategy to Venezuela: to pressure the regime as part of a wider policy against drug trafficking. In 2020, Maduro was added to the State Department’s wanted list on charges of “narco-terrorism,” which theoretically made him a target for a US strike—as was the case with the Caribbean boat.

Today, the US forces deployed off Venezuela’s shores make up the largest military build-up in the area in more than three decades. According to The Wall Street Journal, Washington has deployed over ten thousand US military personnel close to Venezuela, manning advanced weaponry such as the F-35B jet fighters.

In parallel, negotiations appear to have run into a dead end. According to a report by The New York Times, for months, Maduro had been negotiating a deal with Trump to dissuade a US intervention in exchange for major concessions for American companies to access Venezuelan resources. On 6 October, Washington publicly called off the talks, with the US adopting an assertive force posture in the area. While a full US invasion of Venezuela is unlikely, many speculate that the White House is banking on intimidation to compel either an insurrection against Maduro or a coup d’état.

What Are the Stakes for Europe?

Concentrated on the Russian aggression on Ukraine and on the wars in the Middle East, Europe has not had much scope to engage with the intensifying Venezuelan crisis. Overall, both the EU and the national capitals have agreed on the urgency of a democratic transition out of the impasse in Venezuela. The EU has imposed sanctions on the Maduro regime and has facilitated various dialogue initiatives between Caracas and the opposition.

While a full US invasion of Venezuela is unlikely, many speculate that the White House is banking on intimidation to compel either an insurrection against Maduro or a coup d’état.

The more hawkish US stance might encourage some to cast the European strategy as ineffective. Indeed, the EU efforts have been stalling due to limited bandwidth and internal divisions on the means for a peaceful transition. In fact, according to ABC, Washington has reached out to its European allies to join the operation. Recent reports suggest that France has been in talks to broaden cooperation with the US on maritime patrols in the Caribbean. However, Trump’s more muscular approach has important pitfalls.

Crucially, a limited air campaign risks accomplishing none of the political objectives while empowering the hardliners inside Maduro’s regime. Moreover, the entrenched anti-interventionist tendencies among Latin American societies will not welcome any further open use of force. In that sense, the strikes inside Iran by the Israeli and US air forces may have given the wrong lessons; while its nuclear programme might be debilitated, the Islamic Republic remains in place.

Ultimately, Maduro is a survivor. Deprived of the charisma and economic prosperity of his predecessor, Maduro has relied on Machiavellian plotting and outright repression, as well as patronage from outside players such as China, Iran, and Russia. Faced with this complex landscape, Europe cannot play a leading role in the crisis. The solution will come from Venezuela itself and from its neighbours—yet Europe cannot afford to look away either.

Europe Can Make a Difference

First, Europe must build on and sustain its pressure mechanisms on the Maduro regime. As some drug cartels expand into Europe, public safety on the continent becomes intertwined with security in South America. In that sense, cooperating with the US on this threat is warranted. That said, joining a potential US strike campaign on Venezuela would be riven with dangers, potentially leading to blowback across Latin America. A well-calibrated security policy must distinguish between real needs and ambitions.

The solution will come from Venezuela itself and from its neighbours—yet Europe cannot afford to look away either.

Second, the EU must continue its support to attenuate the humanitarian crisis from the population exodus from Venezuela. Mobilising donors and dedicated attention to their plight will translate into goodwill from the countries of the region hosting significant numbers of Venezuelans. Given the amplitude of emigration, any Venezuela policy must account for this new diaspora.

Third, the ongoing crisis must give new momentum for a more ambitious European position on Venezuela. Previous challenges have demonstrated the capacity for European unity (such as in 2022) and the danger of disunity (such as in 2019). A European response must also recognise the enduring ties between Caracas and Moscow, as they enable each other to evade sanctions. Hence, any future bargains with Venezuela must address the Russian dimension, too.

Finally, the national capitals and the EU must reinforce their cooperation with Guyana. Responding to Venezuela’s threats against Guyana’s sovereignty means standing up for international law. During the 2023 and 2024 crises, the United Kingdom Royal Navy HMS Trent sent a signal of deterrence against Maduro by deploying to the Commonwealth nation. In 2025, France became the first EU country to open an embassy in Georgetown, and has since reportedly expanded defence and intelligence cooperation. More EU members should follow suit.

In this context, Estonia has an important role to play. Standing up against the bullying of larger neighbours has been a constant in Tallinn’s foreign policy. Empowering small states has led Estonia to establish productive engagements with countries around the globe, from Botswana to the Maldives. Such outreach could be extended to Guyana as well. For sustained results, triangular cooperation with British and French support can add to the scope of Estonia’s efforts.